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Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-94-049

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ALGERIA

Two Chinese Nationals Reportedly Killed

LD1508134294 Rabat Moroccan Kingdom Radio
Network in Arabic 1300 GMT 15 Aug 94

[Text] Very well-informed sources in Algeria report that two Chinese nationals were killed today in El-Harrach suburb, west of Algiers, by an armed group. This reported killing, which has not been claimed by any side, followed an armed clash between security forces and a group of armed people, at least two of whom were killed.

If the killing of the two Chinese nationals is confirmed, the number of foreigners killed in Algeria by armed groups will total 59 people within a year.

Violence Escalates; Dialogue Questioned

94AF0274C Algiers LIBERTE in French 16 Aug 94 p 3

[Article: "Terrorists Strike Again: Enough Is Enough"]

[Text] Already seriously shaken in recent months by the permanent threat hanging over them, Algerian journalists have just learned that terrorists have ratcheted up their campaign of violence another notch by resorting to kidnapping.

By late afternoon yesterday, more than 24 hours after his abduction, no news had been learned of the fate of Brahim Taouchichet. The circumstances of our colleague's kidnapping were unusual, and this gives rise to numerous questions. The first and most obvious is whether we must accept as "just one of those things" acts carried out in broad daylight, on the public streets, in downtown Algiers, and just write them off to "blind terrorism." The second question is how at all costs we can avoid becoming enured to terrorism, even if that means going out of the way to dramatize even minor acts of violence, including those not involving weapons.

We have come to the point where we find it routine and "natural" to talk about the "squatterization" of such-and-such a village or quarter where terrorists ban people from smoking or reading newspapers and threaten reprisals against citizens who disobey their injunctions to wear the "hidjab," merchants who resist their attempts at extortion, etc.

The merest rumor of such a thing should almost defy credulity, in the context of the principles—so often reiterated by the government—of respect for the constitution and individual and community liberties. The third question that must be asked—the facts demand it—is why the state, with all the logistical means at its disposal, cannot maintain an effective presence on the ground.

One segment of the political class—the RCD [Rally for Culture and Democracy], with Ettahadi at the head of the pack—has already echoed many other observers in restating the question whether the national dialogue is

really capable of bringing civil peace. The dilemma is summed up in a simple logical conundrum: Should one dialogue with those who use violence—and thus murder—to restore security? In the meantime, journalists are still prime targets for Algerian terrorists, and the abduction of one of their colleagues the day before yesterday can only increase their dismay before a situation that shows no sign of abating. It is sad but true that no Algerian today can feel secure anywhere in his own country. Such is the grave reality that forms the inescapable backdrop for any political agenda the regime may hope to pursue.

Security Situation Worsens; Regions Named

94AF0269C Algiers EL WATAN in French 15 Aug 94
p 3

[Article by Lotfi Amara: "Security Situation: Serious Deterioration"]

[Text] Without being alarmist, it must be noted that the security situation throughout the country has worsened considerably, especially in central Algeria.

In Boufarik, for example, it has been learned that terrorists have succeeded in imposing a veritable climate of terror. Sabotage is increasing, and journalists are under threat of reprisal if they attempt to gather news. Terrorized by the outlaw bands literally besieging the town, some tobacconists have even gone so far as to cut off supplies to smokers.

A mostly agricultural region, Boufarik is a cluster of villages and agricultural cooperatives. Engineers and shareholders of agricultural cooperatives were the assassins' initial targets. Since the early manifestations of the terrorist presence, things have gotten worse, and today inhabitants are at the mercy of the fundamentalist diktat. The state is conspicuous by its absence. Local authorities show little interest in countering the Islamist propaganda that bombards the citizens. The women's beauty salons are closed, and citizens' identity documents are being confiscated. According to local inhabitants, the illegal Islamist roadblocks are well on the way to becoming permanent fixtures. In a word, the region has passed almost completely under the control of these armed groups of unknown affiliation.

But the situation is even more desperate in isolated villages. The nights belong to these groups, which move around in large numbers and even go so far as to circulate openly in broad daylight. Inhabitants are intimidated into silence. The relative lull seen in the wilaya of Blida after the security sweeps is but a dim memory. In the hamlet of Chebli, inhabitants get back home and lock themselves in as early as they can, despite the dog-day heat. Terrorist raids have become so frequent that people have lost count. The road between Blida and Medea is avoided by motorists because of illegal roadblocks. Two weeks ago, an illegal roadblock was set up between two military roadblocks just 6 km away. As if encouraged by

the authorities' laxity, the terrorists no longer bother to mask their faces but circulate openly.

In Miliana, there is little reason to expect the situation to improve. Anguish has become a daily occurrence. While the chief town has been spared so far, the same cannot be said for surrounding localities. Last week, a nuptial procession passed a car filled with armed terrorists, and a member of the groom's family accidentally took pictures of the vehicle.

The blessed event almost turned into tragedy when about 30 persons armed to the teeth burst into the hall where festivities were under way and demanded the video cassette, the head of the groom, and cessation of the music. Finally, the armed band yielded to the entreaties of the bridegroom's parents and agreed to settle for some jewelry, the video camera, and the cassette.

In Kabylia, which used to have a reputation as a quiet region, sabotage is increasing at an alarming rate because the authors, cut off from their usual support base, get no cooperation from the local population. In Takhoukht, on a road connecting several large villages, an armed band was relieving all travelers of their jewelry and money and making off with the stolen vehicles. Worshippers on their way to Thursday prayers in the "zaouia" of Sidi-Belkacem were surprised by members of this band, who demanded the keys to their cars and told them to warn the populace that "the brothers will soon pay them a visit to teach them to follow the right path." According to a communique issued by the security services, two terrorists were gunned down in that locale last Thursday.

The fundamentalists have an impressive logistical network to get their message out to the people. According to an old "nadhir" and member of the CNT [National Transition Council], the fundamentalists get support from 11,000 mosques and 20,000 self-described "independent" imams. "To choke this off, the state must get the mosque network under control," he said. The Interior Ministry hopes to take the offensive by adopting very strong measures, such as a purge of suspect public-sector employees. Functionaries known for subversive activities or adherence to fundamentalism will get the boot.

Any ostentatious expression of Islamist movement symbols will be prohibited. The chaotic "moussalate" will be closed. Police units with a mandate to provide protection for places of worship will be established. An education sector that was accused of sowing the seeds of fundamentalism is concerned about these measures, since educators known for their fundamentalist activism will be cashiered.

'Forbidden' Areas: Les Eucalyptus, Sidi Moussa, Larbaa

94AF0272A Algiers LE MATIN in French 4 Aug 94 p 4

[Article by Said Bel; first paragraph is LE MATIN introduction]

[Text] Les Eucalyptus, Larbaa, Sidi Moussa. That triangle, it was announced, is off-limits to "foreigners." Liberated territories, they say. Going there means looking for trouble and you may get a bullet in your hide, so the rumor says. We went there, we talked to the locals—who are getting afraid, that is true—but we did come back with a whole skin. Was that an achievement?

Turning off the highway toward Les Eucalyptus, we first noticed a large building: burned over one month ago, what used to be considered a luxury hotel looks like a haunted castle now that it is abandoned. Barricaded behind an iron portal, it is no longer inhabited.

This almost set the tone of our visit; the final touch was provided by the spectacle of a succession of armored vehicle belonging to the ANP [People's National Army]. City tanks and trucks loaded with soldiers drove by slowly. Coming from Larbaa and Sidi Moussa, they were heading to El-Harrach. Were they coming back from an operation? Our first questions aroused the first concerns.

The line of civilian cars driving in the opposite direction overflowed on the road before stopping to allow the military column to go by. This pause enabled us to discover the "sight" offered by the walls of a town stripped of its eucalyptus: covered with pro-Islamist graffiti, the walls were adorned with many slogans. You cannot miss the message: "Djihad until the institution of the 'khalifa dawla islamiya' [Islamic State]. Death to soldiers, policemen, and all 'taghouts.' Yes, we are terrorists."

The line of civilian cars, for its part, remained stuck between these written threats and the armored vehicles that were still going by. The few pedestrians no longer paid any attention to these sights which events have made commonplace. The military column was gone, the road was free. One km farther, at a crossroads, there was another stop sign.

The place was carefully guarded—by a military roadblock of course. This is where the Algiers governorate ends. This is also where so-called serious things begin. A road sign indicated: Sidi Moussa, 7 km; Larbaa, 7 km; Algiers, 22 km (although it ends only two paces from here).

The crossroads suddenly looked like the center of the world. Which direction should we choose?

Out of curiosity, more than because we like taking risks, we chose Larbaa.

The 7 km in a straight line, on a road bordered with fields, farms, bushes and other "good hiding places," seemed endless. As if time would stop...

At the end, the car slowed down at a strong roadblock set up in front of the city police station. A police station that rather recalled barracks in times of war. The young "soldiers" were trying to look out for anything that

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moved. Larbaa is a town under siege. The few shops that remain open have their iron shutters halfway down.

Hurriedly, citizens do their shopping at the few groceries that are still open. The coffee-shop around the corner, "Mekhat Echabab," is no longer filled with a crowd of young people playing dominos. Newspapers have vanished from the newspaper stands long ago; men no longer lean against the walls to watch pretty girls go by. Smiles have been wiped off faces. And faces often look down, for fear of the other. People no longer hang out. The few people we met outside were in a rush to go back home. Talking to them was nearly impossible.

We are not exaggerating in the least: Larbaa is becoming a "ghost town," but a town that is still well guarded by day. At night, unfortunately, it is not clear what is going on. And this is precisely what gives rise to the wildest rumors. From this deserted town, we retain the image of an old blind man, holding out his hand to a charitable soul that is not about to show up.

At Sidi Moussa...

We drove from Larbaa to Sidi Moussa.

Another town, another atmosphere. Between the two, 7 km of road "decorated" with the charred remnants of cars, trucks, and busses (state-owned, of course).

Spared such acts of sabotage, private carriers prevail in the area, although customers are few. One example of a State symbol that was not spared by the flames is the concrete-slab plant located outside Sidi-Moussa.

The plant, which employed over 3,200 workers and used to be the pride of the town was reduced to ashes. Its visitors targeted the production unit and the trucks used to distribute its products.

Everything was burned. How and by whom? Mum is the word. The investigation is not completed. "The security departments alone could tell you," was the answer. Because the general director was on a visit to Algiers, we could not even get an assessment of the disaster. One thing is sure: the plant is completely inoperative. All workers have been laid off.

Unless the government makes a large budget available by September, the plant will probably remain closed. At any rate, the crisis center is planning to give early retirement to about 50 percent of the personnel.

Back to downtown Sidi Moussa where, although they stopped playing dominos in coffee-shops long ago, young people still meet and discuss what happened the night before. For over one week, between the Maghreb and El Icha prayers, home-made bombs have been detonating. They herald the arrival of terrorist groups.

At Hourouara, D'himet and other small isolated "dechras," armed men appear every night and relieve the inhabitants of their identity papers. To achieve their ends, they do not hesitate to use force. "Sometimes,"

young people we met downtown told us, "terrorists take advantage of the absence of police to operate in full daylight." The pervading climate of suspicion that prevails in Sidi Moussa prompts inhabitants to stay at home all day long. Many took advantage of the holiday period to leave town.

Because it was hard to gather more information in a town that looked normal, we finally drove away. Without having achieved much.

Security Procedures Given High Priority

94AF0268C Algiers EL WATAN in French 16 Aug 94
p 2

[Article by Lyes Abdelmalek: "Priority to Security"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The work of five committees—on security, administration, management, economy, and social affairs and development in the south—forming the basis for the work of the governors' seminar was concluded yesterday. All the proposals and recommendations made by those top civil servants are to be adopted by the central authorities to serve as guidelines in drawing up the new policy on local communities.

The report on the security situation in the governorates affected by the phenomenon of terrorism and subversion reveals a serious situation. The governors were careful to emphasize that assassinations and the destruction of production facilities are increasing at an alarming rate.

"The citizens have become the prey of terrorism to the point that a good many of them have been forced to abandon their villages, leaving behind their jobs and property," says the governor of Ain Defla, chairman of the committee. The absence of security forces in some localities has led the terrorists to regard those localities as "liberated zones" where they do as they please.

The committee also notes that some production enterprises are not participating in the effort to protect their facilities.

"Many company managers are demanding that ANP [People's National Army] units take charge of surveillance in their factories," he emphasizes.

To bring those situations of insecurity to an end as quickly as possible, the governors are calling on "the state to regain effective control by placing those isolated localities under the control of ANP units."

The governors also recommended the organization and arming of new forces such as communal police, war veterans who have shown great bravery, and citizens convinced of the need to firmly combat this destructive phenomenon.

Questions were also raised regarding the effectiveness of the current curfew. It was even proposed that the curfew be lifted.

Concerning coordination of the antiterrorist struggle in the field, the governors recommended that from now on, "there be a unified security structure at the governorate level under a general staff. That arrangement will make it possible to place all the forces engaged in the struggle under a single command capable of acting quickly and effectively."

The governors also emphasized the need to extend that arrangement to the regional and national levels. Regarding the security of production units, the heads of the local communities are demanding that those units become more involved in defending and protecting production facilities. "The firms must allocate sizable budgets to procuring the means for protecting themselves and training specialized security personnel," the speaker reported. He was also careful to state that the administration as well as the firms must unmask and neutralize individuals who infiltrate the establishment and provide the terrorists with strategic information.

"Security in the governorates also requires an improvement in social and economic conditions for the citizens," the speaker emphasized, listing all the actions and measures that might ease the burden borne by the inhabitants and thus ensure them of a normal life.

Lille Traffickers, Links to Arrested Islamists

94AF0274A *Algiers LE MATIN in French 15 Aug 94*
p 3

[Article by Amine Ould-Ali: "What We Didn't Know About FIS Networks in France"]

[Text] Much has been said—and written—about the wave of police round-ups of Algerian Islamists in France.

The number of these arrests, and the rapidity with which they were carried out, suggests there was less interest in nabbing a few important "figureheads" of Algerian fundamentalism in France than in learning more about the numerous "little fish" picked up by the police dragnet. The ones known, in police jargon, as "henchmen."

Among the fundamentalists arrested Friday in Paris were two who are worth a closer look.

Mohamed Belarbi and Lahcene Baroudi. According to the French press, which reported the story, Belarbi and Baroudi were accused following a police search of the premises of the SIRA bookstore, where they had been employed as manager and sales clerk, respectively. The police raid unearthed a large quantity of clandestine tracts and publications of the former FIS [Islamic Salvation Front].

What French journalists did not say (do they know?) is that Belarbi and Baroudi are implicated in what is called the "Boutrif affair."

For those unfamiliar with his case, Abdelhakim Boutrif, an Algerian, was arrested on 9 May, on a highway in the Lille region (northern France), in possession of a veritable arsenal of war.

In his vehicle, police found at least 29 sticks of explosives, a hundred detonators, several thousand cartridges, three large-caliber automatic pistols, a "Galil" assault rifle of Israeli manufacture, infrared binoculars, and about 20 pieces of radio communications equipment, including three scanners. Now what about the link between Boutrif, Belarbi, and Baroudi? According to French police sources, it all began on 21 April, in Germany. On that date, Rabah Kebir turned over \$60,000 to one of the overseas directors of the executive body of the dissolved FIS, who took it to France.

Less than a week later, Mohamed Belarbi took possession of the aforementioned sum and converted it into French francs.

Once the currency was exchanged, half was turned over to an unknown member of the executive body, while the other half was used to buy the arms found in Boutrif's possession.

The arsenal, destined for Mekhloufi's terrorist groups, was supposed to be delivered to the Spanish enclave of Mellila in northern Morocco, whence teams of terrorists would spirit it across Hassan II's kingdom, our sources said, citing Boutrif's confession.

About mid-May the operation was repeated, following the same procedures. But this time the money was exchanged by Lahcene Baroudi, also of the SIRA bookstore. This detail led investigators to take a closer look at this shady "bookstore." To say the least, they were not disappointed.

One can imagine their reaction on discovering that SIRA's proprietors were none other than the five...directors of the FAF (Algerian Fraternity in France), the unofficial middle-men for the ex-FIS in France!

Moussa Kraouche, Djaafar El Houari, Kamel Lettab, Ali Tounsi, and Mohamed Belarbi each own a 20-percent share of SIRA.

Also, it is interesting to note that SIRA styles itself a company in the business of "installations, renovations, and appointments!" That is to say, an enterprise that originally had nothing whatever to do with publishing or distributing books, but which—for the good of the "cause"—added the bookselling activity, at the behest of the five fundamentalist officials, to provide cover behind which to distribute fundamentalist literature with impunity.

Their interest whetted, detectives turned next to the question how the FAF directors had acquired SIRA. Here again, one might say they "struck gold," discovering that the previous owner of the "bookstore," located at 10 Rue de l'Aqueduc in Paris's 10th arrondissement, was none other than...Ahmed Simozrag, an attorney for the FIS!

Simozrag, currently under "assigned residence" at Folembay, had bought SIRA some time before, through

one of the many company "fronts" used to finance the terrorists while camouflaging the part played by "generous" Gulf donors in funneling money—the "sinews of war"—to the armed groups. In this instance, the front company was CREADIF, owned by Simozrag himself.

The involvement of Simozrag at this level no longer comes as a surprise. He is well-known as an "active militant of an organized movement that promotes violence and terrorism on French territory and in various foreign countries, not only by fund raising and financial support but also by propaganda and recruitment activities, under cover of an association of which he is president," as alleged in the 9 November order that he be expelled from French territory.

It should be added that Simozrag was known, long before that, for his close ties both with the directors of the ex-FIS and with their "patrons" in the Arab Gulf.

The head of an Islamist association called "Abaad Islamiya," Simozrag in November 1991 accepted a check for \$1 million from an ultra-wealthy Saudi, Youcef Djamil. At the time, when this fact—which proved Saudis were bankrolling the then-legal FIS—hit the Algerian press, Simozrag claimed that the check in question was intended to support the activities of the aforementioned association.

That subsequently proved to be totally false, for when French police searched his domicile on 9 November 1993, they discovered a copy of a highly compromising fax sent to his Saudi "benefactor."

In that document, Simozrag referred to "problems with 'Abaad' members who believed the money had been meant for them."

With that damning evidence, it does not take much guess work to divine the final destination of the money.

The second paragraph of the document is equally enlightening.

In it, Simozrag informs the Saudi billionaire of the "proclamation of jihad [holy war] in Algeria" and asks for financial aid for the Algerian people in their "struggle against the secular regime, supported by the West and the 'Crusaders.'"

This example alone is enough to prove foreign meddling in this drama that affects our daily lives.

Editorial

At what is a very difficult time for Algeria, a time of pessimism, desolation, and reports of tragic events throughout the country, a glimmer of hope and optimism comes to us from a country in the Gulf, where one of our very own sports teams has just brought honor to Algeria in Arab-world competition, after earlier successes in Africa.

The national men's volleyball team, like Morceli, Benkaddour, Yahiaoui, and other idols of Algerian youth, has just given fresh proof that Algeria is not all bad: quite the contrary.

The distinction it has won in Arab competition is also a success for this nation's leaders, whose efforts to improve the image of Algerian youth are beginning to bear fruit. Because late next month these same volleyball players, who have just shone in inter-Arab play, will have the even weightier task of carrying the banner for Algeria, Africa, and the Arab-Muslim Nation in world championship competition. They will be ambassadors for Algeria, and messengers of Algeria's young people, who are still very much on the scene.

Koran Verses Preached by 'Fundamentalists'

94AF0260A Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR
in French 11-20 Aug p 11

[Article: "Jihad in the Koran"]

[Text] Here are the verses of the various suras that preach holy war. It is these that the fundamentalists preach in the mosques and urge their adherents to follow to the letter. (Editor's Note: The following verses are extracted from the book *Islamisme radical* by Bruno Etienne, published by Livre de Poche. The editor notes that the translations may be open to challenge.)

Sura 9, verse 29: Fight those who believe not in Allah nor in the last day, who proscribe not what Allah and his Prophet have proscribed, and People of the Book who practice not the religion of truth, until, humbled, they shall pay tribute of their own volition.

Sura 9, verse 41: Attack ye with speed and with strength, and commit both yourselves and your worldly possessions to the way of Allah. That is your true interest, if rightly understood.

Sura 8, verse 39: Fight them until there be no more persecution [literally "doctrinal struggle"] (civil war, civil disorder), until there be no religion but Allah's. If your persecutors cease, Allah will see it.

Sura 2, verse 216: Ye are called to do battle, but ye are averse. Mayhap ye have an aversion for what is good for you and an attraction for what is bad for you. Allah knows, and ye do not know.

Sura 9, verse 111: Allah has bought of the Believers their persons and possessions against the Paradise that is reserved for them. They will fight in the service of God, they will slay and be slain. That is a certain promise, to which Allah has bound himself in the Pentateuch, the Gospel, and the Koran. And who is more faithful to his covenants than Allah! Rejoice in the covenant which ye have made with Him. That is the mighty achievement.

Sura 9, verse 123: O Believers! Fight the infidels close at hand. Let them see your sternness! And know that Allah is with those who fear him.

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Sura 3, verse 169: This above all, believe not that those slain in the service of Allah are dead. Not at all! They live. Their Lord provides for their every need.

Sura 3, verses 157, 158: If serving Allah ye are slain or die, it is a remission of sins and a divine mercy more precious than ought ye can amass; if ye die or be slain, ye will be gathered unto Allah.

Sura 8, verse 17: Ye have not slain them (your enemies). It is Allah who has slain them. When ye strike a blow, it is not ye who strike it but Allah, who in this way puts Believers to the test. Allah understands and knows all.

Sura 2, verse 217: They will ask you whether war be permitted during the holy month. Say: "War during that month is an abomination. But to turn people away from serving Allah, from believing in Allah and the Holy Mosque, and to drive the occupants¹ from that place is even more heinous in the eyes of Allah. Persecution ["doctrinal struggle"] is worse than war. If they can, they will attack you until ye have turned from your religion. Those who abjure their religion will die infidels, and their works in this world and the next are in vain. They are the damned, who shall remain eternally in Hell."

Sura 9, verse 5: Once the sacred months are elapsed, slay the infidels wheresoever ye shall find them. Make them prisoners! Besiege them! Ambush them! If they make due amends, offer prayers, and tithe, then allow them to continue on their way. Allah is kind and merciful.

Sura 8, verse 67: No prophet takes prisoners without bloodshed. Ye are seeking worldly goods, while it is Allah's wish that ye win Paradise. Allah is powerful and wise.

Sura 47, verse 35: Do not weaken, and do not ask the [text missing] when ye are the strongest and God is with you! He will not deprive you of the fruits of your labors.

Sura 8, verse 69: Avail yourselves of what is lawful and good in the [text missing] profit that ye take. Fear Allah. Allah is king and merciful.

Sura 8, verse 41: If ye believe in Allah and in what we revealed to Our Servant on the day of the separation², when the two [text missing], know ye that of all the wealth that ye earn, one-fifth belongs to Allah and the Prophet, to his neighbors, to the orphans, the poor, and pilgrims. Allah is all-powerful.

Sura 59, verse 8: Blessed are the poor outcasts driven from their country and possessions, who have sought, by the grace of God, the triumph of Allah and his Prophet, for they are sincere believers.

Footnotes

¹The Prophet and his companions.

² Between good and evil, error and the truth.

History: Origin of FIS, Financial Support

94AF0260B Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR
in French 11-20 Aug 94 pp 7-8, 10

[Interview with S. Labat, by Laurent Joffrin; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Founding Fathers

[Joffrin] How did it [i.e., the FIS, or Islamic Salvation Front] start?

[Labat] At the beginning, in the 1960's, there was a handful of hardliners who denounced the occidental, socialistic, apostate character of the regime. Their founding father was Cheikh Ahmed Sahnoun, who even today is consulted by the FIS militants and sometimes approached by military leaders trying to initiate a dialogue with the Islamists. There was also Abdelatif Soltani, who heaped public scorn on [Algeria's] agrarian reform and declared that anyone who said prayers on nationalized ground would be violating the laws of Islam. He also tried to demonstrate that Algerian socialism was a modern reincarnation of Mazdaism (a religion with revolutionary and social connotations, which flourished in Persia toward the end of the 5th century A.D. and was exterminated by the Muslims in the 10th century). These dissident ulamas were put under surveillance, frequently arrested and later released. They were a very small minority, but it was they who educated a whole generation of Islamist leaders, such as Ali Bel Hadj. One should note also the influence of the volunteer aid workers from the Middle East, who in furtherance of the regime's Arabization policy were brought in to offset the presence of the French volunteer aid workers, but who were all trained in Islamic universities in Syria and Egypt and influenced by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood.

[Joffrin] Did foreign influence play an important role in the creation of the FIS?

[Labat] No. I mention the aid workers only in passing. One must understand that Algerian Islamism is sui generis. In the Muslim world, Algeria often sees itself as an island. Its history is unique. Its brand of nationalism is virulent. It would be a waste of time to search for some sort of "Islamic International" secretly pulling the strings. There are ties, financial for example. But the policy of the FIS is decided entirely in Algeria, by means of very complicated processes. No one is orchestrating it from abroad.

[Joffrin] You have talked about the founding fathers. What happened next?

Elitism

[Labat] The movement itself was born in the universities—and paradoxically enough, among French speakers. At the time, in the mid-1970's, the regime's needed the

support of communist militants, members of the Party of the Socialist Vanguard (PAGS). Reacting against this influence, an intellectual close to the ulemas, Malek Bennabi, established in Algiers a sort of "dead poets society," a small group of students who met each week, with some meetings held in French and others in Arabic. It was called the "central university group." It was a rather modern Islamism, rather elitist, that is to say it was led by people educated at university who wore Western clothes and wanted to take charge of their country's development. They were promoting an alternative vision of modernization that was both economically efficient and in conformity with traditional teachings. Some of their ideological descendants can be found today in the FIS, in its "djaz'ara" or "Algerianist" current, the so-called technicians and managers.

[Joffrin] That is not the only current in the FIS...

[Labat] No. There is a second, more proletarian current. The Islamist students established themselves in poor neighborhoods on the periphery of the large cities. There, they began proselytizing through social action—a very effective tactic that greatly benefited from the endemic economic crisis. They built mosques as opportunities arose and took charge of the daily lives of the most impoverished by organizing all sorts of social projects. It was a clandestine, arduous group effort, and it found fertile soil.

Public Enemy

[Joffrin] Where did it get its financing?

[Labat] Principally from wealthy entrepreneurs and notables, some out of conviction, others to hedge their bets. But at the same time, impressed by what had happened in Afghanistan, splinter groups of more violent propensities arose all over Algeria—very sporadic, very isolated, but also very active. They began by attacking the sale of [alcoholic] beverages and women who wore clothing of which they disapproved. They practiced what was called "the hunting down of evil and the commandment of good." In 1982 they banded together, and thus was born the first Armed Islamic Movement, the ancestor of today's MIA, under the leadership of Mustapha Bouyali, a Kabyle and former freedom fighter in the war for independence. It was he who formed the first Islamist guerrilla force. His men operated in and around Algiers in intermittent fashion (11 deaths in all between 1982 and 1987). At the same time, he set up training sites and built up stockpiles of weapons. Bouyali became "public enemy number one." He was betrayed in 1987 and brought down by machine-gun fire in an ambush staged by security forces. The repression had become more systematic in the meantime, with the regime lashing out at all Islamists.

[Joffrin] Did that radicalize them?

[Labat] No, just the opposite. The Islamists reconsidered their tactics. The "technician" current of which I spoke

earlier enjoined more peaceful tactics, on the model of trade-union agitation. Two unequal factions struggled for influence within the Islamic movement, which was already very scattered: a legalist current, and a violent current. The legalists prevailed.

Regime Errs

[Joffrin] How did the regime react?

[Labat] In my view, it blundered. Anyone who looked like an Islamist was persecuted, imprisoned. Attitudes in the entire [Islamist] community quickly crystallized. The prisons served as a crucible in the forging of a militant identity.

[Joffrin] But the regime relaxed the pressure starting in 1988...

[Labat] Yes. After the big uprisings of late 1988, the FLN [National Liberation Front party] tried to reach out. Islamists were not behind all the agitation in the streets. But they knew how to exploit it. At the first signs of liberalization, in February 1988, they created the FIS, a front uniting diverse currents, as its name indicates. There were two currents at that time, in addition to the armed groups: the advocates of more or less traditional education, and a vanguard of young people with more modern ideas, the "technicians" in Madani's orbit. It was the latter who prevailed in 1991 and imposed their legalist tactics. They also persuaded the still embryonic armed movement to hold off until elections. When the FIS won the elections, the tactics of the "modernists" were seen to have paid off.

But between the first and second round, the army declared a state of siege and suspended the electoral process. All at once, the "legalists" lost legitimacy. Partisans of armed struggle gained the upper hand, and their numbers quickly swelled.

False Dialogue

[Joffrin] Today it's the strategy of armed struggle that guides the FIS. Do you believe there still exists a "moderate" current within the movement with whom dialogue would be possible?

[Labat] The distinction between "moderates" and "extremists" does not make much sense. As I said, there are two main poles, one that embraces armed struggle, composed of activists who dream of a pure, uncompromising Islamic state, without really understanding what that might mean; and a more "technical-managerial" current, politically more astute, more cognizant of domestic and international constraints, but which needs to reassert control of the armed struggle. To my mind, dialogue with the people in this second current is possible. But there remains the risk of a dialogue controlled exclusively by the army—with the military brass and the most hard-line Islamists implicitly in collusion. At all events, military victory is not in the cards for either side. The only solution is a resumption of public discussion

involving all the country's political currents, to prevent Algeria from sliding into civil war and chaos.

Sunnis and Shiites

First of all, it is a question of numbers. Some 88 percent of the world's Muslims are Sunnis; Shiites account for just 12 percent. The Algerians are Sunnis. Due to their superior numbers, the Sunnis (followers of the Sunna, or tradition) consider themselves the upholders of Islamic orthodoxy. Theologically, this supremacy is not really justified.

It was less than 30 years after the death of Mahomet (632 A.D.) that the Muslims began warring among themselves. One faction of the faithful held that the Prophet's rightful successor was Ali, his cousin and son-in-law. Ali led his troops into battle against the other claimant, the caliph Ommeyade, but was assassinated in 661. His followers took the name "sect of Ali," or "Shiites." Ali's tomb, located in the town of Najaf, in Iran [as published], has been an influential holy site for Shiite believers for 1,300 years. Unlike the Sunnis, who think Muslims owe obedience to established secular authority so long as it does not attack Koranic law, Shiites add "loyalty to the imam" to the traditional "five pillars" of the Islamic faith. The imam, who understands the hidden side of the Koranic revelation, is a spiritual leader who is always a direct descendant of Ali. Shiites practice worship of martyrs, which gives their ritual an assertively sectarian, intolerant bent. None of which alters the fact that a goodly number of Sunnis also profess a very virulent fundamentalism.

In Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, Imamist Shiites await the return of the 12th imam, who departed in 873, and until he returns they believe it is the ayatollahs, like Khomeyni, who are the designated interpreters of his secret will. Ismaili Shiites—members of an esoteric sect that recognizes only the first seven imams—are mostly divided between the Druze and Alawites, who are found in Syria and Lebanon.

Imam Saker at Folembay: FIS Tracts Recovered

94AF0271A *Algiers LE MATIN* in French 7 Aug 94 p 2

[Unattributed article: "The Algerian Imam Placed Under Forced Residence Was Transporting Tracts Calling For Armed Struggle in France"]

[Text] The Algerian imam who was placed under forced residence on Saturday, in northeastern France, with 16 other people having close ties to the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], was arrested last Monday on the highway, while transporting tracts calling for armed struggle in France, we learned Saturday from an official source in Privas (Ardeche, Southeast France).

Omar Saker, 39, born in Algiers, was imam in the Ardeche department.

According to the Ardeche prefecture, he was questioned by the police last Monday during a highway identity check, and the police found in his trunk tracts "originating probably from the Islamic Salvation Front" (the fundamentalist FIS).

The tracts, "written in French and in Arabic, called for armed struggle in France and were most likely destined to fundamentalist circles," the same source also indicated, adding that Omar Saker was released after the identity check.

On Wednesday, Omar Saker's wife also filed charges against the imam at the Annonay (Ardeche) police station, for "aggravated assault resulting in a temporary two-day work disability," the same source added.

Imam Omar Saker was the 17th individual to be placed under forced residence in Folembay.

This roundup of Islamist militants came after the attack that killed five Frenchmen Wednesday in Algiers, for which the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the hardline branch of the Algerian Islamic movement, claimed responsibility.

The French minister of interior, Charles Pasqua, announced Friday evening that the 16 Islamic militants gathered in Folembay on Thursday and Friday were "all under a deportation order."

We do not know whether Imam Saker is also the subject of a deportation order.

Former FIS Attorney Simozrag Held in Folembay

94AF0268A *Algiers EL WATAN* in French 16 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by Lotfi Amara: "Islamism in France: Paris Keeps up the Pressure"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Excerpts] Ignoring threats by the AIS [Islamic Salvation Army], France is continuing its clean-up operation in Islamic circles. Following through with that logic, the French minister of defense likens national Islamism to Nazism. [passage omitted]

"There will be other Folembays [detainee camps] if necessary," Charles Pasqua reiterated. Since the police operations began, 23,000 individuals have been investigated, and two new Islamists have been sent to Folembay, where 23 Islamists under house arrest are already being held. Those operations necessitated the mobilization of over 500 police officers. [passage omitted]

According to our fellow newspaper LE MATIN, French police traced the "Ahmed Simozrag" network back to its leaders after arresting Abdelhakim Boutrif last 9 May on a freeway in the vicinity of Lille. He had an arsenal of weapons in his possession.

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In his vehicle police found 29 sticks of explosives, about 100 detonators, several thousand cartridges, three heavy-caliber automatic pistols, an Israeli-made assault gun, infrared binoculars, and about 20 communication devices, including three scanners. A similar operation was carried out around the middle of May. A disturbing circumstance was that both arms smugglers worked in the same bookstore, known as SIRA [Company for Installations, Renovation, and Improvements]. Being onto a good thing, the police carried their investigation further and discovered that the owners of the bookstore were the five leaders of the Algerian Brotherhood in France (FAF). Also according to LE MATIN, SIRA has no connection with books but included them in its activities in order to disseminate fundamentalist literature with complete impunity. Continuing their investigation, police discovered that the former owner was Ahmed Simozrag, an attorney for the former FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] who is currently under house arrest in Folembay. He had bought the bookstore through Creadif [expansion not given], a dummy company.

French police describe Simozrag as "an active militant in an organized movement advocating violence and terrorism in French territory and various foreign states, both through actions to collect funds and financial support and through propaganda and undercover recruitment for an association he heads ([known in Arabic as] Abaad Islamiya). Simozrag was known for his role as an intermediary between the leaders of the dissolved party and the emirs on the Gulf. He received a check for \$1 million from a Saudi named Youcef Djamil in November 1991. When his home was searched, police discovered a fax that had been sent to the donor informing him of the proclamation of a jihad [holy war] in Algeria and asking him for financial help.

Supporters Visit Imam Larbi Kechat at Folembay
94AF0269B Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Aug 94 p 4

[Article by Herve Morin: "Moroccan National at Folembay"]

[Excerpt] Folembay (Aisne)—[Passage omitted] Larbi Kechat, imam of the Ad-Da'wa mosque on Rue Tangier in Paris (19th arrondissement), has received support from Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Mosque of Paris and president of the National Coordination of Muslims in France, which Mr. Kechat has not commented on. He also received a visit on Thursday from Ahmed Miske, his assistant at the Rue Tangier mosque, and from Father Michel Lelong, longtime secretary for Islamic relations (SRI) at the Catholic Episcopate Secretariat. Ahmed Miske issued an appeal for "calm and serenity."

The arrival on Thursday the 18th of a Moroccan national did little to reassure the Algerian assignees at Folembay. The Moroccan, whose identity was not disclosed, but who—according to the prefecture of Vaucluse—has pastoral duties at a mosque in Avignon, was arrested that

morning on the way to work, said Mr. [Djaffar] El Houari [the spokesman for the Folembay assignees], who added he doesn't know "what he's doing here." To this question, as to all the others, the Interior Ministry has only one response: "No comment."

Folembay Detainees; Magri Hospitalized

94AF0268B Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Aug 94 p 8

[Article: "One Detainee Hospitalized Because of Hunger Strike"]

[Text] Said Magri, one of the 26 individuals under house arrest at the barracks in Folembay (Aisne), was admitted to the hospital center in Chauny near Laon on Tuesday 23 August following a hunger strike that began on 13 August. The 28-year-old Algerian national, who was working as a bartender in Lille, arrived at Folembay on 10 August, and he denies any connection with the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). In a separate development, Bishop Gaillot of Evreux has given his "full support and his sympathy" to Larbi Kechat, imam of the Ad'dawa Mosque in Paris, who has also been ordered placed under house arrest at Folembay (Nord), where he was scheduled to arrive on Wednesday 24 August, as a sign of "solidarity." Moreover, the Ministry of Interior has been served a summons accusing it of "assault and battery" against another individual under house arrest, Mohamed Benkaled, by the latter's attorney, Falah Djemai, who took the matter to the judge in chambers at the Laon District Court on Monday 22 August on the grounds that his client had been arbitrarily deprived of his freedom. The hearing is scheduled for 8 September.

Description of Operation Against Hattab Group

94AF0264A Algiers LIBERTE in French 26 May 94 p 2

[Article by Z. Aliou-Salah: "What Happened in Benzerga"—first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction]

[Text] Our reporters relate the operation against the Hattab group. The entire sector was sealed off. The combing operation could start. It was a large-scale operation requiring an impressive human and material potential.

Tuesday, 0530

The combined forces of the Republican Army "Haras El Djemhouri" and the National Gendarmerie were deployed all around the locality called Douar Benziene, in Benzerga. The entire sector was sealed off. The combing operation could start. It was a large-scale operation requiring an impressive human and material potential.

Several armored vehicles and "over 150" troops. The objective was to disable a dangerous terrorist group, which included Hattab Zoheir and his brother Hassan, as

well as Benani Achour, "a great emir." The presence of the group was reported and, this time again, the combined forces acted on a tip.

Each house, each block was thoroughly searched.

0600

Members of the combined forces arrived in front of a house under construction. They were greeted by an individual in blue police field dress: "We are searching this house," he called out to them. Three gendarmes went inside "to help them," and there they saw four other men, also in police field dress and with police coverings.

The gendarmes realized the subterfuge, but the surprise effect acted in favor of those who proved to be terrorists. The "fake policemen" fired at the gendarmes first.

Alerted by the shooting, the members of the combined forces who had remained outside immediately surrounded the house where, as was learned later on, there were also civilians.

Taking advantage of the confusion that prevailed inside, three children managed to escape. They told members of the security forces that their parents and their younger sister were inside. Negotiations with the terrorists were then started to obtain the release of the hostages. "You are surrounded. You have no chance of escaping. Surrender and release the hostages," the officer heading the operation asked them. "No," the terrorists answered. After several summons, the officer ordered his troops to storm the house.

0730

The operation to free the hostages began with heavy fire from both sides. First explosion: directly hit by a "shell" fired from an armored vehicle, the parpen wall surrounding the house collapsed.

Members of the combined forces surrounded the premises. The fire kept getting heavier. Tear gases spread throughout the house. Cautiously, the commandos advanced.

They managed to get inside. Both sides kept firing. While attempting to free the hostages, one member of the security forces was torn by a grenade launched by a terrorist. Not in the least discouraged by that cruel loss, the commandos redoubled their efforts to save the prisoners. The noose was tightening around the terrorists.

The members of the combined forces advanced one room at a time, driving back Hattab and his friends. Caught off guard, the man guarding the hostages was killed. The hostages were free at last.

They were unharmed except for the house owner's wife who was slightly wounded in the leg. After this spectacular rescue operation, the liberators were overwhelmed with joy.

The hostages, still in a state of shock, were soon reassured. Thus, they realized they were free. The woman burst into tears. Immediately afterward, they were taken away in an ambulance.

Meanwhile, the engagement with the rest of the group, entrenched in another room, was getting even fiercer. Five armored vehicles fired at the house in succession. The walls collapsed. The security forces gave no respite to the terrorists. Another explosion. Smoke got into every room. Hattab and his group fired back from the adjacent house under construction.

Smaller shells fired from the armored vehicles bombarded the terrorists' refuge. Built as double partitions, the walls withstood the RPG [expansion not given] fire.

Around 1100

Army helicopters flew over the location, launching grenades on the armed group hideout.

1230

General offensive. The riposte became weaker. Other terrorists were killed.

1400

The entire group was wiped out. The clearing of the premises began. It ended at 1800. Immediately, the officer in charge of the operation affixed seals on the premises.

Yesterday, the combined forces were still on location, performing a meticulous search.

1630

The dynamiter group arrived. By walkie-talkie, an officer reported to his superior. The latter answered: "Take all precautions. Evacuate everybody. Pay attention to the adjacent houses. They must not be hit." "Okay," the officer answered. The dynamiter group started working. To protect the adjacent houses, 3 kg of TNT were set up.

1710

First explosion. One half of the house collapsed. A second attempt was required. "Boom," more walls fell.

The officer reported to his superior: "The house is not entirely demolished. They can't use a greater charge because of the adjacent houses." "All right, come back," the superior ordered.

This operation made it possible to recover three Kalashnikovs, and two automatic pistols belonging to policemen Ouchene Nacer, assassinated last Monday at Dergana, and Arrous Djelloul, killed on 23 May at the "Chergui" coffee shop of Bordj El-Bahri, plus one sawed-off hunting rifle. According to our information, the group killed consisted of Hattab Zoheir, Hattab Hassan,

Benani Achour, Khaled Echaoui, and Ahriz Mounir also known as Bibi. The body of the latter was not positively identified yet.

[Box, p 2]

The Security Forces' Communique

Five terrorists were located in a house and killed by the police on Tuesday, around 0700, during a search operation carried out in the locality of Herraga, district of Benzerga (Boumerdes governorate).

Two of the terrorists were identified as Hattab Zoheir and Hattab Hassan, both the sons of a harki [North African soldier who sided with the French]; they were wanted for several assassinations, including those of Kasdi Merbah, former prime minister and president of the MAJD [Algerian Movement for Justice and Development], and his associates and that of Mustapha Abada, former general director of ENTV, and for attacking a gendarmerie patrol at Benzerga, in February 1994.

The operation resulted in the recovery of six Kalashnikov submachine guns and one Berretta-brand automatic pistol, which were identified as having been stolen during attacks against policemen, and one hunting rifle.

Four policemen were seriously wounded during this operation.

In addition, the police are still actively looking for terrorist Hattab Abdelkader, also known as "Mouloud" (a cousin of the Hattab brothers).

AIS 'Responsible' for Taouchichet Kidnapping

94AF0268D Algiers EL WATAN in French 15 Aug 94
p 1

[Article by Y.B.: "Terrorism: Editor of HOROSCOPE Magazine Kidnapped"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] **Brahim Taouchichet, editor of the magazine HOROSCOPE, was kidnapped in front of the press center yesterday. This is a serious event for the entire profession, which is the constant target of harsh attacks by the terrorists.**

Less than an hour after the kidnapping, the newspaper offices received a fax from the "Oath Company" of the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). Signed by Hocine Abdellatif, it claimed responsibility for the journalist's kidnapping.

The communique, written on the Islamic Salvation Front's letterhead, emphasized that the operation was carried out by members of the "Oath" section who had disguised themselves as police officers for the occasion. A completely new feature of the work by the armed

groups was the statement that the kidnapped journalist would be "tried" before a decision was reached concerning his case.

At the press center, which bears the name of another journalist who died for a democratic Algeria—Tahar Djaout—emotion could be seen on everyone's face. They were all wondering whether they should really believe what had just happened.

Brahim was kidnapped only a few meters from the main entrance to the press center. A woman standing on the balcony of her apartment at the time of the kidnapping said she saw an armed man pointing his pistol at the victim's head. She shouted to attract the attention of passers-by and of police officers guarding the press center, but was unable to make herself heard.

Other individuals present at the scene of the operation alerted the police officers in question to suspicious movements by the occupants of the vehicle (a black Volkswagen van), but without saying for certain that a kidnapping was under way.

For his part, a colleague from ALGER REPUBLICAIN could clearly distinguish the haste of the vehicle's escorts, especially one who made a very athletic dive into the van as it shot off at high speed.

Unlike the assassinations of journalists for which the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) has claimed responsibility, the kidnapping of Brahim Taouchichet is claimed to be the work of the Islamic Salvation Front's "Oath" company. At any rate, this is the second time that a statement of this kind has been signed by Hocine Abdellatif, who previously sent the press agencies a communique threatening France with reprisals for placing Algerian Islamists under house arrest at the Folembay Barracks.

Tally of Schools Burned by AIS, GIA Reported

94AF0271B Algiers EL WATAN in French
21 Aug 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Youcef Mehdi: "Terrorism: 400 Schools Burned"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Whereas all nations on earth make considerable efforts to promote science and knowledge, the AIS [Islamic Salvation Army] and the GIA [Armed Islamic Group] are engaged in a competition of a new type. The outbidding tactics of the two terrorist organizations aim to destroy the Algerian school system.

Several arson attempts, ascribed to the AIS, were perpetrated yesterday in Algiers, against two schools in Beau-Fraisier, one in Birkhadem, and another one in Belcourt.

As for the GIA, according to a communique published in the newspaper EL HAYAT, it uttered threats earlier this month against "any student or teacher who would continue to attend Algeria's schools and universities."

Is it necessary to recall the black weekend of December 1993? The APS reported, in fact, that on the last Thursday and Friday of that month, terrorists caused considerable damage to school buildings in several regions of the country.

Two high schools, five middle schools, and two elementary schools were targeted by arsonists. In Blida, one middle school and two primary schools in the farming village of Benhamadi, and two middle schools at Sidi Medjber and El Medjia, were partially destroyed by arson on Friday, that day of prayer and contemplation for Muslims.

Part of the Ain Fakroun high school (Oum el-Bouaghi governorate), the middle school of El Hramlia (Oum el-Bouaghi), and the laboratory of the "Essalam" high school in Chetia (Chlef) were completely destroyed by criminal arson toward the end of December 1993.

For his part, the minister of national education, Amar Sakhri, indicated last Wednesday that "over 400 schools have been burned by terrorist groups."

The minister made this statement at a meeting with the National Federation of Students' Parents; he added that "the construction of new schools is considerably behind schedule. We thus lack room for over 75,000 students." Four hundred schools burned. The loss is huge. The earthquakes of October 1980 and 1989, and that of last Thursday near Mascara, did not cause as much damage.

The minister, who certainly knows how things stand, could have been less sparing with his information. The people must know what those who do these things in the name of Islam are capable of.

In these 400 schools, how many classrooms were destroyed? How many Algerian children have been deprived of a place in school by those who promise them the moon with the institution of the Islamic Republic? These classrooms contained teaching equipment (tables, blackboards, closets, plus maps, books, etc.).

What is the estimated amount of the losses thus incurred? How long will it take before these resources are again made available to the students?

Do not forget also the tens of assassinations that have targeted the teachers community, including school principals. Even the foreigners who had come to our country to help educate children and adolescents were not spared by the Islamists' murderous folly.

Is it necessary to recall that illiteracy is already wreaking havoc upon the Algerian population, with 7.5 million who can neither read nor write? Or are we to take seriously those who claim that the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] wants to rule a nation of illiterates? What else could explain such hatred for school and those who teach?

Outside schools, attacks target all those who teach or impart knowledge. Father Verges, 64, of French origin, a

Christian and a Marist, devoted a great part of his life, in the most complete anonymity, to help the children of the needy in the Casbah.

Past retirement age, he managed a library-working room where students who do not have enough room at home came to do their homework and study their lessons. He was not spared the fundamentalists' condemnation and was killed together with a nun, Sister P.H. Saint-Raymond, 69, an Assumptionist, who had been in Algeria for 10 years.

The University also experienced damage.

The laboratory of one of the Blida university institutions was damaged, microcomputers were vandalized, and electronic tables were covered with tar.

GIA Statement on Striking French Interests Reported

NC1208075994 Paris AFP in English 0712 GMT 12 Aug 94

[Text] Beirut, Aug 12 (AFP)—A hardline Algerian Islamic group on Friday threatened to attack French interests in Algeria unless Paris agreed to a list of demands, including the evacuation of all French nationals from its former colony.

The Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which claimed responsibility for the assassination of five Frenchmen in Algiers on August 3, issued the threat in a statement issued to the Arabic daily AL-HAYAH, which is edited in London and published here.

The GIA said it would "strike at French interests with force" in Algeria unless the French government met six demands.

These included the evacuation of all French citizens from Algeria and an end to French government support for the Algerian government.

The latest threat came as France continued a security crackdown following Islamic fundamentalist threats of terrorist attacks.

Citizens Arrest 2 Escapees From Tazoult

94AF0272B Algiers LE MATIN in French 7 Aug 94 p 2

[Article signed S.T.: "Tizi-Ouzou: Two Tazoult Prisoners Arrested by Citizens; the People's Counterattack Goes on"]

[Text] Last Thursday around 2000, two prisoners who had escaped from Tazoult were arrested by citizens at Azib Ahmed, a village of the Tizi-Ouzou community, we learned from a reliable source. "It was past 2000 when the two men arrived at the village. Because of the late hour and because they were so dirty, we decided to question them," a young man from the village stated,

adding: "Since they had no identity papers, we decided to arrest them, tie them with a rope and take them to the gendarmerie brigade."

Around 2200, the two men were turned in to the gendarmerie. Until then, no one in the village knew that they were two dangerous terrorists wanted by the security forces since last June, when they had escaped from Tazoult.

Questioning by the gendarmerie disclosed the identity of the two men: prisoners who had taken part in the spectacular escape from Tazoult. One of them had been sentenced to life, the other to 10 years without parole, we also learned.

For some time, acts of courage, heroism, and resistance in the struggle against fundamentalist barbarity have been getting more numerous. Local people are actually getting involved in the struggle against terrorism.

At Tizi-Ouzou, it was the third time the people counter-attacked in less than one week. The kickoff, we should recall, was given on 31 July by the villagers of Igoudjal. A large group of terrorists, over 30 men who had come to steal the villagers' hunting rifles, were engaged by the people of Igoudjal. The leader was killed and three other terrorists seriously wounded.

Last Friday, when six men attempted to rob merchants at the Oued-Aissi car market, a few kilometers from the governorate seat, citizens fought back.

Two men were killed and the other four managed to flee.

These antiterrorist acts are appreciated in the region. Moreover, citizens who used to be afraid to react are increasingly determined to defend themselves and fight terrorism.

Several villages, we learned, have formed resistance and self-defense committees. Others go one step further in organizing themselves; for instance, last Thursday at Azeffoun, all the villages in the district gathered and decided to coordinate their efforts and form a standing vigilance committee.

Armed Groups Retaliate Against Policeman's Family

94AF0268E Algiers EL WATAN in French 16 Aug 94
pp 1, 3

[Article by Abia Cherif: "Journey in Horror: Torture of Young Cherif"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] It is often said that words are inadequate for describing the savagery with which the terrorists commit their hideous crimes. This time there are simply no words with which to describe the crime that has just been perpetrated against an 18-year-old adolescent. His only mistake was that he refused to murder his brother—a policeman—as the Islamists wanted him to.

Abderrahmane had been recruited into the police force "only a few months ago," he told us. He signed on despite all the advice received from his friends and especially his family, who regarded the job as a suicide operation.

"I could very well have kept on working as a store clerk, but I heard that men who wanted to join the security services would be welcome. You could say that I wanted to be useful to Algeria," he told us.

After a few months, family pressure on him began to mount. Several of his fellow officers had already been killed in the line of duty, and his relatives could no longer bear the constant expectation that "bad news would be announced to them." But nothing helped: Abderrahmane was determined to continue.

He feared only one thing: reprisals against his family. There were plenty of examples around him. And serious threats were beginning to weigh on him. Anonymous telephone calls would wake him in the middle of the night. At first the callers would ask him to resign, but eventually they condemned him.

The first threatening letter arrived a few days later: "You will die a heathen," it said. Two more messages saying the same thing followed about two weeks apart, but for Abderrahmane, giving up was out of the question. He said: "That would mean giving ground to those barbarians."

But his fear of reprisals against his family grew stronger and stronger. Parents, siblings, and children of police officers, gendarmes, and members of other security services had already died after being mutilated and horribly tortured.

Abderrahmane had a brother that he was particularly fond of. That brother was Cherif and he had just turned 18 years old.

Unfortunately, he was the one that the terrorists chose to carry out their reprisals. "He who was so fond of scents and nice things," Abderrahmane sighed.

But those who are trying to bring Algeria to its knees offered him only the acrid odor of gunpowder as his last scent in this life that he loved so much.

Cherif was kidnapped the first time by a group of armed individuals who first asked him to steal his brother's weapon and then used threats to force him to paint graffiti favorable to armed Islamic groups on walls in the El-Madania neighborhood.

The worst soon followed. The terrorists again appeared at young Cherif's home and this time asked him to murder his older brother Abderrahmane and bring them the latter's weapon.

One morning they confronted him again and threatened to murder him in place of his brother if he did not do as they said. But it did not work: Cherif refused to give in to blackmail.

At around 1900, three armed individuals again confronted him, surrounded him, and forced him to follow them. Terrified, he could only obey.

Cherif was taken to an unknown destination where the terrorists tortured him for hours on end. They sharply dislocated first his shoulder and then his leg and then beat him before slashing his face with a razor.

Unfortunately for poor Cherif, the torture was not yet over. Those unspeakable individuals first beat him with a shotgun and then riddled his stomach with bullets.

His body was shaken with death throes when a bullet under his chin shattered his brain. Once again, words fail one.

At around 2300, young Cherif's blood-covered body was dumped in front of his family's home. With courage and absolute dignity, Abderrahmane, his brother the policeman, picked him up and placed him gently in his mother's arms.

His mother, who is still in constant mourning for her little Cherif, is in constant mourning for Algeria.

Promotion of Military Officers Discussed

94AF0260C Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
12 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by M. Benmohamed: "Defenders of the Republic: Graduation of the First Class of Air Defense Staff Officers"]

[Excerpts] Cadet Tahar B. of Guelma, missile specialist.

Cadet Said A. of Tizi-Ouzou, radar specialist.

Cadet Adar O. of Adrar, communications specialist.

There are dozens of them. All trained in Algeria.

The first Algerian staff officer class, the first Algerian year-group: pure products of independent Algeria, marching past, impeccable in their brightly colored uniforms, their sharply outlined faces overcome by emotion when the "Djazairouna" is played. [passage omitted]

The ANP [Peoples National Army] stands as the last bastion against regression to the Dark Ages or descent into total fratricidal war: the last remaining bulwark, against which the assaults of enemies and adversaries are broken, their malign schemes thwarted; the shield of the nation, impervious to venomous disparagement, calumny, or slander. It shall not fail. This conviction, this inescapable impression, inspired all who saw these young men in khaki, these "djounoud" from the Advanced School for Air Defense of the territory of Reghaia, which yesterday celebrated the graduation of the first staff officers' class, the 11th officer training class, and the 16th active-duty cadet class constituting the 1994 year-group, which was named in honor of "Sadouki Ahmed."

But who is Sadouki Ahmed? Rather, who was he? A child of the people. Born in El Attaf, in a douar. His father, a day-laborer, the son of a "khammes," was also once a mujahidin. Ahmed joined the ANP at age 20 and became a top-rated electronics technician. He took training courses and was promoted to captain in two years. He lived neither in the palace nor in a country cottage.

In a populous low-income neighborhood, in one of those housing developments where there is no greenery, in one of those apartment blocks where they assassinate intellectuals, policemen, djounoud, officers, and even ordinary citizens who have not used their military decorations, power, or influence, to feather their nests or fatten their bank accounts, Ahmed loved trees, plants, greenery. Normal for a country boy. And it was there, in the countryside, that he was assassinated.

His family was present yesterday for the ceremony. Dignified and proud. "Chahid," it was said of him. His name is enshrined on the decorations and the certificates of merit presented to top-ranking members of the graduating class. His name will be remembered even in Palestine, for a class of Palestinians, completing a course in air defense, will soon be returning to the autonomous territories.

Ahmed has returned to the earth from whence he came, and other Ahmeds have taken his place. The same oath is repeated by a new generation: "I swear by Allah the Great to serve the fatherland..." Repeated in unison, before stands filled with military onlookers. Marching in double time, in columns, or in squared formation, keeping time to "My brothers will not forget your martyrdom..."

General Laouadi, commander of territorial air defense forces, was on hand to witness the event. November lives in these members of the July graduating class.

Other Graduations

General Fodil Saidi, commander of the 4th Military Region, presided recently at graduation ceremonies at the Special Forces Training Camp at Biskra and the Antiaircraft Defense Training Camp at Laghouat, on Independence Day.

In Biskra, Gen. Saidi presided at graduation ceremonies for a new class of officers and NCOs in the special forces, according to a source close to the 4th Military Region. The ceremonies were also witnessed by wilaya authorities.

In Laghouat, accompanied by authorities of the wilayas of Laghouat, Ghardaia, and Djelfa, the 4th Military Region commander presided at the graduation of a class of active-duty officers and NCOs. Their year-group was named in honor of Lieutenant Colonel Selimi Brahim, son of a "chahid" and himself a chahid in his country's armed forces, who was slain in a terrorist attack.

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Description of Daily Life in Casbah

94AF0261A Algiers LIBERTE in French 20 Jul 94 p 4

[Article by Nassim Kouba: "Casbah of the 'Berani'"]

[Text] Like the other old quarters of Algiers, the celebrated Casbah is dying, of indifference...

It's very hot: early afternoon, in the month of July. A procession of vehicles suddenly blocks the Bencheneb road in Upper Casbah, opposite the little "El Minzah Ettahlibiya" community hall, and the air echoes with the din of car horns and "derboukas." In the background, you can just make out the sound of "youyous." The bride is arriving. An amateur photographer is trying to immortalize the happy event. Up on the balconies, the most "curious" of the young women of the quarter jostle each other for a glimpse. "They're probably waiting for their own turn," one youth quips. Inside the hall, a sweet, smooth feminine voice intones "Houni kanou," a popular Algiers song full of charm and sensitivity. The ambiance is electric. It could not be otherwise. Today is a day of celebration! It looks like the Casbah has recaptured the gaiety of yesteryear.

But that is only an illusion. A hasty judgment, because joy is all too transient now in the old city. The Casbah, this shrine to the armed struggle, bastion of the Revolution, which has given birth to martyrs of the likes of Omar, Rahal Boualem, Hassiba Ben Bouali...has dramatically metamorphosed, over the last two years, into an arena of organized crime.

Randon Street, Amara Ali, divides the city in two: Upper and Lower Casbah. Shops "packed" with black-market merchandise are teeming with shoppers searching for a "good bargain." Deluxe brands and shoes are on display: Nike, Lapidus, Reebok, Pierre Cardin....

There's something here for every taste. But you have to be a discerning shopper, for the market is flooded with "Taiwan" products. Despite all this, and the impossibly high prices, young people are determined to stay in style, keep up "the look." A trendy dress sells for more than 35,000 Algerian dinars, and people are buying. It's Algeria's perennial paradox. Money is flowing freely, to the great joy of the merchants. Not far off is the "dlala" of Djamaa "Lihoud." Another place of "business."

The place is aswam with peripatetic vendors. Every inch of space is taken up. People here must stay constantly on their guard, for thefts and muggings have long been a daily occurrence.

In addition to the latest in fashions and electronic products, one sees radio-alarm clocks, cameras, compact disc players...you'd think you were in Hong Kong. "From time to time the police swoop down, haul everyone in, and confiscate all the merchandise," says N.R., 26, who graduated two years ago from law school and is now unemployed.

His situation is not that unusual. Unemployment hovers at 60 percent in the Citadel. For almost a year now, he has occupied a small space here where he sells knick-knacks: blades, batteries, lighters, etc. "It's more than enough to keep food on the table," he says.

Officials on the communal executive delegation [DEC] are considering the possibility in the near future of relocating all these vendors to Port Said Square. It will be a permanent market place. "That way we can manage and control the business activity that's going on illegally today. These young people will then be reintegrated into legal commerce channels."

But in the Casbah, the number one problem is still housing. A family of eight to 10 people typically shares a one-room apartment. B., 18 years old, lives on Bachara Brothers Street. He changes his clothes in a gutted stairwell.

He has no choice. He shares a single room with his father, mother, and six sisters, all older than he. It's summertime. The curfew and the stifling heat don't make things any easier.

"Many cases of incest have been reported, the police will confirm it," says one communal executive official.

"There's nothing left to lose, nothing to gain," say young people in the Casbah.

In 1985, for the first time since independence, the Old City "blew up," rejecting social injustice and protesting the slum clearance project that was to go along with a resettlement program.

Many families, about 2,000, were relocated to Eucalyptus, Baraki, Theni, Boudouaou, and Bainem, and some have returned. After getting new lodgings, they came back to reoccupy their old quarters.

Outsiders have moved into some of these shells—abandoned houses, with no water or electricity. "We can't expel them, if only for humanitarian reasons." Some housing developments are occupied by families that lost their homes in natural disasters. Since 1992, 22 families have been residing in a primary school at 21 Ourida Meddad Boulevard, while five other families have been living in tents at Placette Hohamed Azzouzi. "We cohabit with rats, but no one cares what happens to us. Where is the state?" asks a haggard-faced 15-year-old boy. He shows us dozens of letters of complaint that have gone unanswered. Like all the other residents of the Placette, he lives a hand-to-mouth existence.

Other disaster victims have turned up at DEC headquarters: Eighteen families live in the Music Conservatory. They have been there since 1992, when their lodgings at 2 Said Chebah Street (Lower Casbah) collapsed. Rym and Assia, two little urchins, have lived here since their infancy: The employees, taking pity on them, let them wander freely about in the offices.

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In an effort to alleviate the chronic misery of the people, commune leaders plan to build a prefabricated transit center, to be set up at Beni Messous, on a 2-hectare plot. Later, a second, bigger project will involve construction of 2,500 housing units at Mahelma. The state agency AADL [expansion not given] is administering this project.

Since 1962 and the departure of the "proprietors" from their old residences to neighborhoods like Bab El-Oued, Telemly, St. Eugene, etc. the Casbah has become the "drop point" for "new arrivals." Genuine natives of the city are on their way to becoming a minority. The rural exodus has turned it into a dormitory town.

According to the most recent census, taken in 1989, 66,000 souls are living here, packed in the most inhuman, degrading conditions. This veritable tidal wave will sweep away most of the values and traditions of the Old Algiers. "People came here to force us into a new social mold, one based on hatred and contempt." Within the Casbah, the sad, begrimed walls bear the imprint of the now-dissolved FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]: Antiregime graffiti is everywhere. On Rabah Ryah Street, the sickening stench is enough to bowl you over. Houses everywhere in the Casbah are in a state of decrepitude: It's a miracle they are still standing, even with the help of rafters installed to provide extra support for the old masonry structures. The Casbah is a blighted area, and one that seems far removed from the capital city. In a state of advanced decay, it provides fertile ground for the armed groups.

A little girl with a crepe-paper bauble in her hand plays happily under the supports: She has no idea the danger she's in: "Another earthquake as severe as the one we had on 29 October 1989, and it will be a catastrophe." A little over a month ago, a building collapsed on Bab El-Oued Street, in Lower Casbah.

The security situation continues to be worrisome. Although there have been fewer assassinations since the month of Ramadan, when almost every day saw the death of at least one civilian or policeman, the cease-fire being observed by the armed groups is precarious. From end to end, the old city is pocked with forbidden zones.

Visitors are advised to steer clear of certain streets and cul-de-sacs. Armed groups have set up permanent "refuges" there, and it's not wise to disturb them. A., a 50-year-old man living in the Bab El-Oued quarter, no longer dares frequent his old "houma" on Marengo Street: "I miss the Casbah enormously, but I don't want to run the risk, because for them I am a 'Berani,' an easy target." R., a young white-collar worker in a state-owned enterprise, can't understand it: "I have no political leanings. I have no problem with the state or with the armed people. Nobody could have anything against me, yet I live in fear." After work, he locks himself up in his house. Television and a satellite dish are his only consolation. Here the curfew begins at 2000. The streets are unlit and deserted. Nobody leaves his "sqifa." "Young

people sit on their doorstep and talk. The more courageous of them stay out until 2200." So the summer nights are long and tedious. Most of the adolescents are into a new type of drug: ferouna. Nobody feels safe. People live in a climate of suspicion.

News and rumor travel very fast. "You don't have to do anything at all to be accused of collaboration with the 'houkouma' or complicity with the terrorists."

On Bachara Brother Street, a group of children are playing soccer on the razed site of an old building. Attila has just scored... The intensity of their play leads us to stay there a few minutes: "It's our very own World Cup." Nearby, hammer and nails in hand, a young boy ignores us. He is trying to build a "vehicle" out of an old plank and some castoff roller bearings. "It's not just a way to escape the harshness of everyday life": He will take his makeshift "car" with him to look for a bottle of butane gas.

Small girls—who have already been turned into "women" by the miseries of life here—often have a hard time lugging their jerry-cans of water. "The water only runs three or four hours a day."

Sometimes, only late at night.

Members of the family must take turns going for water. Leaning against a wall still decorated with FIS campaign posters for the December 1991 legislative elections, a group of teenagers talk about the World Cup match they saw the previous night on TV.

Up towards Sidi Abderrahmane, a group of oldsters beg for alms. They're hoping for "waada." The doors are closed, for construction.

The legendary patron saint of the city seems to have absconded from the Old Quarter. Their saint, who succeeded in saving this place from all the other evils and dangers it has faced over the centuries, has perhaps opted for exile... Poor Casbah!

Mascara: Problems of Daily Life 'Unbearable'

94AF0265A Algiers LE MATIN in French
8 Aug 94 p 11

[Article by S. M. Manseur: "Mascara, Between Facts and Figures: The Suffering Just Goes On and On!"—first paragraph is LE MATIN introduction]

[Text] There are problems, at governorate as well as at region or community level. They are no longer taboo; actually, they co-exist with the people. Housing, unemployment, crime, and insecurity have their word to say in that governorate. Rural and city people experience these tragedies daily.

Because there are no infrastructure projects and no proper industrial zone, the definitive elimination of SNTF [National Railway Transport Company] and Air

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Algeria routes has considerably weakened any prospects for a more or less decent life.

As for the governorate committee in charge of creating jobs (microbusinesses) for the young, it is ready to start working, they say.

According to official sources, however, the companies, whose doors are half open, no longer manage to provide for their workers' needs, either materially, or morally, or even administratively. That is the contradiction of a society perfectly attuned to inequality and injustice.

Apparently, when the news came that its [soccer] club had made the "first" national league, Mascara did not alter its humdrum daily routine. The few young people in town let off steam in its narrow alleyways. After that, however, life became dull again, although tradition would have called for a jubilant crowd to fill the streets.

Exactly, What Is Going On?

If one excepts the 30 or so coffee shops that remain the only animated meeting places for the population and the unemployed, Mascara offers the sight of a town with more chaff than wheat. Besides, the unemployed, whose fate remains one of the most uncertain in the country, plagued as it is by social injustice and "hogra" [scorn, contempt], obviously leave even the most optimistic in the country at a loss. In that governorate, culture has become the art of getting something to eat, for those who fish in troubled waters; culture is going to the dogs for lack of art. To compound the mess, there is not even a Community Arts Center nor any similar facilities pertaining to this vital and promising field. At the governorate seat, hotels are absolutely non-existent.

There is one swimming pool, which has been housing the victims of a disaster for quite a long time, and another one, almost abandoned, in what used to be a public park, now partially abandoned too.

In that town, movie houses are conspicuous by their absence and even the "souk el-fellah" timidly closed their doors almost one year ago, as if out of shame. The town is suffocating under the pressures applied from all sides.

Neighboring towns, by the way, are not doing much better. Bou Hanifia, some 20 km northwest of Mascara, is no longer what it used to be. A mere visit will show the rift: merchants cling to their shutters, times and customs have changed a lot. Whereas not so long ago (in good times), summer vacationers were the joy of this district, renowned for its thermal baths and its quiet atmosphere, tourists have now become rare, and so has money. The feeling of disquiet among the population is felt more deeply, and the hotels are no longer full.

Hacine, a small enclave belonging to the Bouhanifia district, is suffering: deprived of water for the past six months, and with insecurity prevailing after nightfall, the people feel quite helpless.

What About Mohammadia?

Mohammadia, 45 km from the governorate center, with its winding roads and no water because of climatic effects, reflects the charm of the town that was once famous for its oranges and its trade. Of all that, nothing is left but desolation and concern for the future; the region has become a high-risk region. Sig, the former "Saint-Denis-de-Sig," a nerve center, a crossroads of trade and circulation serving nearly the entire region and toward all areas of the country, does not have a single hotel. "You see, it's absurd when you see how these things affect the town: insalubrious conditions, broken up roads and sidewalks, an irksome administration, the foul odor that comes from everywhere.... They are depriving us of water," apparently disillusioned citizens complained.

On the other hand, passengers going through this town no longer stop there as they used to. The coffee shops, which used to remain open around the clock no longer do so because it is no longer safe. This has an increasing impact on the shopping boulevard. Having a cup of coffee or a drink nowadays means abdicating.

About 20 km southwest of the governorate, we find the Tighennif district, the former Palikao for those familiar with agriculture; this district saw its hopes vanish for the fourth time in a row, due to the drought and the hot weather that prevailed recently. The leisure industry is having a rough time, and the place is sullen. Except for coffee shop after coffee shop, there is absolutely nothing to see; gone is the promenade along the lake and the beautiful swimming pool that was the town's pride. The one movie house, vandalized, the seats ripped open, can no longer contain the young people, who have fallen prey to delinquency.

Along the same road, but 35 km further to the south and in a state of complete lethargy, lies Oued El-Abtal, a deserted community without any facilities.

Ghriss, a farming district, is the richest of the region in that respect; its fertile land and abundant water enabled it to be the best in the area, but the drought and hot weather have played havoc with all projections.

Currently, the area is a farming district only by name. The ground water completely vanished as a result of wild drilling: some 5,000 wells were drilled illegally, within sight of the authorities in charge. The 17-hectare airport, built at a cost of a paltry 6 billion centimes to the State, was closed in 1987 and has now become the subject of all discussions, both locally and at the governorate seat.

We are not making up all this; it is what the people have to cope with everyday, and it makes life bitter and unbearable.

What About the Young People in All That?

As for the young people of Mascara, they can be seen at the place called "the former Ben Daoud barracks,"

20,000 square meters downtown; suffering and doubt can be read in their eyes. Drugs, narcotics, alcohol are commonly used there. But can we really blame them? Those to whom we asked the question were obviously embarrassed and chose not to answer. "That's venturing on quicksand, and besides these are just hoodlums, why should they complain," a fat man, an executive, replied to us.

The answers are few whenever "young people" are mentioned. So many promises, and nothing but promises; what is lacking is change among continuity, and our country's young people are the ones who suffer from the ups and downs of the nomenclature and its vicious circle.

There is no lack of absurdities in that town. Just watch the people standing in line to buy bread or semolina in Mascara's only—and iniquitous—Algerian Gallery and you can assess the damage. Corruption and illegal practices are common, obtaining an administrative document is a feat, and obstacles of all sorts are often hard to overcome. That, therefore, is the daily life of an average citizen, and especially that of a young person dreaming of better days.

Will they ever know better days?

Tizi-Ouzou: Housing Prices 'Soaring'

94AF0265B Algiers LE MATIN in French 9 Aug 94 p 8

[Article by Djillali Djeffer—first paragraph is LE MATIN introduction]

[Text] Every blessed day, citizens wake up to find that prices have risen again. Already overwhelmed by the scarcity and high price of staple foods, the citizens of Kabylia are now dealt a new blow by fate.

Already badly off, citizens were surprised in recent days to learn about the unbridled and infernal rise of the prices of anything connected with real estate.

Apartments and houses sell for extraordinary prices; rentals—rare but expensive—can be obtained only for outrageous sums, paid in cash and with priority being given to those who have foreign currency, if you please! This being said, it is at least paradoxical to see, on the other hand, real-estate agencies shooting up everywhere. But, once explained, that seems quite normal, since the initiates tell us that, in this field, a lot of money changes hand within the caste [as published] and that agencies make the task easier, in return for a percentage—a large one of course. This, of course, is in the nature of things.

Observers explain that prices will rise because of the unfavorable conditions prevailing in our country, characterized by pervading insecurity in many regions, in particular around Algiers (within a few kilometers from the governorate seat), and because of the Kabylia enjoys a period of relative calm.

In other words, many people have recourse to "inner exile" and therefore a second residence in that region is a must. For our survey, we approached many persons, and the figures they kept throwing at us will make your eyes pop out. Here is proof: an F4 apartment in Tizi-Ouzou or Azzazga sells for around 250 million centimes.

That is right, 250 million centimes for an F4 apartment.

Although it is possible to find F4 apartments for 180 million centimes (the minimum price) at Draa Ben Khadda or Oued Aissi, these are still unaffordable for the modest incomes of most Algerian employees. And for fear, dear reader, of making you dizzy or giddy, we shall refrain from telling you for how much F5 and larger apartments sell. You would not believe it! The same is true of houses which, depending on the type, sell for prices starting at 400 million centimes, and go up ad infinitum.

That means 1.5 billion, no less! Yet, these prices and the mind-boggling number of zeros they contain do not frighten buyers. Just make the rounds of real-estate agencies (a promising market) and you can see how affluent the clients are.

These agencies, some of which made it a point to request anonymity, acknowledged that there are many buyers.

In other words, you can expect these services, which have already reached cruising speed, to flourish and reach greater heights. The range of buyers consists essentially of emigrants, people who are professionals (notaries, physicians, lawyers, etc.) or individuals with social problems (pressing problems if need be. [sentence as published])

But, we were assured, there are also the initiates of MFP [expansion not given] and people benefiting from the old system as well as barons of the underground black market who handle billions and try to acquire as much property as possible—housing, apartments, and houses among other things. In plainer language, this means a (successful) attempt at laundering ill-gotten and dirty money of dubious origin. Unfortunately, the rogatory committee can do nothing. Our sources assured us that these "vultures" borrow third-parties' names to make their purchases, so as not to draw attention. What is sometimes bitter is that many transactions are made in foreign currency. Evidence of this can also be found in ads published in daily newspapers, offering [apartments] provided payment is in foreign currency. Some of these ads also ask for sums in Algerian currency. But the people we talked to pointed out that this is meant to deceive because, once the seller is reached by phone, he will pledge allegiance to the French franc, swearing that his property will be sold only for foreign currency, without a single centime in dinars, "all or nothing"! Poor dinar!

One "panacea": commercial or office premises; those located downtown in the Djurdjura capital sell for as much as 400 million centimes, sometimes more. [sentence as published]

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Faced with these "repugnant and repulsive" high prices, many, in an emergency, turn to rentals.

But even on that side, the situation is no joke and the offers are very rare, we were told.

If, however, we find an offer, it will cost us an arm and a leg, and with conditions that would make IMF executives blush. For instance, you may be asked to pay one or even two years' rent in advance.

Also, monthly rents range from 8,000 to 16,000 Algerian dinars.

This shows that acquiring housing in Kabylia has now become utopian and illusory. And ordinary citizens complain about these rising prices which they call unusual and insulting. Meanwhile, State-built low-cost housing is late in coming, for instance the 45 EPLF [expansion not given] units—a project that is now in its sixth year of construction. Sad!

Fire Damage in Tizi-Ouou; 9 Deaths

94AF0272D Algiers EL WATAN in French
17 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by D. Benabi: "Deadly Fires; Nine Dead in Ait-Yahia"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] For a week now, a series of fires has devastated thousands of hectares in the Tizi-Ouzou governorate. From Yakouren to Tamgout, from Sidi Ali Bounab to Azeffoun, the destructive flames left only ashes and desolation behind them.

But the most dramatic was the fire that encircled the Ait-Yahia community (near Ain El-Hammam) and caused the death of nine people late on Monday afternoon, while over 150 were slightly wounded in the village of Ighil Hfar.

The columns of smoke that surrounded the area, making the air unbreathable within a radius of 20 km, were announcing violent fires. All the villages of the Ait-Yahia community were on the alert, the villagers getting ready to protect themselves against the huge flames which, pushed by the wind, progressed rapidly and threatened the houses.

Less lucky, because entirely surrounded by the forest, the village of Ighil Hfar experienced murderous episodes as early as 1800. The villagers, armed only with their courage, faced the fire that devastated their entire village, killing and wounding all those that tried to oppose it.

According to the Ait-Yahia DEC [communal executive delegate], "civilian rescue reinforcements arrived only around 2000, after the disaster had struck." He said that the damages were somewhat limited only thanks to the dedication of the Ain El-Hamman medical district personnel and local citizens. Asked about the Orsec plan

[civil-emergency plan] that was still not being implemented, he indicated that he had himself asked for its implementation as early as Sunday, when things began to take a serious turn in the Ait-Yahia district. But implementation of the plan is said to have started only yesterday, and information from the Tizi-Ouzou governorate are becoming increasingly harder to get.

The tragedy that occurred the day before yesterday brings to mind that of July 1993 in Taguemount Azzouz (Beni Douala district) when about 10 people died during the wave of forest fires experienced by the region, and the ridiculously inadequate means made available to fight the fires.

Although civilian-rescue reinforcement teams sent from bordering governorates somehow made it possible to place more personnel around inhabited zones, the content of the famous "Orsec plan" remains a mystery.

Seldom available to date, the material means mentioned in the plan are in most cases out of service or purely and simply sold at public auctions (e.g., trucks, tank-carriers, miscellaneous machinery, etc.). In the Tizi-Ouzou governorate as a whole, 70 percent of which consists of forest and scrub, fire-fighting resources are insignificant. Even essentially preventive measures such as firebreaks and farmers trails were not given priority when meetings were held at the start of summer, the season of all dangers.

The logical result of this lack of foresight and hesitations of all kind is that nine people are dead and 10,000 hectares of forest and scrub went up in smoke. Without the citizens' active mobilization, the toll would have been still heavier.

Overview of Terrorist Activities in 'Attia's Area'

94AF0269A Algiers LIBERTE in French 6 Jun 94 p 3

[Article: "Sayah Attia's Fiefdom"]

[Excerpt] An exhaustive list of all the terrorist exploits shows just how much irreparable damage has been done: Out of the wilaya's 64 communes, 28 APC [People's Communal Assembly] headquarters have been destroyed by fire. Since it costs at least 100 million centimes to renovate a communal headquarters, one can reckon how much money has been lost for regional development. Eight DEC's [communal executive delegates] and vice presidents have been assassinated.

"Aswak" units in the most remote corners of the wilaya also been burned down. They're closed now, on instructions from the wilaya government. We're not going to feed "them" anymore, a wilaya security official says. Several roads have been declared "off limits" both to citizenry and the security services. National 62, the so-called "road of death," is the most dangerous section of the wilaya road network. "We can't even come close to making it safe, and we won't anytime soon," says a police inspector. It's here, between Berrouaghia and

El-Khemis, that terrorists erect their roadblocks. Travelers stand little chance of escaping these murderers. Even security forces have fallen victim to the deadly ambushes. Travelers have been relieved of their money and cars. And along this same stretch about 50 trucks belonging to state-owned enterprises have been put to the torch.

On Monday, the son of a chahid was abducted in Mongorno, a locality about 50 km from Medea. On Tuesday, security forces found his head, just outside Berrouaghia. "The nose and ears were cut off," recounts a stunned young physician: "It could only be the work of sons of harkis [members of a "harka" or native auxiliary contingent, during the war for independence]."

The previous Monday, the police station was the target of a terrorist attack at about 0220. A policeman was seriously wounded and evacuated to Medea hospital. Not even hospital personnel have been spared. Three employees at the Gouiaa facility have been assassinated—the first two about three weeks ago, the latest just last week. The facility at Baada has been attacked four times. "The Berrouaghia hospital morgue is running out of room," says one hospital official. The morgue's eight new [body] storage compartments are already "occupied," and corpses are routinely transferred to Medea. The Mongorno Hotel, the only large hotel in the wilaya, is falling into ruin, for lack of patronage. Few outsiders come, and few travelers spend the night. "If the situation continues, we will have to shut it down," says the manager.

In Berrouaghia, there is only one hour a day of running water. "The situation is desperate: We only have a three-month supply of water. If no solution is found, we're going to have to intensify water rationing," says one local official.

On the outskirts of town, not far from the cemetery, the ANP [People's National Army] has built an impressively equipped barracks. "Since the end of Ramadan, we're breathing easier, the ANP has struck some solid blows against the armed groups, but it's not enough," we are told by a bookseller, who also informs us the beauty salons for women are still closed. In Berrouaghia, tobacconists and printing houses are still open. But Robayia, 38 km from Berrouaghia, is considered an extremely unsafe place to venture. "It's wide open for certain types of people, off limits to others." Inhabitants are being victimized by terrorist attacks and multiple executions.

The authorities have abdicated their responsibilities in cowardly fashion, according to citizens. More than 90 percent of the populace of that commune has fled. The town is being depleted by an exodus of a new kind: People threatened by terrorists are abandoning their homes and land. Some wealthy families reportedly have moved to Tipaza, Saoula, and the capital. The poorer people have gone to stay with relatives in Berrouaghia. Here in Robayia, the grim toll has been high: Between 30 and 40 homes have been destroyed by armed groups.

"Those who refuse to pay the extortioners are killed." One farmer survived an attack perpetrated by Sayah Attia himself. He was driven from his hometown, while his house, possessions, and agricultural equipment were looted. "Here, if you want to stay alive and left in peace, you must bow to the will of the terrorists." Bouyissi Mokhtar reportedly has taken Sayah Attia's place. That veteran of the Afghan war joined the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] in 1991. He was the only man in the region to go to Kabul.

The group headed by Bouyissi is composed of about 30 criminals, most of them sons of notorious harkis. Ali Bouragua, his brother Kadour, and Abdelkader Bouchibane constitute the hard core of this terrorist cell. The APC and the Robayia community center have been torched. The DEC, driven out against his will, works now out of daïra headquarters in Berrouaghia. All the buses have been burned. There is only one school. Few students attend it anymore. Chebouti is believed to have resumed his activities in the El Amrya region, where he was born. People say the escaped prisoners from Tazoult are here. They are believed to be behind the start-up of new groups in Medea. Among them, Allal Saad Soud (former secretary general of the FIS bureau in Medea), Zitouni Mohamed, and Bounoua El-Kerbi, whom security services have identified as responsible for several murders, come from families who collaborated with, and fought alongside, the colonial army during the war for liberation.

Lakhdar Kara, a former internee at Reggane, currently heads a small group that is causing havoc in the Berrouaghia region. On 4 May, H.S., a fellow and son of a chahid living in Ouled Dayel, was attacked. "Accused of having ties to the 'houkouma,' I'm a target for the armed groups. My vehicle, a Peugeot 404, was burned after I refused to give them the 50,000 Algerian dinars they demanded." Another victim, Z.A., a former mujahidin, the father of eight children and head of a two-wife household, has given up. He shot at a terrorist who came to take his money. Today, he may be marked for death, "my house is destroyed, my goods have been plundered, and the authorities could hardly care less."

In Robayia, violent death is a daily event, striking people regardless of which side they support. The fate of Harchiche Mohamed, the notorious terrorist, is instructive. He was killed by his confederates, who had raped his wife during his absence. On his return from Birtouta, where he had been "posted" for six months, Harchiche discovered his wife was pregnant. He protested, and the emir sentenced him to die. "Terrorists come at night to eat, rape the young women, and take money, because the state is absent," says another victim, who refuses to talk about all her misfortunes for she no longer believes in anything and is suspicious of everyone. The road that leads to Ksar El-Boukhari is dangerous, it is said. This daïra has an almost medieval look to it. The few Coca-Cola posters are the only indication the town is not completely cut off from the outside world. Unemployment in this town of 40,000 is now 70 percent. And acts

of sabotage are frequent enough here to keep both visitors and natives on tenterhooks. The majority of state-owned enterprises have been destroyed. Neither Cotitex, nor EMAC [expansion not given], nor the transport enterprise OREVIC [expansion not given] have been spared. Hundreds of workers, both men and women, have been put on mandatory leave. Every day more citizens are assassinated, but the authorities do nothing about it. "Here, nobody feels safe: Your brother or even your father could sell you out tomorrow to save his own life," says one citizen. "Here we've learned to get along by following the old adage, 'speak no evil, see no evil, hear no evil.'"

On the day of Aid, several corpses were found littering the town square. About 10 days ago an administrative secretary, Daoud Ferhat, was killed. A week ago, a young woman, 27, was slain. The sister of a gendarme, she had recently given birth to a baby. At 2045 on the fateful day, a group abducted her from her domicile. Her father, husband, and sister all offered to take her place, but in vain. She was found dead in the old quarter of El Ksar, popularly known as "Rambo." This town, nicknamed "the slaughterhouse," is virtually a war zone. Seven APC officials have been assassinated. We learned from the security services that large groups are active in the region. Matmoura Ahmed and his cousin Lakhdar, Kebrita Lakhdar, Daoura Rchiar, and Ain Guerrad are responsible for the atrocities being committed.

Telephone lines between Ksar El-Boukhari and Berrouaghia have been cut off. All along the road, the wires have been severed. A number of telephone poles have been felled. Post and telegraph employees are trying to repair the damage. The road from Ksar El-Boukhari to Derrak is hazardous. A gendarme dissuades us from taking it. "We ourselves venture on it only in numbers and in force." At Derrak, one fine day, the townspeople turned out for a large demonstration to express their anger at the terrorists, to express their indignation at all the threats and massacres. But their cry of revolt was purely symbolic. The wilaya "failed to get the message." [passage omitted]

[Box p 3]

Editorial: "Scars"

So many tales and rumors have circulated about Medea, Berrouaghia, Tamezguida, and the surrounding villages. We had hoped they would not prove true. But the reality on the ground is even worse, more terrible, than we thought. A kind of gangrene is slowly killing the region. In these straggling villages, these communes, death has become the least of the unimaginable atrocities visited daily on the inhabitants.

Whole populations, living under the yoke of fear, constrained to become exiles in their own country to flee the terrorists. Women raped, young people mutilated, mothers inconsolable at the death of their children. Titteri has too long remained a fiefdom for the outlaws,

despite all the security forces deployed to combat them. There are signs peace may return, but the wounds suffered by the inhabitants are too deep to heal quickly.

Reconstruction of the burned-out schools and destroyed enterprises, and reopening of the markets closed by terrorist threats, will enable these towns to return to normal life—but how soon? And how long will it take the families living there to forget all the deaths and tears?

Azzefoun: Citizens Organize Against 'Terrorism'

94AF0269D Algiers EL WATAN in French 15 Aug 94
p 5

[Article by Yacine Bahri: "Villagers Organize Against Terrorism"]

[Text] How to eradicate these germs of violence that sow terror and grief day after day in the lives of Algerian families? In the daira of Azzefoun, Igoujdal to be more precise, the villagers have decided to organize.... The hotel that was to be our base of operations for the duration of our stay was aswarm with people; the nearby beach was packed with a dense throng of bathers. For an outsider passing through, this good-natured ambiance contrasted sharply with alarmist reports of skirmishes with terrorists and a general mobilization of the populace.

Azzefoun—"There's no need to overdramatize things. Sure, we're not minimizing the danger, but we are set up to counter it and stop it," one citizen told us. The proof of their vigilance came the first morning after our arrival. Acting on information provided by citizens, the gendarmes succeeded in laying hands on an armed group of four people. Nearly all the villages in the daira of Azzefoun have established security and watch procedures that kick into action whenever suspicious movements are observed. The track record of this security machinery is impressive: Besides the losses the terrorists sustained in the altercation at Igoujdal, they have had about ten personnel taken prisoner by ordinary citizens and/or gendarmes.

Strength in Unity

When our interlocutor speaks of Igoujdal, his voice becomes solemn: "That day will be graven in our memories right alongside the battles of our glorious mujahidin." He gladly offers to find us a guide to accompany us to the fortress-village, situated some 20 km out.

Ammi Ali, well into his sixties, his thickset body topped by a grizzled head of hair, greets us in a hoarse, earthy voice: "Welcome, Marhabane." In the service vehicle, on the way to Igoujdal, we drink in Ammi Ali's words.

He's an old mujahidin, a fighter known throughout the region. He doesn't hesitate to draw parallels between the war of liberation and the hunt for terrorists, all the while fulminating against the state's abject failure to help the

threatened citizenry: "We could have exterminated them. Allah galeb (what a pity it is), but we were short of ammunition."

Asked for details of the encounter, he urged us to wait until our arrival in Igoudal, where we could make inquiry of members of the local "resistance."

He was not a direct participant but was among reinforcements sent from the chief town of the daïra. "By the time the alert was sounded—it took the messenger 20 minutes to get back to Azzeffoun—and the old mujahidin and armed volunteers had assembled and arrived at the scene of the engagement, the attackers had already withdrawn."

One can sense in his words a twinge of regret mixed with anger. "During the guerrilla war, when we were fighting for independence, our freedom of movement was extremely reduced, owing to the presence of military garrisons in the chief towns and well-equipped forward army posts at strategic points. Here, there are vast tracts of unsurveyed territory where the terrorists can rest up, train, and regroup after every operation. Where are our armed forces, our helicopters, our communications?" One can imagine the excitement and commotion of mustering the reinforcements. Witnesses say it was a stirring scene. Young people barely in their teens, hurrying to the wagons, begging to be issued guns to go to Igoudal; adult volunteers and old mujahidin—some of whom had been gravely wounded in the war—streaming out of the cafes and stores, going in search of weapons, returning with them to the assembly point to jump into requisitioned vehicles. It was like a scene in a war movie. But this one was made in Algeria, and 32 years after independence.

At Ighil-Mehandi, the beautiful mosque clearly outlined against the sky, shaded despite the heavy afternoon heat, a group of young men, rifles slung over their shoulders. Five hundred meters further on, the village of Oulkhout, with the tomb of Tahar Djaout on our right. Finally, we arrive at the foot of the citadel, 300 meters from the [tomb of the] sleeping poet.

A barricade of stones and tree trunks blocks the road in both directions. Sentries stand guard, guns in hand, ready to fire. They signal us to slow down, and we pull to a stop. Our guide gets out first, they recognize him and hug him affectionately. He introduces us: "You have visitors. These are journalists who have come to do whatever they can to help you." No problem: We are not even asked to give our names.

We help them clear the road, then drive on toward the center of the village, perched high on the summit of a rounded knoll with a view straight down to the beach of Sidi Kalifa. From the foot of the knoll to the summit, at regular intervals, young and not-so-young people are standing guard 24 hours a day.

Dignity

The first sentry we run into is a young man, barely 18, leaning against the trunk of an olive tree. In his blue eyes

one can read the courage and determination of people fighting for their dignity and honor. He responds cautiously to our hail, intent on carrying out his mission. Our guide tells me that the sentries are under strictest orders to remain vigilant.

The village committee received us inside the mosque: steely faces, fatigued from long days of standing watch. Over steaming coffee, our hosts recount the details of their heroic action.

But diffidently. They eschew any vainglory: For them, it was just their duty, the most obvious thing in the world.

Mokrane, fortyish, is on extended leave: He doesn't know when the Algiers factory that employs him will reopen. For the moment, he is part of the defense force defending the dignity of his village. Many others are in similar circumstances. His voice calm, eyes on the ground, he confides: "We were ready and waiting for them, for they had been confiscating the weapons in small nearby villages." He continues, recounting the days just preceding the attack: "They have a weapon that is very powerful against the weak: brainwashing and propaganda. They sent us an emissary who tried to discourage us by saying they are more powerful than the ANP [People's National Army] and equipped with sophisticated weapons. The emissary 'advised' us to surrender our weapons, because we were putting ourselves at risk of 'bloody reprisals.'"

This thinly veiled message was received loud and clear. But it had just the opposite effect from the one intended: It redoubled the villagers' will to resist and increased their motivation.

A young 20-year-old man fired the first shot. He was standing watch at the first guard-post when the white Daewoo of the group's "emir" and two Toyota trucks stopped at the foot of the road leading to the village. Decked out in "Rambo" garb and sporting a black head-band, the "emir" shouted in a menacing voice, "sellem silahak, y a rabbek" (throw down your weapons). The only response was the whistle of buckshot that hit him squarely in the chest. His two companions, completely stupefied, dragged him by the feet and hoisted him into one of the trucks. They in turn came under heavy fire from a second sentry. As for the man in charge of the "machine that spits death" (the Diktariov machine gun), he didn't have time to press the trigger before he took a bullet in the middle of the head. He fell end over end, dragging the ordnance with him. Once again, companions rushed to hoist him, bleeding, into one of the trucks.

Recovering from their shock, the assailants tried to force their way uphill to the village. They charged, weapons in hand, chanting their war cry, "aliha nahya, aliha namout." When they got within firing range, they were greeted with more salvos.

The air rang with the bullets of dignity, accompanied by the "youyous" of the women. The terrorists ran into a

solid screen of fire, and as soon as they could gather up their six wounded (or dead) companions, they beat an indescribably miserable, disorderly retreat. They were in such dire straits they had to launch a tear-gas grenade to buy time to turn their vehicles around and flee. In the stampede, three terrorists were left behind.

Having apparently avoided the fighting because they were not armed, they hid themselves in a nearby ravine. They were picked up by the villagers after the fighting ended. The youngest villagers, their blood still running hot after this baptism of fire, tried to pursue the routed forces. It took all the authority of the veterans to persuade them to give up the chase. Reinforcements from Azzefoun and surrounding villages arrived after the fighting, but their gesture of solidarity was much appreciated by the resisters of Igoujdal.

The next day, a delegation arrived headed by the wali, the chief of the military sector, and the commander of a gendarmerie unit. The villagers were promised lots of arms and munitions, as well as an army garrison for the region in the very near future. But the commitment of the villagers themselves would have to fill the gap [in time] between promises and their fulfillment.

Every Man for Himself

For proof, look at the intervillage coordination of security and defense plans, which the old mujahidin—through their organization, the ONM [National Mujahidin Organization]—and militants of the political parties (FFS [Front of Socialist Forces], RCD [Rally for Culture and Democracy], and FLN [National Liberation Front party]) have decided to establish throughout the daïra. A series of joint meetings has led to creation of a "crisis committee" that will closely monitor improvements in the security machinery in each village. In every corner of the daïra, the watchwords are vigilance and mobilization. And in the village of Igoujdal, that means general mobilization. The decision was solemnly decreed, and all measures have been taken to make it operational: sale of livestock herds, work in the fields limited in both time and space, no vacations....

Leaving this fortress-village, we can't get out of our minds the villagers' heroic words, veritable acts of faith that every worthy Algerian should make his own: "We will resist the terrorists with or without the help of the state." "Our strength is in our unity. We are peaceful citizens, we were not looking for a fight, but when our dignity is attacked, we defend it even at the cost of our lives."

When we got up to the cemetery of Oulkhoul, our photographer asked us to stop. It was a fitting opportunity to turn our thoughts to the tomb of the symbolist poet. One imagines him with his good-natured smile, relishing the sight of the pell-mell rout of the "reactionary brethren." As for those brethren looking ahead to the future—his own spiritual family—they have just begun,

here in Igoujdal, close by his tomb, their triumphal march toward progress and civil peace.

IRAQ

Country's Options in Face of UNSC Discussed

94LH0091A Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
5 Jul 94 p 6

[Article by Wa'il Muhammad Isma'il: "Iraq's Options in Managing the Conflict with the UN Security Council"]

[Text] Struggle is essentially a conflict of wills resulting from differences in the motives of nations and in their visions, aspirations, objectives, resources, and capabilities, etc. This, in the final analysis, leads to the adoption of decisions and foreign policies that are more disparate than they are in agreement. And yet conflicts, though replete with tensions and pressures, stay short of armed struggle.

A struggle takes on different forms and shapes. It may be political, economic, ideological, technological, or informational, etc. Its tools range from the most positive to the most negative. Examples are pressure, embargoes, containment and threats, punishment, bargaining, inducements, and concessions, etc.

We can identify such tools in the current struggle between Iraq and the UN Security Council—not as an institution by as a reflection of the powers that dominate it—the United States.

The management of this struggle by the leader President Saddam Husayn has blossomed as a true measure of administrative and political acumen through the exercise of all available options without sacrificing national interests or political rights.

Iraq's political leadership, with the leader president at its helm, has adopted ancillary as well as random strategies—each used in its own time as conditions warranted in the service of Iraq's overall policy towards the United Nations and its Security Council.

Reconciliation has characterized Iraqi policy during a period of mobilization as well as of psychological and physical reconstruction. New approaches to foreign relations have been devised whose priorities are not rigid but with elements of flexibility based on mutual economic interests.

All those options of reconciliation helped chart a course towards a settlement that does not undermine national interests and yet dispels claims by the aggressors, and by other parties allied with World Zionism, that a crisis exists between Iraq and the Security Council.

Every effort was made during that stage to garner new friends, to neutralize the forces regionally and internationally allied with the United States, and to bolster Iraq's world position and advocate its just cause.

That segment of policy was not makeshift but rather a deliberate plan that would lead to a second stage in 1994 whereby pressure was exerted by peaceful means on several countries including the permanent members of the Security Council (France, China, and Russia). The plan had a three-pronged thrust [as published]:

1. Define objectives guided by accurate probability forecasting. This means defining Iraq's regional and international objectives—dynamic, political, and economic—and how they might influence the issue of ending the embargo.

2. Devise strategies. This complements the first prong and is rooted in policy planning on empirical and scientific bases. One of the objectives here is to contain hostile campaigns and to win friendly nations over to the side of lifting the unjust embargo on Iraq.

In view of this we ask: What characterized those options?

They were undoubtedly effective even though the unjust embargo continues. The majority's attitude was indeed positive during the latest UNSC periodic review (18 March 1994) as proved by U.S. representative Ulbright's open threat to veto any Security Council resolution that would relax the embargo.

That was one indicator. Another indicator is a change in the traditional format of the statement issued by the Council at the conclusion of periodic Embargo Committee meetings and the new emphasis on the need to add text that would hearten Iraq and commend its cooperation with the Council. That is why the Council concluded its meeting without issuing a statement.

That shows a positive development in favor of Iraq and indicates the beginning of the end to the unjust embargo and to U.S. domination of the Council. It may also indicate a fracture in the alliance of countries hostile to Iraq.

A third indicator is the manner in which members of the Council approached special commission chairman Rolf Ekeus, who has acted in past years with imperious authority instigated by the United States with whom alone he maintained contact.

Iraq was able to make a case for calling him before the Council where he was embarrassed by direct member questions on his commission's performance, on Iraq's progress in abiding by its commitments under Paragraph 22, and on why he withheld information from the Council, why he renewed monitoring but delayed announcing its starting date, why it had to be kept up for a full six months, etc.

He was admonished by the Council to submit a monthly summary on the progress of his commission's remaining tasks and to expedite determining the length of the monitoring period under Paragraph 22; which means lifting the economic embargo on Iraq.

All these accomplishments indicate the success of Iraqi options in managing the struggle with the Security Council and in frustrating the arbitrariness of Iraq's enemies. There only remains opportunistic extorsive stipulations that will totally fail over time.

Iraq's relations with the Security Council, especially where it involves the embargo, has begun for a long time to be subject to world public opinion which has started to question the morality of insistently withholding the food and medical supplies of nearly 20 million people. It has also begun to question why Iraq is being treated in this fashion when others, like Israel, are being treated quite differently despite the passage of more than a quarter of a century since the Security Council passed Resolution 242 calling for withdrawal from the occupied territories. The Security Council has been unable to this day to punish the Zionist entity for its continued defiance of more than 100 Security Council and UN resolutions. This defiance has been underlined by the recent Ibrahimi Shrine massacre, which has proved to the world the extent to which international values are undermined without even-handedness.

Baghdad Consults Moscow on Sanctions

94AA0107A Paris AL-WATAN AL-ARABI in Arabic
10 Jul 94 pp 30-32

[Article by Pavel Davidov: "Resettlement of Palestinians in Southern Iraq in Return for Lifting of Sanctions"]

[Text] Moscow—The utter secrecy with which Tariq 'Aziz's latest visit to Moscow was engulfed was not because the talks concerned the lifting or alleviation of sanctions imposed on Baghdad. AL-WATAN AL-ARABI information confirms that the Iraqi deputy prime minister's visit to the Kremlin moved in the direction of breaking the economic and political isolation engulfing Iraq finally by involving Iraq in the Middle East peace process. The first step begins with Iraq's participation in solving the Palestinian refugee issue by resettling them in southern Iraq.

A meeting that was held in St. Petersburg recently between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz was engulfed in extreme secrecy, imposed by Kozyrev. In accordance with the minister's instructions, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials have observed absolute silence.

But it is impossible to keep secret a meeting attended by a person who steals the international limelight, such as Tariq 'Aziz, especially since Iraq's foreign policy activities are at the heart of world interest. It is also technically difficult to keep secret a meeting attended by an Iraqi official. It is well known that Iraqi officials cannot use Iraqi aircraft. To get to Moscow, Tariq 'Aziz was compelled to lease a Jordanian aircraft which flew across Turkish airspace with the Turkish authorities' approval. Therefore, the authorities of these two countries, which have firm relations with the United States, have been

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aware of Tariq 'Aziz's trip. Secrecy has also failed to conceal Tariq 'Aziz's travels between the two Russian capitals: the first capital (Moscow) and the second capital (St. Petersburg). On the day following his arrival in Moscow, 'Aziz traveled to St. Petersburg, where Kozyrev had arrived from Belgrade. After a session of talks, Kozyrev, who had given instructions that the talks be kept confidential, left for Belgrade and Tariq 'Aziz headed for Moscow. If the intention was to truly conceal everything, the presence of the "secret" guest should have been confined to Moscow, at least.

Oil and Debts

So, talks held by an Iraqi official cannot be secret. The same applies to the subject matter of the talks. It is well known that the Iraqi leadership's main concern today is to lift the sanctions imposed on Baghdad by the world community in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Iraq. Moscow also has an interest in such a step, not for political considerations, because Moscow's political position is firm, but for purely economic considerations.

In the wake of the Kozyrev-Tariq meeting in St. Petersburg, the well-informed Muscovite IZVESTIA said that the "Iraqis are prepared to pay a generous price for Russia's assistance in lifting the sanctions. First, they promise that if sanctions are lifted or alleviated, they will repay the debt they owe Russia, amounting to nearly \$7 billion, with oil. Second, the Iraqis have promised to renew contracts with Russian companies which had started to implement projects in Iraq before the Gulf war and to conclude very attractive new contracts. The Iraqis have suggested that, as a temporary step, Moscow turn a blind eye to some private Russian companies' violation of the oil embargo.

In response to questions about Russia's position on the sanctions imposed on Iraq, Aleksandr Kalogyn [name as transliterated], head of the Iraq section at the Middle East and Africa Desk of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, "Even if the Iraqis promise us mountains of gold, they will not be able to actually repay the debt in the near future. Iraq is required to spend 30 percent of its oil export revenues, which are its main source of foreign exchange, to pay reparations. Second, Iraq has to repay debts to countries other than Russia. Third, Iraq must meet its essential needs for foodstuffs, medicines, spare parts, and so forth."

Kalogyn went on to add, "If we arrange Iraq's priorities according to importance, we find that there is no reason to expect a plentiful torrent of Iraqi oil to flow into Russian oil tankers. If our hope before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was to see Iraq repay its debt at the rate of \$1.5 billion annually, then such expectations are unrealistic now."

As for the resumption of economic cooperation between Russia and Iraq, there is no doubt that preparations are underway for this purpose. It is no secret that numerous

countries and companies are trying to gain a foothold in Iraq. Russian companies are no exception. Their representatives visit Iraq and Iraqis arrive in Moscow to hold talks with them. But these companies cannot begin implementing agreements until the appropriate political circumstances develop.

There is no doubt that Russian businessmen's circles, especially weapons producers, hope that economic cooperation with Iraq will be restored to its past condition. Recently, an official of the Russian company that monopolizes the sale of weapons said that Russia is prepared to resume delivery of weapons supplies to Iraq. Even though the Russian economy is in a lamentable condition now, hopes are attached to the deep-rooted relations of trust and understanding between Moscow and Baghdad. Moreover, many hope that the Iraqi leadership will make a decision befitting Russia.

Another viewpoint has been expressed by a Russian expert interviewed by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI. This expert has said that countries and companies that have not dealt with Iraq previously, such as Total, a French company, and Lukoil, a Russian company, have better chances because there are no problems between them and Iraq concerning debts, loans, or property. Iraqis can deal with such companies without fearing that they will demand reparations for what they lost as a result of the war. Aleksandr Kalogyn admits that Moscow is watching with interest the "activities of western companies in Iraq. Naturally, we encourage our companies to become active there. But this does not mean that there are Russian companies that try to violate the blockade unilaterally. In any case, such violation is really impossible, even though it is possible on paper."

So, what is the justification for Russia's attempt to lift the sanctions imposed on Iraq?

"What is important, says Foreign Ministry Official Aleksandr Kalogyn, is that Iraq has actually begun to implement the world community's demands. Though it employed crooked methods and resorted to procrastination and to the concealment of information initially, Baghdad changed its position on the UN Special Commission as of last summer, perhaps as a result of a political decision. The logical thing is for Iraq to recognize Security Council Resolution 715 and to agree to place its military industrial program under long-term monitoring."

Kalogyn added, "All this leads to the conclusion that Iraq is following the path of full cooperation with the Special Commission, whose task it is to uncover all installations for the manufacture and operation of weapons of mass destruction; to destroy them; and to impose long-term monitoring on the Iraqi military industry program. Provision 22 of the Security Council resolution, which defines the Special Commission's tasks says that the ban on Iraqi exports can be lifted if Iraq implements the demands concerning armament. This provision makes no other demands."

He further added, "What is intended now is to lift the ban on Iraqi exports only, meaning that paragraph 22 of the Security Council resolution is the sole subject of discussion. We should keep in mind that even if the ban on Iraqi exports, meaning oil exports primarily, is lifted, Iraq will not be able to start exporting oil for six or seven months because the monitoring issue requires time. Before it is imposed, the installations to be monitored must be defined, keeping in mind that there were more than 70 installations connected with biology [biological weapons development] alone, plus chemical installations, installations connected with the missile industry, and other installations. A special report must be written on all these installations and signed by the Iraqis. Monitoring equipment must be installed, and one must ensure that their data is checked. In other words, a job that requires great time and efforts must be completed."

Washington Does Not Agree

So, Moscow thinks that there have been impressive positive developments in Baghdad's position on the weapons-elimination issue and that the world community must respond to these developments appropriately. Otherwise, Baghdad may back down on its cooperation and may evade responding to the world community's demands.

It is worth noting that Moscow's position on the sanctions is practically identical to the French position and close to the Chinese position. London is also becoming more aware of the need to do something. Washington alone continues to reject abolishing or alleviating the sanctions imposed on Iraq. It is Moscow's opinion that the intransigence of Washington, which considers it premature to even talk about the issue, is due to the fact that the Iraqi dossier is one of the few dossiers not placed on the shelf of the Clinton administration's foreign policy successes. If this administration alleviates the sanctions against Iraq, it will be subjected to violent criticism.

Even though the U.S. administration has ordinarily controlled the Iraqi dossier since the Gulf war and even though it believes that only Washington is entitled to set a date for doing something in this regard, should it be necessary, the Russians believe that Washington cannot persist in its position endlessly. It is the opinion of Moscow, of the majority of the Security Council members, and of the UN Special Commission that major developments have occurred in Iraq's position. If Baghdad adds to them its recognition of Kuwait in accordance with Security Council Resolution 833, then this will weaken the position of those who say that nothing has developed to date. In other words, Moscow believes that if Washington finds itself isolated, then it will be inevitably compelled to change its position on Iraq.

To date, the Iraq issue has not disturbed Russian-U.S. relations, according to an official at the Russian Ministry

of Foreign Affairs. Moscow does not plan to muddy these relations. But on the other hand, it does not plan to water down its effort to lift the ban on Iraqi exports, nothing more and nothing less.

Exports to Iraq, activities of foreign firms there, financial deals, weapons supplies, and spare parts fall, according to what we have been told by officials of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, within the framework of the comprehensive sanctions stipulated in paragraphs 21 and 24 of the Security Council resolution. It is a much more difficult task to eliminate these sanctions because it will be required to establish an import control system, especially for imports that can be used for peaceful and military purposes simultaneously. Moreover, paragraph 21 stipulates that the resolution to lift the comprehensive sanctions will be made "in light of the Iraqi Government's policy and action, including implementation of all the appropriate Security Council resolutions."

These resolutions encompass numerous demands, including recognition of Kuwait and of its sovereignty over its territories and [demarcation] of the Iraq-Kuwait border in accordance with UN resolutions. Even though Iraq has recognized Resolution 687, which refers to Kuwait's sovereignty, Moscow wishes Iraq would declare its recognition of Kuwait and of Resolution 833 because the Kuwaiti dossier, though not directly connected with the ban on Iraqi oil, represents an obstacle on the path to resolving this issue.

Palestinians in Iraq

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that the absolute confidentiality with which Tariq 'Aziz's visit was engulfed was not for the purpose of concealing the Soviet endeavors to lift the international blockade against Iraq, considering that Moscow's position is well known in this regard. What is more, Moscow lets no opportunity go by without underlining its call for alleviating the sanctions. Sources that are well informed with what went on in Moscow and St. Petersburg have asserted that Kremlin leaders are working for a much broader plan than just alleviating the sanctions. In case it succeeds, this plan will lead not just to lifting the sanctions but also to returning Iraq to the world community and to developing a complete solution to the problem in which Iraq got itself involved when it occupied Kuwait. These sources have emphasized that Moscow, which is determined to play the role of full partner in the ongoing Middle East peace process, seeks to achieve through Baghdad a breakthrough that strengthens this role; that restores its past position as a main partner in the Middle East; and that flows ultimately into Yeltsin's and the Kremlin leaders' plan to return Russia to the international arena as an influential superpower.

In this regard, a prominent Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official who has asked not to be named has revealed that Russian-Iraqi talks touched on the sanctions issue, and that Kozyrev discussed with 'Aziz very

important issues that had been raised previously and to which Baghdad is expected to respond. The most significant of these issues was a discussion on how to involve Iraq in the Middle East process. It is well known in this regard that Washington had already notified the Iraqis in secret negotiations held in New York several months ago of the need for Baghdad to join the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. The U.S. requirement reached the point of demanding that the Iraqi regime recognize Israel explicitly. Many observers view this recognition as the fundamental and main factor that continues to motivate Washington to maintain the sanctions and to refuse to lift them on the pretext of Iraq's failure to fulfill terms of the UN resolutions. Reports add that the Baghdad regime has become aware of the role this U.S. requirement plays in continuation of the blockade. Consequently, this regime seeks to develop a "compromise" through which it declares its wish to enter into the peace process without shouldering the burden of declaring its recognition of Israel explicitly. It seems that Tariq 'Aziz has already conveyed this tendency to more than one Western capital and has emphasized that Iraq does not wish to obstruct the peace process. The issue of relations between Iraq and Israel was raised during the "medical visit" the Iraqi deputy prime minister made to Paris several months ago. It was said at the time that 'Aziz came to Paris looking for a lighter "settlement" than what is required by the United States. A few weeks ago, French sources revealed that Baghdad had conveyed to "middlemen" its agreement to proceed with the process of rapprochement with Israel and that there was discussion of the possibility of reviving the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline. Some Israeli papers went as far as asserting that there was going to be an imminent forward surge on the line of normalization between Iraq and Israel. DAVAR even went as far as attributing similar reports to Israeli Energy Minister Moshe Shahal.

Russian reports assert that a significant part of 'Aziz's talks in Moscow focused on this "compromise," on developing a formula that reflects Baghdad's approval of the Middle East negotiations and its direct involvement in this process and on adopting a preparatory step does not initially go as far as raising the question of recognition procedures. While waiting to find out the outcome of this step on the real ground and to reap its fruits in the lifting or alleviation of sanctions, the international parties concerned can consider this step a goodwill initiative on the part of the Iraqis. A Russian official has revealed to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that Tariq 'Aziz brought with him to Moscow a serious plan that is likely to soften the strict U.S. position, to enhance Iraq's international image, and to give those who support lifting the sanctions a strong boost, especially if Moscow decides to adopt this plan, to support and promote it, and to use it as a strong card, along with Iraq's response to most UN resolutions, especially those connected with armament monitoring and with eliminating mass destruction weapons. According to well-informed Russian sources, this plan includes a proposal by Iraq to participate first

in solving the Palestinian refugee problem, which is one of the most complex issues in the negotiations. This proposal expresses explicitly Iraq's willingness to receive Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon and to resettle them in southern Iraq. The plan also provides additional detailed arrangements for implementing this proposal.

Russian sources assert that this idea has been submitted at previous meetings between Iraqi and Russian officials, that Moscow has previously released "trial balloons" concerning this idea in the direction of U.S. and Israeli officials, and that it has been encouraged to carry on with it.

This plan does not mean just solving the problem of Palestinian presence in Lebanese territories as part of the refugees issue or just contributing to ensuring the security of Israel's northern borders. It also constitutes an important step in helping Iraq not only to have have the sanctions lifted or alleviated but also to break its economic and political isolation and return to the world community through involvement in the peaceful settlement, and this is what is most important. Iraq will thus hit two birds with one stone, considering that its agreement to resettle Lebanon's Palestinian refugees in southern Iraq specifically is likely to alter the demographic makeup there and, consequently, to play a role in the interest of the Baghdad regime. What remains is for Moscow to succeed in selling this Iraqi plan. Russian observers expect the early indicators of this Russian effort to surface in the next few weeks and hope that the blockade imposed on Iraq will begin to be loosened next fall.

Russia Called Main Economic, Military Ally of Country

94LH0084A Paris AL-MUHARRIR in Arabic 18 Jul 94
p 7

[Text] Following the St. Petersburg meeting between Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, which occurred in an atmosphere of complete secrecy, the surprises that were expected to occur at the beginning of the past week inside the Security Council regarding a partial lifting of the embargo against Iraq were instantly thwarted by the Americans at the summit of the seven major industrial nations and Russia in Naples. The final communique confirmed the continuation of the embargo against Libya and Iraq, but the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council "will be followed by a review of sanctions."

What became known of the St. Petersburg meeting, where Tariq 'Aziz attempted to return the hands of the Russian clock to the former Iraqi time, indicates developments which may be described as being at least "very positive," as an Iraqi diplomat in London stated to AL-MUHARRIR, repeating a phrase released by a source in Baghdad describing it as "being more than we expected."

In regard to defining those "surprises," the Iraqi diplomat pointed to the item published by AL-MUHARRIR on 13 June about the possibility that Russia, France, and China would threaten to unilaterally announce the lifting of the embargo against Iraq if efforts were to reach an impasse, or "something to that effect."

The Russians are demanding that the monitoring period on the Iraqi armaments programs be limited to six months only, to begin immediately through a resolution of the Security Council. Baghdad has announced that it has completely stopped its nonconventional weapons program. Moscow is expressing its unconditional support of the "positive changes" that are related to disarmament in Iraq, while Washington is silent, "inventing" on each occasion a new pretext for maintaining the embargo to satisfy its Gulf allies.

A statement released by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Kolokolov after Tariq 'Aziz's visit, indicated that "the meeting touched upon the possibility of easing the international sanctions...and that the impartial implementation of the Security Council resolutions enables Russia to support the course developed in the Security Council which leads to the gradual revocation of sanctions."

The Iraqi diplomat in London stated to AL-MUHARRIR that 'Aziz assured Kozyrev of the support of France and China for any initiative that aims at lifting the embargo. However, they want Russia to initiate it, and that "press leaks on this point are true."

British political sources do not rule out the possibility that the Iraqi deputy foreign minister had presented the Russians offers that make one's mouth water in the midst of Yeltsin's sharp economic battle. It is on his victory or defeat in this battle that his political future depends for many years to come.

Those offers might include "turning Russia into a key partner of Iraq" in most spheres, especially the military and economic spheres, similar to the situation with the former Soviet Union. The Iraqi diplomat did not rule out the possibility that Baghdad had presented the Russians with the idea of laying an oil pipeline from the north of Iraq to Russia across Turkey to guarantee the needs of the Russian people for oil, "which is a matter that is sufficient by itself to spare Yeltsin from having to follow in the steps of the Western nations."

It is possible that the timing of 'Aziz's visit to Moscow on the eve of the Naples summit is a broad step toward improving the position of the Russian president at that summit and to refrain from permitting him to be led to accept the sometimes crippling conditions that the West imposes on him in order to receive aid. However, it appears that the Clinton administration was aware of the importance of the timing and motives of that visit and of what repercussions it might have on Yeltsin's position inside the conference. It acted on that basis, not letting the Kremlin chief on this occasion feel, as on previous

occasions, that he is begging, but treated him as "a full European partner" with rights and responsibilities. This is something that the Russians have up until now been attempting to extract from the West in various ways.

The Americans also pushed behind the scenes some of their European allies to reassure Yeltsin that the requested economic and material aid will begin to arrive gradually. They also made the French understand that the future of their intervention in Rwanda—it too being a matter that Paris is attempting not to raise in order to pass it with the least possible outcry or opposition—is dependent on their position in the Security Council on lifting the embargo on Iraq.

Largest Russian Delegation To Baghdad

In a surprising development following Tariq 'Aziz's visit to Moscow, AL-MUHARRIR has learned that the largest Russian delegation since the fall of the Soviet Union will soon be going to Baghdad. It includes the ministers of defense and economics and will implement the agreements that have been reached in the negotiations between the two sides.

Discussion Of, Warning About Turkish Oil Pipeline

94LH0082A Paris AL-MUHARRIR in Arabic 20 Jun 94 p 12

[Article by Hasan Hamadat: "Exclusive AL-MUHARRIR Expose of Threats Posed to Iraq's Trans-Turkey Oil Pipeline"]

[Text] They liken it to a child whose teacher handed him a small ball that was in actuality an atom bomb. The child ran with the ball, skipping to his backyard as his relatives and neighbors held their breaths lest he should stumble and fumble the ball, triggering an explosion that would cause a terrible environmental disaster all over a region crisscrossed by connecting rivers, dams, and water canals.

That allegoric backyard is Turkey's southeast Anatolia where giant dams and hydroelectric stations dominate the sources of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates.

The 990-km pipeline that traverses that region transports Kirkuk crude to the Turkish refinery at Adana near the Mediterranean, passing through the border town of Sirzah then Diyarbakir and Gaziantep. The pipeline would quake from the thunder of cannons, air raids, and exploding antitank mines as it cuts across sniper fields where bullets and bombs fly and where actual war is raging between the Turkish Army and the Kurdish Workers Party militias whom the Ankara Government disparages as terrorists.

The war there, in southeast Anatolia, has cost the State of Turkey \$25 billion over the past 10 years. This is a sum equal to the value of exports for two years. Not only does this war continue to rage, it is gaining in violence

and fury. This war will cost \$6 billion this year, according to Western estimates. Meanwhile, Turkey is expending enormous sums on dam and power generation projects to "develop and modernize" the embattled region on the assumption that the water belongs to Turkey, whereas the oil belongs to its producers.

This is not the place to dwell on the inequities foisted upon Syria and Iraq by Turkey's monopolistic control over Tigris and Euphrates waters. The war raging there is depressing the Turkish tourism sector, a major source of hard currency, because tourism installations are targeted by Kurdish Workers Party "bombing operations." As a result, the number of tourists is expected to shrink this year to about 3 million from 6.5 million in 1993, and last year's tourism revenues of \$4 billion will consequently decline.

Allocations for the current war in southeast Anatolia give precedence to pipeline security, because a major and concentrated terrorist attack on the pipeline that carries black gold is all it takes to trigger a disaster.

The pipeline presently contains 12 million tons of oil. What would happen if it were bombed or sabotaged?

First, an incident of that sort would lead to a terrible environmental crisis that would, for many years to come, frustrate land reclamation projects on both sides of the pipeline—north from Diyarbakir to the outskirts of Erzurum and south from Mardin to the Syrian border and maybe even to the Iraqi border.

Second, the Tigris would become contaminated and so would Fan Lake as well as the Euphrates and its lakes and dams. Contamination would impair hydroelectric power stations. Chemical imbalances would rob the water of being "sweet running water" and would render it worthless for drinking and irrigation. It then become necessary to launder the sick water with Euphrates and Tigris waters flowing from the north. Experts pose some embarrassing questions at this point: how extensive are the negative outcomes of the giant dams that have been erected? Would it be possible to launder or reclaim dam water, specifically at the Ataturk dam?

Third, Syrian and Iraqi territories, by virtue of the two major rivers Tigris and Euphrates, are especially susceptible to catastrophes of this sort. The Euphrates, which flows through Syria and Iraq, and the Tigris, which crosses the triangle, are suffering relative water problems as a direct result of the huge factories that the neighbor to the north has built over the past several years. They already suffer a chemical imbalance; so, what would their water be like if a new disorder is added to the existing malady? What would become of the tripartite water agreement between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq? That agreement, signed in 1987, is but a first step toward righting the wrong inflicted on the two Arab states by Turkey's monopolistic utilization of the waters of the two rivers and by its refusal to allow the Euphrates to cascade into Syria at upwards of 500 cubic meters per second.

It is to be noted that Turkey has adamantly refused over the years to recognize the international nature of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The pretext it cites is the absence of international law regulating the water utilization of transnational rivers. One wonders why no such law exists, except in the form of a bill that a United Nations committee was assigned to draft in 1971 but only completed in 1992 in time for the Water Committee meetings held as part of the Madrid multilateral talks.

Fourth, this situation leads us to wonder about the future of water negotiations should a catastrophe occur, perhaps as a result of pipeline bombing or sabotage. How would the ailing waters be utilized and shared if the so-called Middle East Crisis is settled or in case the peace process derailed or totally collapsed?

In view of the seriousness of the situation and because a catastrophe would be pervasive, pipeline security has so far reflected the understanding of the parties directly or indirectly concerned with the water issue and with the war raging in the vicinity of the pipeline in southeast Anatolia. That explains why tensions have been so responsibly handled in the talks held every now and then between Ankara and Damascus over water and the Kurdish Workers Party, and between Ankara and Baghdad over water and the Kurdish problem.

These talks mirror the tensions that have risen in recent years. Some observers even go as far as to analyze government performance in this regard. They point out that both the Turkish Government and Workers Party militias have been careful not to endanger the pipeline. Turkey cannot jeopardize the pipeline whose closure would cause it to suffer financial losses. The militias, on the other hand, do not want to destroy an asset that runs in what they claim is their territory. They had previously advocated seceding the territory from Turkey but are now calling, albeit imperceptibly, for selfrule within a federal framework.

But, what guarantees do we have that the pipeline would not be blasted in error? Did the U.S. Air Force not mistakenly bring down a friendly over northern Iraq some two months ago? What guarantee do we have that a disabled plane would not plunge on top of the pipeline?

As if it were everybody's darling, that pipeline! They all disagree on everything except looking out for it. It is true that friction between Turkey and both Syria and Iraq predates the pipeline by many years. The pipeline is likewise predated by the conflict between the State of Turkey and those whom it calls Mountain Turks rather than Kurds.

Nevertheless, the pipeline has come to figure prominently in all regional affairs. Turkey, having erected dams and caused problems, has no option but to shoulder the pipeline's burdens and caveats because it has profited by it a great deal and hopes to profit even more in the future. Its security concerns over the pipeline began with the Iran-Iraq war, continued through that

war, and increased with the embargo on Iraq because of the severity of that embargo and of the spiraling confrontation between the Turkish state and Kurdish Workers Party militias who have come to aspire to something akin to the unnatural status achieved since 1991 by leaders of the autonomous region in northern Iraq.

Turkey has therefore pushed, to the extent that it could, for lifting the Iraqi embargo or at least easing it by allowing the pipeline to be emptied of its oil cargo in preparation for the resumption of pumping when the embargo is lifted. It reached a preliminary agreement with Iraq in that regard and relayed the text of that agreement to Washington. The end result is that Turkey's Under Secretary of State Ozdem Sanberk succeeded a few days ago in obtaining U.S. consent to have the pipeline drained.

They call the pipeline a "jail," because it symbolizes the capture of international will and its subjugation to orders from Washington. The Turks have been unable since the embargo on Iraq to draw one drop of pipeline oil because the Americans withheld consent, whereas the United Nations has turned into another Federal Government agency!

Will the pipeline be drained in accordance with the two-months-old Turkish-Iraqi agreement, which the Americans insisted on modifying during their talks with Ozdem Sanberk?

At any rate, it now becomes obvious the extent to which control can be exerted over events, particularly if they relate to armed opposition movements, regardless of whether their followers are called terrorists or freedom-fighters.

As to the details of the agreement on the destiny of pipeline oil and the future of pumping—a lot has been and is being written, and even more will be written in the future. Alas, the pipeline is akin to the Ukrainian reactor at Chernobyl, in that each carries within it the seeds of danger, but both are indispensable.

Cabinet Bans 129 Foreign Commodities From Market

94LH0093B Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
6 Jul 94 p 7

[Article by Kazim al-Ta'i: "Start of Implementation of Decree Banning Circulation of 129 Commodities"]

[Text] Last Friday, the authorities concerned in the Baghdad Governorate started implementing the cabinet decree banning the display and circulation of 129 commodities.

Committees for identifying commodities, examination, and confiscation have been formed. They include representatives of the Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Finance, the Economic Crime Control Directorate, and the Trade Control Directorate. An operations room has been

formed under the chairmanship of the governor of Baghdad to follow up on the work of the assigned committees.

In an interview with AL-JUMHURIYAH, Colonel al-Huquqi Diya'-al-Din, head of the Economic Crime Control Directorate, pointed out that Revolution Command Council decree No. 30 of 1993 will be applied against violators; that this decree contains severe and decisive penalties to protect our national economy under the circumstances of the tyrannical blockade; and that the system of operation rooms has been revived in Baghdad and the governorates.

As to the Economic Crime Control Directorate's measures to prevent the circulation of foreign currencies outside the official outlets, al-Huquqi said, "The circulation of foreign currencies in official outlets, such as banks, money changing companies, and official agencies, is legitimate. There are 40 companies in Baghdad, five in Nineveh [Ninawa], five in al-Basrah, bank branches in the governorates, and first-class hotels. Purchase and sale are conducted in accordance with official receipts that support transactions legally so as to prevent illegal speculation."

Muthanna Ibrahim al-Hatim, general director of the Trade Control Directorate at the Ministry of Trade, has said that the banned commodities are not essential commodities under these circumstances and that the ministry, along with operation rooms, keeps an eye on violators.

Ba'th Party Assumes Role in Price Controls

94LH0085A Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
27 Jun 94 pp 1, 15

[Article by Salah al-Mukhtar: "The People's Authority, the Embargo, and the Party"]

[Text] Recent decrees by the revolutionary leadership vest certain Party organizations with authority to detain individuals and confiscate assets used in illegal activities. Close observers of those edicts must go beyond simply depicting them as oversight by the people. They should thoroughly scrutinize the powers vested in Party organizations as well as examine how they relate to the embargo and ascertain their value for containing it.

Since the advent of the 17-30 July 1968 revolution, the political scene in Iraq has been distinguished by the Ba'th Arab Socialist Party's leadership role in effecting major fundamental changes in society and in structuring models for the national renaissance. The revolution would have fallen short of its primary objectives were it not for the Party's organizational structure throughout Iraq. Our Party has led, as well as participated, in initiating Iraq's great revolutionary developments. It has assumed leadership of change because the leader of the revolution, President Saddam Husayn, is also the country's secretary general and as such commands the Party organization that controls the state through cells that

permeate even the most remote of Iraqi villages, thereby creating a most effective apparatus with profound influence over society and the state.

The Party organization likewise performs an executive function that is unparalleled in society. It ensures the implementation and follow-up of command decisions either through coordinating with state agencies or through popular oversight. The Ba'th Socialist Party has therefore been the vanguard leader of the process of revolutionary societal development and has charted the state's policies and its general course.

Saddam's glorious guidance of the Party's leadership role that helped shape it into the primary force that ensures organizing society and its masses, mobilizing it, and dedicating its resources to the defense of Iraq the Great. It has also ensured wide-scale popular participation in repulsing Iranian aggression. As to the mother-of-all-battles, despite the ferocity of the attack and the extraordinary force deployed against Iraq, Party apparatus (both civilian and military) have played a critical role in instilling steadfastness in the face of military aggression and in eliminating those who drifted into the world of treachery and treason.

Today, as the embargo approaches its conclusion and as the struggle grows in intensity and complexity, the leader of the revolution and of society has decided to bolster the Party's role in the critical battle that calls for a change in approach and strategy in order to guarantee utmost steadfastness and fortitude.

Since the enemy strives to harm the Iraqi people's livelihood and services and all other methods having failed, it becomes mandatory to alleviate the Iraqi people's suffering to the extent possible, and to improve services to the highest level possible. Those two objectives require more than activating and propelling the apparatus of the state and of popular organizations; and there is nothing more effective and lasting than oversight by the people.

In view of the extraordinary challenges posed by the embargo, the state's apparatus need general popular support in the form of assistance in decision implementation and follow-up as well as in the form of creative initiatives to support those decisions. The experiences of the past four years prove that the enemy's situation rooms are working day and night to undermine state decisions and plans to protect the people and make their lives easier under the embargo. Those situation rooms seek by all means to turn those policies into exercises in frustration.

It is no longer feasible, therefore, to be content with official government oversight of state decisions. It has become necessary that the Party engage in an effective struggle that combines popular authority with popular oversight. Popular oversight is necessary to identify violations and the evasion of state decisions meant to alleviate the people's suffering. But oversight alone is not

enough, because the Party does not exercise its leadership directly. It relies for that on state agencies and apparatus. This is where oversight has lagged, and decisive action has been lacking to deal with cases of negativism that the Party had identified and referred to the supreme authority.

In view of that, and in order to confront the enemy's wily designs, it clearly became necessary to vest some Party organizations with the executive powers they need to put a stop to the infractions and aberrations that add to the suffering of the people. That has prompted the astute and pragmatic decree to vest the people, Party troops, and people's councils with authority to detain and confiscate the assets of those who endanger the people's livelihoods and who wittingly or unwittingly serve the interests of the enemy.

That is a momentous decree of great significance, because it endows popular oversight with the ability to act and summarily bring an end to such violations. The end result is twofold. First, transgressions would provoke immediate and summary punishments that would deter the overwhelming majority of violators. Second, the masses who are the embargo's victims would emerge as defenders of their own interests. This translates into the creation of a comprehensive and effective oversight network reinforced with firm deterrents.

It is obvious therefore that the Party is once again in the vanguard, taking the lead in a venerable mission to bolster the spirit of steadfastness, reduce the embargo's burden, and increase people's input in determining their present and their future. We need creative popular initiatives and the Party's blossoming creative capacity as we elevate it to new heights in order to design for each citizen a role to play in the battle to end the embargo.

Report on Price Control Committees of Ba'th Party

94LH0086A Baghdad AL-'IRAQ in Arabic 30 Jun 94
p 3

[Article by 'Abd-al-Amir al-Faysal: "AL-'IRAQ in the Field to Monitor the Experiment of People's Oversight Over Prices; Open Seminars and Market Policing Committees at the Ba'th Party's Abi-Ja'far al-Mansur Branch"]

[Text] One shows one's mettle in times of difficulty, when it is possible to tell the difference between white thread and black thread, sincerely hopeful that white will prevail along with goodness, gallantry, and altruism. It behooves each of us these days of the unfair embargo to discharge our duty toward our people and countrymen in order that they may persevere in the face of the embargo and frustrate the enemy's designs to undermine the will of the great people of Iraq.

With that goal of bolstering the people's will in mind, the Revolutionary Command Council has issued a decree which vests party organizations and people's councils

with authority to police the markets, empowering them to become fully involved with preserving price stability and safeguarding the food supply against exploitation by the unscrupulous.

In order to monitor that decree's implementation, AL-'IRAQ visited the 'Abi-Ja'far al-Mansur branch, where it met with comrade Luqman 'Udat Mutlaq al-Dulaymi, secretary general of the 'Abi Ja'far al-Mansur branch of the Ba'th Arab Socialist Party. He reviewed the grave responsibilities with which they were honored by the great leader Saddam Husayn, who has entrusted Party organizations with playing an effective and constructive role in stabilizing local markets and warding off unlawful price increases fabricated by the weak-spirited who exploit the conditions imposed on our people by the unjust embargo.

[Al-Faysal] How do you plan to implement the decree?

[Al-Dulaymi] As part of the responsibilities of the Abi-Ja'far al-Mansur branch, we moved to contact the comrade directly, immediately after the decree was issued, in order to explain the edict and its positive impact on citizens by stabilizing the market. We accomplished this by holding symposia emphasizing that the honor bestowed upon us by the comrade leader Saddam Husayn is a responsibility added to the struggles of our great party. It is a duty entrusted to us, and we will strive to carry it out in a manner consistent with its targeted objectives. We also have held open seminars for grocers and shopkeepers who deal in foods, vegetables, and fruits. Our aim was to alert them in order that none of them may stray and we would lose one of our countrymen.

[Al-Faysal] How do you rate the progress achieved so far?

[Al-Dulaymi] We are absolutely delighted by the decree's positive results and by how committed merchants, grocers, and shopkeepers are to its implementation, reflecting the true depth of the relationship between the leader and his people on one hand and between the party and the people on the other. Respect for the decree reflects the true feelings of citizens and their dedication to their countrymen and their motherland. We have not come across a single case of noncompliance, thanks to constant vigil by the committees formed from among leaders of Party divisions and chapters within the Abi-Ja'far al-Mansur branch organization.

There is no doubt that the contingency created by the continued unjust economic embargo requires that we double our efforts to safeguard our national economy and strengthen the elements it needs to persevere. We must likewise double our efforts to thwart unscrupulous individuals from exploiting the state of embargo for purposes of their greed, and to prevent those scattered incidents from becoming a pattern or a phenomenon harmful to society. The decree has therefore been consistent with the current state of our great Iraq. We will be

strict but fair in employing it against proven violations of official food, vegetables, and fruit price controls.

The comrade secretary general of the Abi-Ja'far al-Mansur branch added: "In order to diligently and responsibly enforce the decree in coordination with people's councils and other agencies, a situation room has been established at every Party branch to receive the field audits of the committees created in Party divisions to ensure compliance with the decree and adherence to price controls which serve the interests of buyers and sellers equally."

[Al-Faysal] What measures have you adopted for the implementation of Revolutionary Command Council decree on policing and controlling the sale and circulation of foreign currency other than in designated bureaus?

[Al-Dulaymi] There is no doubt that recent decrees governing local markets have had a clear and significant impact on stabilizing prices to a reasonable degree, on preventing the exploitation of the current state of emergency to the detriment of citizens, and on containing the circulation of foreign currency outside official exchange bureaus. This latest decree has put an end to those who used foreign currency as a medium for misbegotten gain. The branch has instituted several actions to police and prevent the sale of foreign currency outside money exchanges. Several committees have already been formed to follow up on the decree and monitor its proper enforcement. There is no doubt that we will not be lenient about violations of this Revolutionary Command Council decree. We will be as strict as it takes to achieve the decree's targeted objectives in the service of our people and our motherland.

[Al-Faysal] What initiatives has the branch taken under these conditions?

[Al-Dulaymi] We in the Abi-Ja'far branch organization have been diligent in launching many charitable initiatives such as when many physicians volunteered to treat citizens for free, when barbers within the branch's bailiwick reduced their charges, and when butchers volunteered to supply poor families with monthly meat allotments—thereby creating benevolent links among citizens. The branch's Fund allocates monthly stipends of 400 dinars for each of 1,624 families, and some 4,600 additional families have been beneficiaries of funds provided by the leader comrade Saddam Husayn.

Quick Results

Comrade Fadhil Muhammad al-Mashhadani, member of the leadership [council] of the Abi-Ja'far al-Mansur branch, told AL-'IRAQ that Revolutionary Command Council Decree No. 56, which charges Party organizations and people's councils with policing prices and punishing violators, was prompted by the real suffering that the leader comrade Saddam Husayn, may God keep him, discerned as a consequence of the irresponsible

behavior of some weak-spirited individuals who have exploited the unjust embargo to gouge the citizenry. The decree had great impact on our countrymen and quickly resulted in strict compliance with the Revolutionary Command Council decree. Our branch Party organization in the divisions and chapters has devised plans to enforce the decree, police local markets within the branch's bailiwick, and identify those elements who attempt to manipulate the people's sustenance in their quest for illicit gain at the expense of the citizenry.

Accordingly, the committees charged with policing local markets have acted in coordination with the people's council and other agencies to control noncompliance. It was very satisfying to witness that the decree had rapid and positive results that reflect profound understanding and quick responsiveness by our compatriots the merchants, grocers, and shopkeepers.

Comrade Fadhil Muhammad added: "The emergency economic situation created by the unfair economic embargo is a temporary contingency. The unjust embargo will eventually come to an end as its objectives are frustrated by the efforts and solidarity of our loyal countrymen."

Justice Called Historic Responsibility of Ekeus

94LH0092A Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
8 Jul 94 p 6

[Article by Dr. Sami Sa'dun]

[Text] On 18 July, the Security Council will begin its periodic review of the unjust blockade imposed on Iraq. This review will follow the two reviews of last March and May, both of which saw praise for Iraq's cooperation and an open demand by the majority of members for lifting the blockade imposed on its people, compared to the contrasting and isolated U.S. position. The United States insists, for retaliatory reasons, on maintaining the blockade for a longer period on the pretext that the Special Commission chairman has not completed his work and has not submitted his report to the Security Council, not to mention other worn-out pretexts.

Since the Security Council's session of last March—which was held to discuss the the commission's monthly report, submitted by Mr. Ekeus in accordance with paragraph No. 22 of Security Council Resolution No. 687—Ekeus has been praising Iraq's cooperation and stressing that the commission work is nearing its end and that they have completed drafting the monitoring plan. In his latest tour in Paris, Moscow, Bonn, London, and Washington and before arriving in Baghdad on the 4th of this month of July, Ekeus asserted that he will submit his report to the Security Council's coming review session. Even though Ekeus has not revealed the nature of his report, the Special Commission's report must, in accordance with reality and logic, be fair, just, objective, and courageous in underlining the truth so that paragraph

22—which calls for lifting the blockade after the prohibited weapons dossier is closed and after Iraq fulfills the obligations imposed on it—will be implemented immediately.

Mr. Ekeus is faced with a major historic responsibility that dictates that he tell the truth honestly and objectively. There is no justification and no place for procrastination in submitting his report for review, because delay and procrastination will, as Mr. Ekeus is well aware, increase the dimensions of the tragedy and of the human hardship emanating from the unjust blockade that has claimed the lives of thousands of children, women, old men, and patients. If pretexts have been fabricated in recent years, then those lies have collapsed now and the Security Council is aware of the true nature of the Special Commission's work, which has been completed technically. All the commission has to do, according to the demand of the majority of the members, is submit its final report, coupled with the monitoring program, even though implementation of this program actually started when two cameras were installed in July 1993 or, at most, when Iraq declared its acceptance of Resolution 715 last November. Premeditated procrastination and delay this time and under the umbrella of the current atmosphere prevailing in the Security Council halls can only be interpreted as submission to the will of the U.S. administration, which is the only party that is determined to prolong the blockade for well-known reasons that have nothing to do with Security Council resolutions. The Special Commission faces its responsibility, and honesty dictates that it underline the truth about its completion of its mission in its report to the Security Council, without any pressure from this or that party. Only then will the commission and its chairman have objectively and honestly completed their mission. And this is the only thing that will absolve it of the responsibility of premeditated delay and of its painful human consequences. This is what we hope for and what we expect to happen in this July's coming session.

As for the Clinton administration, one can only expect it to persist in its feverish endeavors to prolong the blockade, even though it is aware that these are desperate endeavors that the international community will reject strongly this time. Moreover, this administration has realized that this approach will not accomplish its retaliatory political objectives against the Iraq of hero Saddam Husayn. Our struggling people will, despite their hardship, continue to be steadfast and patient. A lot has passed and only a little remains. The blockade will inevitably pass in the near future, and this is a fact that will, God willing, gouge the enemies' eyes and will deflect their malice to their hearts.

ISRAEL

Dangers of Religious-Secular Conflict Analyzed

94AA0096A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
17 Jul 94 p B1

[Article by Amnon Denkner: "Why a Jewboy?"]

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[Text] The cry "Jewboy!" that was shouted by Knesset Member [MK] Mikha'el Eytan at his colleague Ron Cohen in the heat of the debate has aroused the usual raft of repudiative and denunciatory reactions, but how interesting can they be? There is something deeper than the conventional supposition that what is involved here is excitement and excessive nervous arousal. For the purpose of this discussion, we need not hold our breath in anticipation of an apology by Eytan in the good Eretz-Yisra'el spirit. That would not matter. What is interesting is that the use by MK Eytan of an antisemitic term regarding a Jewish disputant is not new and certainly should not knock people off of their chairs for surprise, for it is a usage that is a characteristic sign in the history of the Israeli right.

The revisionist movement, which was the hard core of the right, was founded and operated as an almost exact copy, in the spirit of the times, of the fascist and quasifascist movements in Europe and, mainly, of the movements of the extreme right in Poland. The ideas, the uniforms, the parades, the glory, the legions, the flags, and even the slogan "only thus," as a translation of the Polish "Tilko Tak." One does not have to be very intelligent to foresee that the internalization of the style of the non-Jewish, violent, antisemitic right would also lead to the internalization of those non-Jews' opinion of the Jews. And, indeed, the cult of force, national pride sliding into blind extreme nationalism and scorn and calumny of those who appeared and still appear to be traitors on the national issue only because they have a more moderate viewpoint, led the Eretz-Yisra'eli and the Israeli right to harsh expressions against the left, which it viewed and, indeed, defined, many times, by many of the characteristics that the antisemites ascribe to the Jews.

In the mythology of the Israeli right—were we only able to say here, indeed, only the extreme right—the compromise-ready left was defined as grovelling, Jewboy, Judenrat, collaborator, devoid of a feeling for the homeland, money grubbing and licentious, deceitful, scheming, embezzling, and corruptor of tender and innocent souls. What is amusing is that the right tended to traditionally accuse the left of "self-hatred" at the same time that it itself was so swept by this self-hatred until only a hair, if at all, distinguished some of its statements from what was common among luminaries such as Goebbels and Goering.

More than anything, this approach expresses, in its continuation to this day, the existence of a cultural chasm. A great deal of anger and a great deal of enmity are building up on the secular and religious right against what they grasp as a dominant secular, liberal, permissive, and leftist culture that has taken over the state and the spirit of its people. The assertions against this culture from their side—which may be read mainly in what has become the journal of the ideological right, NEKUDA—are similar in an unsurprising way to the assertions that ultra-nationalist, right-wing circles in Europe in the twenties and the thirties made against the Jewish culture

that, they said, had taken over their countries: it is degenerate, weakens the national impulse, cosmopolitan, corrupting, hedonistic, and sick. Opposed to it is a healthy, traditional, national culture that is linked to the land and to religion and can instill strength in the limp limbs of the nation, except that a Jewboy-leftist-liberal conspiracy keeps it from growing and developing.

In this cultural alienation there are good news and bad news. The good news is that in contrast to part of its leadership, which still suffers from the heritage of Revisionist alienation, the decisive majority of the secular, right-wing public in Israel feels no such alienation—its young members dance and sing at the 'Arad Festival, their parents read Me'ir Shalev and 'Amos 'Oz and the evening newspapers and watch the various television programs like everyone else. There is no cultural fissure between them and the others.

The bad news is that the religious, nationalist right is really alienated from the dominant culture in Israel, scorns it, and envies it a bit. A journalist who accompanied Ge'ula Cohen three months ago and went with her into a clothing store in Qiryat Arba heard her say that it has everything, just like on Dizengoff. And again, when he and she were guests of the author Na'omi Frankel in the Jewish Quarter in Hebron, the hostess said to him when she served cake, you see, people here eat just like on Dizengoff. There is something pathetic, despicable, and certainly not very au courant—for even Shenkin [street] has already waned in favor of Florentine [street]—in defining the dominant culture, which is to be worshipped, as "Dizengoff," and here there is certainly an odor that is reminiscent of conversations with emigrants who have not visited the country for many years.

But Cohen and Frankel are only secular appendages of the central force of the Jews in the territories—the nationalist religious force that views Dizengoff, Shenkin, and Florentine and all the rest as a dangerous lair. The cultural alienation is what frightens and not necessarily the political antagonism, for the former, more than the latter, is what negates the legitimacy of the other side, defines it as despicable and abhorrent, and prepares the program for acts of violence of Jews against Jews.

Dan Meridor on Likud Policies, Leadership

94AA0096B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
7 Jul 94 p B2

[Article by Amnon Barzilay: "Does Not Want Youth Movement Slogans"]

[Text] On Saturday evening, at the mass demonstration of the right at Kikar Zion, MK [member of Knesset] Dan Meridor understood the problem that was created by the connection between the Likud and the settlers. In a room near the balcony from which the speeches were made at the demonstration, Meridor conducted, together with his comrades Beni Begin and Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert, a difficult argument with the chiefs of the

Judaea-Samaria-Gaza Council. Meridor and his comrades said that it was necessary to sing "Hatikva" and to disperse. The settlers were not satisfied with a demonstration. They wanted to go to East Jerusalem, to Orient House. "It cannot be considered," Meridor said to the settlers, "You disperse after the demonstration." Likud Chairman Benyamin Netanyahu held a similar opinion.

The two expressed different positions on another issue. The former director-general of the prime minister's office, Yosi Ben-Aharon, asked Meridor to support initiatives to approach the heads of the American Congress so that they would act to pass a law against the stationing of an American military force on the Golan Heights. Meridor vehemently opposed this initiative. Ben-Aharon heard a different response from Netanyahu.

Dan Meridor's popularity has increased in recent months. He is a sought-after speaker for the Likud, and there are those in the party who assert that he is the most active. More than Netanyahu the chairman. This phenomenon is not reflected in public opinion polls. But members of the Knesset faction, members of the government press office, and persons active in Jewish organizations confirm its existence. There is today no American senator—not to speak of a leader of one of the Jewish communities—who will try to meet with a figure from the Israeli opposition and will not first try to meet with Meridor.

There is no unequivocal explanation for this. It may be that the popularity that Meridor enjoys is related to a move by David Magen, who put forward Meridor's name a year and a half ago as a candidate for the leadership of the Likud. It may be that the reason is based on the way in which Meridor presents his political views. A strong hawk in his political views, who is capable of maintaining, at least outwardly, a moderate persona. Foreign visitors relate to him as a gentleman. It is not clear if such an image helps someone who wants to compete to be prime minister of Israel.

One of Meridor's main activities is striving for a break between the Likud's political activity and the extreme right. "The Likud is characterized by the integration of security, human rights, liberalism, Eretz-Yisra'el, and peace. This integration does not characterize Moledet and Tehiya." [quotation marks as published]

[HA'ARETZ] Do you agree with Yitzhak Shamir's opinion that Yasir 'Arafat's visit in the areas of the autonomy is the beginning of the destruction of Israel?

[Meridor] "Everyone expresses himself in his own way."

[HA'ARETZ] That is all?

[Meridor] "I do not criticize the style of others."

[HA'ARETZ] But do you stand behind that declaration?

[Meridor] "Were I a critic of speeches, I would say that 'Arafat's speech on the day of his arrival in Gaza was not impressive, but it mainly related to the PLO's multistage

plan. There were some very serious messages in the speech. 'Arafat told the Arabs of the Negev and the Galilee that their day would come. He said that he had come to Gaza and Jericho. Afterwards to Kalkiliya and Bethlehem. Afterwards to Jerusalem and afterwards to the Negev and to the Galilee."

[HA'ARETZ] What exactly is the source of your fear?

[Meridor] "It is what they asked the Prince of Kuwait on the eve of the Iraqi invasion."

[HA'ARETZ] Are you comparing the State of Israel to Kuwait?

[Meridor] "Not today, but when Netanya is 18 km from the border?"

[HA'ARETZ] Are you apprehensive that the Palestinians will have a state of their own?

[Meridor] "It is not the Palestinians that frighten me, rather a return to the 1967 lines. Abba Eban once called them Auschwitz lines. When Sadat came, his message was peace. 'Arafat remains the same person. He praises all those who engaged in terror. He speaks of my brother the hero Ahmed Yasin. He praises the stone throwers."

[HA'ARETZ] Many of the Likud leaders were not enthusiastic at the time about Sadat's speech.

[Meridor] "Correct, both Chief of Staff Mota Gur and persons in the Likud did not receive Sadat, did not believe in the peace moves. In retrospect, it is clear that Menahem Begin was right."

[HA'ARETZ] The continuer of Begin's way, Yitzhak Shamir, was ready to drag out the negotiations for many years.

[Meridor] "The problem is that the time factor in the equation has turned upside down. The Arabs think that this government must, for political reasons, bring about a peace agreement. That if there will not be peace before the elections, there will be nothing to present in advance of them. How can negotiations be conducted when the other side knows that you do not have time?"

[HA'ARETZ] And again to the matter of 'Arafat's speech—it seems that he is imprisoned by his rhetoric and that you, too, are dragged along after him.

[Meridor] "I must relate to his speech, what would I refer to if not to the speech? We have still not seen what he is doing. I definitely accept that we must examine not what he did and said in the past, but the other side's behavior in the future. Whether the terror ceases. Whether they do not return to cries of Jihad. I do not want to be the prisoner of a conception."

[HA'ARETZ] That is to say, you accept that what is involved is a new diplomatic situation?

[Meridor] "What stands before us is not only a demand to honor the agreement and the signature on it, but also

the question of the rest of the way. There are undertakings that 'Arafat accepted in the agreement and has not carried out: the abrogation of the Palestinian Covenant, denunciation of the terror. And there were the calls for Jihad over Jerusalem."

[HA'ARETZ] And if 'Arafat carries out the undertakings?

[Meridor] The Likud will have to see reality as it will be then, including the agreement. We cannot escape reality. It is impossible to ignore signed agreements of a legitimate government, even if it errs, and what it signs obligates the Likud. It will have to examine whether the terror was ended and to arrive at the best agreement."

[HA'ARETZ] Do you see yourself conducting negotiations with 'Arafat?

[Meridor] "I do not see myself meeting with him. That is not the main question."

[HA'ARETZ] But if you return to power, 'Arafat will be your partner.

[Meridor] "That is a hypothetical question. I do not wish to relate to it."

[HA'ARETZ] 'Arafat is not hypothetical. Why do you evade answering the question, would you meet with 'Arafat for the purpose of negotiations?

[Meridor] "That term, to evade, is not bad. I do not yet know. Even though the problem whether I would meet with 'Arafat is not personal. Despite the dramatic aspect, it would not be wise to say what the Likud would do."

[HA'ARETZ] Do you not think that perhaps the Likud's voters are curious and want to know already now whether you would meet with 'Arafat?

[Meridor] "They know the main points of the Likud's approach. Today there is an increase in support for the Likud. Before the elections, we will have to draw up the platform. Remember what Yitzhak Rabin once called 'Arafat. It was only months before he met with him."

[HA'ARETZ] What is your position regarding a possible visit by 'Arafat to Jerusalem?

[Meridor] "'Arafat reminds me of what Jabotinsky once said. When a thief comes to your home and sings the anthem, you have to be stupid to stand at attention while he empties the house. He does not come to Jerusalem to pray. It would not be wise on the part of the government to allow him to come to Jerusalem. It is not a feast, it is a demonstration. It is a political statement."

Meridor has recently won much praise and esteem in the Likud due to the exposure of the letter of Shimon Peres to Jorgen Holst on the subject of the continued activity of PLO institutions in East Jerusalem. It became clear that it is not necessary to take extreme positions and to link up with the extreme right in order to accumulate time on the air and public popularity. This parliamentary action by Meridor and Beni Begin succeeded in

eroding the credibility of the government and especially the credibility of Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres. The methods of working, the sophisticated briefing of the journalists, the choice of the questions that were posed to Peres—Meridor's touch was evident in all of these.

As soon as the existence of 'Arafat's cassette became public, Meridor and Begin studied the speech and analyzed thoroughly the things that he said in Johannesburg regarding the letter on the subject of Jerusalem. Meridor denies, but in the Likud they do not exclude the possibility that thanks to his credibility and the esteem he receives in governmental entities, including analysis entities, someone supplied him with a lead. In the final analysis, it was Meridor who succeeded in shaking Peres from his tranquillity and causing him to burst out uncharacteristically at the journalists; after they quoted Meridor, who said that he was a liar, they caught from the foreign minister the epithet "a wilde hayas" [Yiddish for wild animals].

In fact, Meridor did not use the word liar. He said that Peres spoke an "untruth," and for that he caught an uncomplimentary reprimand from MK Eliyahu Ben-Elisar. It was in the discussion that the Likud faction held after the affair of the letter was revealed, a discussion that was intended to crystallize ways of responding. "You have to use more extreme expressions, be more outspoken, ratchet it up," Ben-Elisar said to him. "It is possible to give a message in any way," Meridor replied, "I will speak in my own way. I will not change myself." Apparently, Meridor is not capable of uttering the word liar. A great attribute in a man, perhaps a great deficiency in a politician.

[HA'ARETZ] What parts of the Likud platform do you propose to revise?

[Meridor] "It is impossible to ignore reality. No one would propose to reconquer Gaza. Therefore, it would not be logical were we to write in the platform that we want to impose autonomy on Gaza. It is already not realistic."

[HA'ARETZ] What about Judea and Samaria?

[Meridor] "If there will not be an additional agreement in Judea and Samaria, the platform of the Likud, which speaks of a functional compromise in the manner of autonomy, is a good idea."

[HA'ARETZ] The State of Israel without Gaza and Jericho is already not the entire Land of Yisra'el.

[Meridor] "I am ready to take risks for the sake of a reasonable and calculated peace agreement."

[HA'ARETZ] What is your interim conclusion with the implementation of the autonomy?

[Meridor] "There were estimates by the security arms that there would be an increase in the terror activities. I

shared those apprehensions. In fact, since the implementation of the autonomy, the security situation was much better than I had feared."

[HA'ARETZ] So you do not ascribe this to 'Arafat?

[Meridor] "I note a fact. The terror has decreased. But it is an illusion to think that if we insist and do not give to 'Arafat what he wants, that the terror will not intensify."

[HA'ARETZ] Do you not feel the difficulty of selling the Likud's position today?

[Meridor] "Among the public there is support for the agreement, but a growing portion—is worried. The euphoria at the time of the Oslo Agreement has been replaced by a sobering up. A large portion of the public, even if it is not opposed, is worried by the negotiations and fears that we will concede too much."

[HA'ARETZ] You are considered in the Likud to be moderate in your political views.

[Meridor] "I do not know what is moderate and what is extreme. I know that two conditions must be upheld. One—one must have a clear sense of where one wants to go. The second—one must have one's feet on the ground. Not to err with illusions that it is possible to solve everything in a brief maneuver. I do not want to be left with youth movement slogans."

[HA'ARETZ] Do you see any difference between the positions of the Likud and those of the rest of the right?

[Meridor] "We believe in the autonomy, the extreme right does not. We believe in a functional compromise, which involves no small risks. They believe that the autonomy is a danger and do not want to go on that path."

[HA'ARETZ] Therefore you seek to break the link between the Likud and the right?

[Meridor] "I am acting so that the Likud will lead the diplomatic maneuver. If others want to join it, I welcome that. The Likud must not become what it is not. The Likud is not an imitation of Moledet and Tehiya. In order to be victorious, it must be faithful to itself."

[HA'ARETZ] The impression is that, in fact, there is no big difference. You cooperate with the extreme right in demonstrations and in votes in the Knesset.

[Meridor] "Also when Labor was in opposition, it joined all the demonstrations of the left and of Peace Now."

[HA'ARETZ] What hides behind the meetings, in which you are participating, of MKs from the Likud and Labor?

[Meridor] "The dialogue with members of the opposing party is important. In the American Congress, as well, Republicans and Democrats hold meetings."

[HA'ARETZ] What is your message?

[Meridor] "There is no personal statement here. These members of Labor are dissatisfied with the line that has taken over the party."

[HA'ARETZ] To the same degree, can it be said that Knesset members from the Likud who came to the meetings are dissatisfied with the line that has taken over the Likud?

[Meridor] "In no way. The Labor people are in a coalition in which every vote has more importance, because it is part of Labor's blocking majority."

[HA'ARETZ] Are you preparing the basis for a party of the center?

[Meridor] "It is not intended for that, and I do not think that will be the result."

His easy disposition, they say in the Likud about Meridor, is perhaps his greatest enemy. He does have a relative advantage over Netanyahu: Meridor can bring about internal reconciliation within the Likud. Immediately after Netanyahu's election as chairman of the Likud, Meridor said to him that he did not do enough to conciliate David Levi. Meridor holds this opinion today, as well, although he is not willing to discuss it.

But Meridor, in contrast to other top persons in the Likud leadership, is trying to strengthen his position in the center of the political map. There, in his opinion, is the source of the votes that will decide which party will win in 1996. There are those who are undecided between Labor and the Likud. But Meridor himself engenders a feeling similar to that which is engendered by the floating votes—he is indecisive. Both in his behavior and in his speech, which is not always clear, unequivocal. The things that Meridor says off the record are always much more interesting than what he is willing to say in his own name. For that reason, he sounds less decisive, and that does not serve him. And, in any event, he has the image of a moderate who concedes more than is expected of a graduate of the Beitar movement.

[HA'ARETZ] Do you see yourself as a candidate for leadership of the Likud?

[Meridor] "I may compete in the future. I am likely to consider that positively."

[HA'ARETZ] When?

[Meridor] "Benyamin Netanyahu was elected as candidate of the Likud for prime minister in the 1996 elections."

[HA'ARETZ] What has to happen for there to be new elections for the leadership of the Likud?

[Meridor] "I do not want to open the discussion about the constitution. Netanyahu was elected. I do not want to deal with hypothetical questions. Any such involvement invites suppositions, doubts, speculations."

[HA'ARETZ] About half a year ago MK David Magen presented you as a candidate for leadership of the Likud.

[Meridor] "That was his initiative."

[HA'ARETZ] His initiative had your agreement.

[Meridor] "I do not know all of the details. Magen spoke with persons, there was no meeting. He spoke with journalists. I do not know exactly how it began. When I learned of it, I asked for observance of the policy that we do not open the candidacy within the Likud."

[HA'ARETZ] Given the apprehensions in the diplomatic sphere, perhaps you cannot allow yourself to wait?

[Meridor] "You are right, but the wrong way is to present the question: what is to be done if the candidate succeeds or does not succeed. Now we must stand behind Netanyahu."

[HA'ARETZ] There is disappointment with his leadership among the Likud's voters.

[Meridor] "A large portion of the voters believes that it is possible to return to rule immediately. Because of that they are disappointed and frustrated. I myself do not believe that the Likud can attain power in the near future."

Reduction in IDF's 'Qualitative Edge' Forecast

94AA0096D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
8 Jul 94 p B1

[Article by Ze'ev Shiff: "Problems of Excess Power"]

[Text] Has the power of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] begun to deteriorate? Many would respond in amazement on hearing the question. Israel signed recently a new deal for F-15A airplanes, among the most advanced attack airplanes. The construction of the submarines and the Sa'ar vessels is proceeding nicely. Nevertheless, the question arises whether the IDF can hold onto everything that it has, to develop and to procure and to maintain what exists. This question arose for me when the State Controller noted in her last report that in recent years the IDF has reduced its investments in development by 43 percent. An examination showed that this is a continuing process, and not only of "recent years." It turns out that in the last decade the decrease in the IDF's development budgets came to approximately 67 percent.

What is more: development concluded recently in the research and development department of the defense establishment of a special model that shows that in the present situation, the process of the deterioration of the IDF's power is unavoidable. It will occur unless special measures are taken. This is not a process that is characteristic of the IDF alone, and all of the advanced armies are encountering it.

The developer of the model is Dr. Brigadier General Yitzhak Ben-Yisra'el, an air force man who today heads the research and development department of the defense

establishment. Ben-Yisra'el gave a lecture on his model not long ago to the research employees of Rafa'el, and many were astounded by the description of the situation. The model aroused arguments, but it is difficult to contradict the data.

What spurred Dr. Ben-Yisra'el to develop the model is the repeated assertion of the senior command that there is never enough money, even though the subsistence budget of the IDF is increasing all the time. The IDF order of battle has not increased. There has even been a decrease in the number of units and in the standing army. In the last decade, investments in development have even decreased from 25 percent of the NIS [new Israeli shekel] budget in 1984 to less than 8 percent this year. If the share of development in the budget that also includes foreign currency is in issue, then the decrease is even steeper, to 5 percent. The steepest decline was in the years 1984-1990. Afterwards, the decrease continued at a moderate rate. The extent of the decrease is shown by the fact that in the American Army, investments in development amount to 13.2 percent of the overall budget, and in the French Army—to 18 percent.

One of the conclusions reached by the model is this: as the army becomes more modern, current expenditures for maintenance and subsistence go up. Not only is the modern equipment more expensive; but also the maintenance of this equipment is more expensive, as is personnel training. In other words: the more advanced the equipment of an army, the less money it has.

Fewer Modern Systems

Of course, the time comes when the equipment begins to become obsolete. And then the heads of the army find out that with the unallocated funds at their disposal, which, as stated, shrank due to the large subsistence expenditures, they can procure fewer modern systems at the same time. Not only because they have become more expensive, but also because funds are lacking. If in the previous stage they had succeeded in procuring, for example, 10 modern weapons systems, with the money that is now at their disposal they cannot purchase more than five systems and even less. From this point begins the slow waning of the army's power. That is the important conclusion. In the American and the French armies they told Ben-Yisra'el that this process is recognized also among them.

There is a kind of competition with the process of obsolescence, but beginning in the eighth year, the deterioration began in the new units, and beginning in the 10th year, this is reflected in the overall strength of the army. Ben-Yisra'el examined this in several scenarios. For example, if the size of the army remains fixed and if they withdraw old weapons regularly. The process of deterioration in this case will begin in the eleventh year. In another scenario, there is always an available budget amounting to approximately 20 percent of the general budget. Here, strength will increase in the beginning.

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Renewal will slow greatly in the eighth year, and the deterioration will begin in the tenth year. In another scenario, in which the IDF receives obsolete weapons from the United States as gifts, there will at first be no investments in procurement, but the subsistence budget will go up steeply after two years and there will be increasing erosion in the available budget.

The Quality Gap Will Narrow

Whoever seeks to draw conclusions about the IDF could say that for the past two years the IDF has reached the peak of its strength. But according to this model, the process of slow deterioration will begin in another two years. It is correct that a similar process will happen also to the Egyptian Army, for example. But the overall conclusion is that due to the purchases of modern weapons in the Arab armies, the quality gap that has always been in our favor will narrow and the relative losses in war are liable to worsen.

How do we extricate ourselves from the process of deterioration? One way, according to Ben-Yisra'el, is to reduce the army drastically. A slash of approximately 20 percent will allow a process of renewal. Another possibility is to increase the defense budget according to the growth in the [gross] national product. The Ministry of Finance strongly opposes this. A third way—to maintain a constant available budget. And a fourth way—to erode budget items as the Americans are doing today. For example, a very big cut in the subsistence expenditures, a significant cut in procurement, while the development budget is not touched at this stage.

What will the IDF do—it is not clear. But if this model is exact, certainly the multiyear plan of Lieutenant General Barak for renewing the army cannot be accomplished in the end unless there is a parallel decline in the IDF's order of battle.

Increase in Defense Exports for 1993 Reported

94AA0096C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
15 Jul 94 p 6

[Article by Sharon Sadeh: "Israel's Defense Exports Increased 20% in 1993"]

[Text] Israel's defense exports increased 20 percent in 1993 despite the slump in sales of weapons and armaments in the world market. According to defense sources, new foreign orders received by the defense industries came to approximately \$1.8 billion, as against approximately \$1.5 billion in 1992. Sales of the industries, which express actual deliveries of products and systems to customers, amounted to approximately \$1.4 billion in 1993, the same as in 1992.

Last year, most of the exports were to countries in the Far East, Asia, and Eastern Europe, and it seems that this trend will continue also in the future, although an

improvement was recorded this year in sales to existing markets and penetration of new markets, such as Oceania.

A defense source said that the increase in defense exports is an impressive achievement by the defense industries and the export and military assistance branch of the Ministry of Defense. According to him, Israel is apparently the only country that has succeeded, thanks to many marketing efforts, to increase the orders it received, at a time when procurement throughout the world is shrinking. He added that the order backlog of the defense industries will remain stable also in the future.

Israel maintains defense ties with more than 70 countries the world over. From 1975 to 1992, Israel increased sales by 75 percent, while global sales dropped by 45 percent in that period, and this trend continues.

The order backlog of Israel Aircraft Industries, the biggest arms exporter in Israel, today comes to approximately \$2.5 billion. The company's sales in 1993 came to \$1.45 billion, of which 75 percent were exports.

The most important orders and sales of Israel Aircraft Industries in the past year were:

- Production orders for equipment and platforms for approximately \$230 million in the framework of a deal for supplying unpiloted aircraft of the "Hunter" type for the U.S. Army, where IAI is serving as a sub-contractor for the American company TRW.
- The sale of systems manufactured by Elta for F-3 airplanes in Australia for approximately \$30 million. A follow-on deal in the amount of approximately \$40 million was signed a few days ago. (According to a report in the weekly FLIGHT).
- The supply of night-vision systems for Cobra helicopters of the U.S. Marines, for a preliminary value of approximately \$32 million.
- An order for laser-guided bombs from India for approximately \$10 million, as was published by foreign sources. (Report in the American weekly DEFENSE NEWS).
- The receipt of contracts related to the development of the antimissile "Arrow," for approximately \$50 million.
- The signing of contracts for the sale of Barak missiles to foreign purchasers in cooperation with Rafa'el (as part of multiyear deals), valued at tens of millions of dollars, as part of deals that amount to \$200 million to \$300 million. According to foreign publications, Barak missiles were sold to the navies of Singapore and Chile, in addition to vessels of the Israel Navy. (A report in the JANE'S annual).
- The sale of technology, consulting, and products for hundreds of millions of dollars to foreign clients, in the framework of multiyear deals. They include, according to foreign publications—China, India, and South Africa.

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The defense exports of the Military Industry came to approximately \$250 million in 1993, and this figure accounts for approximately 60 percent of the company's sales. The outstanding deals of TA'AS [military industries] in 1993 were the sale of ammunition and equipment to Romania and Estonia for more than \$100 million.

Rafa'el (the Armaments Development Authority) signed in 1993 new contracts totaling approximately \$150 million: approximately \$80 million in orders for missiles of various types, including "Barak" naval missiles and "Python" advanced air-to-air missiles; approximately \$30 million in orders for "Popeye" air-to-ground missiles by the United States; approximately \$30 million in orders for protective systems for armored vehicles and upgrading; orders of approximately \$20 million for electronic warfare systems. Rafa'el's exports for 1993 came to approximately \$100 million.

Elisra, a subsidiary of Tadiran that specializes in electronic warfare systems, concluded in 1993 new deals worth only approximately \$40 million, and the company's sales in 1993 came to approximately \$100 million.

Elbit reported revenues of approximately \$230 million from sales of military systems and products in 1993—an increase of approximately 18 percent over the previous year. The outstanding deal that Elbit reported in the past year was the upgrading of approximately 100 MiG-21 airplanes for the Romanian air force, for a multiyear total of approximately \$300 million. Actually, this deal brought only approximately \$12 million in revenues in 1993.

OMAN

First Woman Wins in Shura Election

94AE0162A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
1 Aug 94 p 4

[Article by Sa'id 'Uyasi: "First Woman Wins in Omani Shura Council Elections"]

[Text] Omani women took a major step forward with the victory of Lumays al-Ta'i in the Omani Shura Council elections. She won third place in Bawshar Wilayat, which is subordinate to the Muscat Governorate.

It is evident that the women of Bawshar were determined to gain one of the five nominations offered in the wilayat elections held on 30 July 1994. Despite intense competition, Lumays al-Ta'i was able to obtain 81 votes out of the 313 vote total. Her victory was accomplished from among 28 candidates, including five women. Immediately after her victory, Lumays al-Ta'i told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the women and men of Bawshar were all behind her. Despite her denial that she carried out any kind of election propaganda, sources among the

people of Bawshar confirmed to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the women of the wilayat united behind Lumays al-Ta'i, and that they campaigned for her inside the wilayat's homes.

Lumays al-Ta'i stressed that the strong social ties between her and the people of the wilayat was one factor for her victory. She said: "I had never thought of running, but the women and girls of Bawshar urged me to run. They supported me until I won."

Lumays al-Ta'i is an official in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and has considerable experience in social affairs. For two years she served as editor-in-chief of the magazine, al-UMANIYAH. This is a specialized women's magazine, published by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. She was also director of the Office of Women's Cultural Associations for three years. She is the daughter of the deceased Omani poet, 'Abdallah al-Ta'i, who was the first minister of information during the reign of Sultan Qabus in Oman in 1970.

Apparently the women of Bawshar learned a lot from the elections of the wilayats of Quryat and al-'Amirat, "which are among the six wilayats subordinate to the Governorate of Muscat that have permitted women to run for membership in the Shura Council for the first time."

In the Quryat Wilayat, a woman obtained only eight votes, and in the al-'Amirat Wilayat, the artist Sham'ah Muhammad won 48 votes. Neither of the two was nominated. Lumays al-Ta'i told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that she wanted women to win in the remaining three wilayat nominations, which are Muscat, Matrah, and al-Sib, because if she continued to be the only woman in the Shura, that would mean the failure of women to compete with men. She emphasized that the presence of more than one woman in the Shura Council would strengthen opportunities for the success of the experiment to put women on the Shura Council and would strengthen opportunities to broaden the experiment in the future.

Despite the fact that Lumays al-Ta'i's victory does not mean she will automatically obtain membership on the Shura Council, observers in Muscat believe that any woman who wins nomination will be chosen for council membership, in order to complete the experiment of permitting Omani women to enter the Shura Council. It is well known that the election of council members is done in two stages. In the first stage, shaykhs, prominent persons, and notables select two candidates from each wilayat with a population of less than 30,000, and four candidates from each wilayat with a population of more than 30,000, through free and direct elections. Then, official sultanate authorities choose one member in the first category and two members in the second category, without regard to number of votes or finishing place of each candidate.

Concerning what a woman might offer through council membership, Lumays al-Ta'i told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that a woman is like a man. She is his sister, his

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right arm, and half of society. Oman is a country with general, not special, issues. A woman's role in the Shura Council is just like a man's, with regard to the various developmental, economic, and social issues.

She added: "It is true that some probably think that a woman will only concentrate on her specific issues, but this belief is wrong, because society is a whole and is not divided. Woman is a basic support for man and vice versa. If woman is a pillar of the community, then man must support her role. Efforts must be integrated." She went on to say: "This is not just my opinion, but is the viewpoint of all women who have run in Bawshar and all parts of Oman. Women have always been side by side with men in the streets, the markets, the fields and factories, in the ministry, and everywhere. If there are women's issues, they ought to be concerning how to strengthen her role, help her become aware of her social and public responsibilities, and overcome obstacles—if they exist—in order to exercise her role fully and not inadequately."

It should be mentioned that the nomination process continues in Oman's 59 wilayats. It is scheduled to be completed by the middle of August. The names of the 80 members will be announced one month after the nominations have been completed. The new council is scheduled to begin its work in January 1995, for three years.

Manufacturing Grows at 17-Percent Rate for 1993

94AE0162B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
6 Aug 94 p 10

[Text] On 5 August 1994, it was announced in Muscat that the Omani industrial sector recorded a growth rate of 17 percent in 1993. That is a continuation of the growth rate that has been registered in recent years.

The Omani News Agency reported that initial figures make clear the increased industrial contribution to Oman's gross domestic product. Last year the increase was \$581.4 million, i.e., 5 percent of the GDP, compared with 1992 when it totaled \$494.5 million, or 4.3 percent of the GDP.

Total investment in the sultanate's industrial sector, as of the end of 1992, was \$1.077 billion, while the number of industrial establishments recorded during that period totaled 3,742, compared with 403 industrial establishments in 1980, when total investment was \$80.6 million.

Omani manufactured exports have risen substantially in recent years. In 1990, they were valued at 68.1 Omani rials [RO], increasing to approximately RO122.5 million in 1993. The number of Omani factories exporting their products rose to 83 in 1993.

The news agency reported that the Sultanate of Oman has developed a long range industrial plan, aimed at attaining a 12.8-percent growth rate annually during the present 1991-95 five-year plan, and a 10-percent growth rate annually during the next five-year plan, beginning in

1996. The plan is also aimed at diversifying the production base and exploiting the available natural resources, such as minerals and agricultural and fishery products.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

New Customs Law Goes Into Effect

94AE0159A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
31 Jul 94 p 11

[Article by 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sadiqi: "UAE Begins Tomorrow To Apply 4 Percent Customs Duties to Imports"]

[Text] On 1 August 1994, the United Arab Emirates [UAE] will start to implement a decision to adjust customs duties to 4 percent at all import entryways in the country. Dr. 'Ubayd Saqr Bust [name as transliterated], chairman of the Board of Customs and acting director general of Dubayy Customs, stated that the UAE's consideration of that matter stemmed from governmental directives at the highest levels to establish and apply the decisions of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] as pertains to tariffs and customs fees.

In a press conference held in Dubayy on 30 July, Busit said he expected that increasing customs tariffs from 1-4 percent would not lead to a rise in prices of consumer goods in the UAE. He said that many of these goods, led by food, were included on the list of customs exceptions. Moreover, many of them were locally produced. He anticipated that merchants would try to raise the prices of certain imported goods, on grounds of increased customs duties, but he said that the intense competition for which UAE markets are known will not permit substantive price increases. Merchants will resort to absorbing the increases by reducing their profit margins slightly. Busit emphasized the importance of customs duties in contributing to diversification of non-oil sources of income for the state. He anticipated that after the new tariffs have been applied, their profits will reach 1.5 billion UAE dirhams, as compared with the current level of less than one-half billion dirhams. As income, customs revenue goes to local government treasuries of the various emirates. The chairman of the Customs Board pointed out that applying the 4-percent customs tariff was not a new matter. It reflects a previous decision that goes back to 1983. However, that decision was not applied then, for reasons connected with the economic recession that hit the region and the world. Busit said that 4 percent was appropriate and is the lowest in the Gulf, based on the GCC's unified economic agreement. Busit explained that the UAE's position had provoked embarrassment among the GCC nations because it required less than the minimum tariff. He pointed out that the 4-percent level would not be a great burden and would not affect the UAE as a commercial center. He said: "The issue that caused us to apply the 4 percent was that when we looked at prices in the GCC countries, we found that they were no different from the UAE's prices."

Note that customs duties in some countries, Saudi Arabia for example, have reached 12 percent."

Busit added that the GCC states have prepared two lists; the first for goods exempted from customs, and the second for goods subject to customs duties. There is a third list that will be added shortly. But fees in the UAE will not exceed 4 percent over the medium term. He stressed that the 1-percent tariff previously applied in the UAE was not in line with governmental expenditures, the services offered in customs offices, and investment in technology to carry out transactions pertaining to the clearance of merchandise over a short period of time—no more than 15 minutes—without the need to go to the customs building. He pointed out that Dubayy Customs offers many services to merchants and shipping companies, and payment is more than the 4 percent. In addition, containers are cleared within a period of between 4 to 6 days.

Busit emphasized that the new decision will not affect the re-export trade that flourishes in Dubayy and the UAE, since that trade can keep its merchandise in designated storage areas in free zones for six months without paying customs duties. Moreover, a study is being made with regard to recovering fees originally collected on re-exported goods. The Bureau of Customs is also currently developing and training its cadres and recruiting national and Arab skills to be used for the UAE's benefit. It is also coordinating and consulting to acquire expertise in the customs field from other countries.

A study is currently underway to introduce a modern electronic system to provide data about goods before they reach UAE ports. This is called IDI [as transliterated], and is presently being used only in Australia, Canada, Singapore, and Malaysia.

Busit expects an increase in deception by merchants after the new tariffs are applied, in order to reduce the fees that they will have to pay. He said that trickery also occurred when the old percentage was applied. He referred to an internationally known system that is based on old and modern methods to expose the fraudulent merchants. He added that trickery could lead to the state losing millions of dirhams annually in lost revenue.

Regarding exempted materials, Busit said that they include all basic goods, including food, except for frozen meats; all agricultural products and drugs used in agriculture; and building materials, such as iron, aluminum, and lumber.

Works of gold were previously given a six-month grace period for re-export purposes, with a 1-percent fee imposed later. As of 1 August, a 4-percent customs duty will be paid on these works. These fees pertain to all items included in the list of luxury goods, except for alcoholic beverages, upon which a 25-percent tariff will be imposed, and tobacco upon which a 3-percent tax and

a 4-percent duty are currently being paid. There is a trend toward raising the percentage to 5 percent at a later date.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Former President on War-Related Issues

94AE0166A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 11 Aug 94
p 7

[Interview with 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, former president of South Yemen, by Sulayman Nimr in Damascus; date not given: "Yemen Needs Political Settlement, Comprehensive Peace; My Forces Had Main Role in Deciding the Battle"—first four paragraphs are AL-HAYAH introduction]

[Text] During the Yemen war, which lasted more than two months, South Yemen's former president, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, played a role as one of the intermediaries in the war and crisis. It became known that his forces, which he formed in the north of Yemen after his departure from Aden in the wake of the events of January 1986, fought alongside Northern government forces against Southern socialist forces. Indeed, these forces, which included 11 brigades, were called "unity brigades." They and their commanders played the main role in deciding the battle in favor of President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. At the same time, there were political and military leaders close to the former president who fought with the Southern side against their colleagues fighting with the North.

Former president 'Ali Nasir Muhammad explained the reasons for this in an AL-HAYAH interview. He said that after unification in 1990 he had left his supporters free to choose their political and military destiny. Most of the political leaders had joined the General People's Congress Party. The military leaders had maintained their relations with President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. A few of them returned to the Socialist Party. "I was unable to ask my supporters not to join the war on Sanaa's side because President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih for a number of years had been the one paying these forces and providing them with the weapons and money they needed."

President 'Ali Nasir acknowledges that his forces "had the main role in deciding the battle in Sanaa's favor because of their military experience and because President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih was able to gain the favor of these forces and make them the main tool for winning the war. The other side—the Socialist Party—did not have room for the return of those who wanted to return to the party and the South."

As President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih worked to gain the favor of the forces and supporters of President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, he also tried to gain for himself the favor of the former South Yemeni president. After the signing of the Pledge and Accord Document in Amman, he offered 'Ali Nasir Muhammad the opportunity to return with

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him to Sanaa and assume the vice presidency. 'Ali Nasir refused. During the war, especially after 'Ali Salim al-Bid proclaimed secession, the latter contacted 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and offered him the opportunity to return to Aden and assume the vice presidency for six months and the presidency afterward. 'Ali Nasir again rejected the offer. Now he refuses to return to Sanaa or Aden, although he remains in contact with Yemen and its crisis. AL-HAYAH therefore met him in Damascus for the following interview.

[Nimr] In your opinion, what were the reasons that led to the war? Whom should one hold responsible for what happened, especially preparing for and initiating the war.

[Muhammad] I have said much about the unification experience during the last four years. I stated from the beginning that many mistakes were made from day one that led to the outbreak of the crisis. The most important error was the absence of a comprehensive strategic vision of how to deal with a historic event that allowed for a historic turn in the life of Yemen. It allowed for the building of a new unified state on Yemeni soil. It allowed for firmly anchoring a government of order and law in the country. It allowed for reconstructing the government and its institutions on comprehensive national foundations that exempted no one and banished no force. It allowed for establishing an evolved local government that would allow the popular sectors in all the governorates to be made participants in managing their affairs. It allowed for differentiation and competition among the governorates, and it allowed for preventing the kind of intensive centralization that creates a bureaucracy that hinders dealing with citizens' affairs and problems and thus hinders the process of development and growth.

The absence of this vision and will led the political leadership to deal negatively with this historic event. They began by dividing the government and its institutions among themselves. They worked for illicit gain. Corruption and bribery spread. A crisis inevitably developed and worsened in such a sickly atmosphere. Each side tried to maintain and entrench its privileges by aligning other forces and sides. Each side kept its loyalties and armed forces to protect its interests.

Afterward the situation developed into constant wrangling between the sides and an information and propaganda escalation that magnified one's opponent's errors and ignored one's own wrongdoings. As a result, all the proposed cures became subject to political posturing, rejection, blackmailing, or stalling. This includes the important document that gained a consensus of the political forces and might have constituted a way out of the crisis, had it, too, not been treated with the same political blackmailing and attempt to attack others. In this way, opportunities to mend the situation and conditions were lost.

After the Pledge and Accord Document finally was signed in Amman in the way it was and after the

behavior that followed, I felt that the parties had reached an impasse and had begun making preparations to appeal to something other than dialogue. I felt that they were no longer looking for solutions, but were preparing to resolve matters by other means. They were preparing for war, and each side was looking for a justification on the part of the other side. Thus the question of who bears responsibility for what happened, who prepared for war, and who initiated it is purely theoretical. Events were tending in that direction, and everyone was engrossed in preparing his materiel and forces and waiting for the hour of decision.

[Nimr] What was your role while you were following the situation?

[Muhammad] Unification was a leap forward for Yemen's leaders, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc, as well as for other regional factors. It was a way out of the vicious circle in which some were trapped. It would have been the opening of a new age if this great event had been handled with comprehensive consciousness and vision.

Unfortunately, some parties from the outset were dragging their heavy history with them while embarking on a unique and historic experiment. Not only did unification occur while unity in the South was absent and kept absent, but the new terms and practices worked to entrench the disorder and maintain the errors instead of overcoming them. The agreement between the two ruling sides came to confirm this. For example, the two sides agreed that I had to leave Yemen with five of my senior supporters: Ahmad Musa'id Husayn, Muhammad 'Ali Ahmad, Colonel 'Abdallah 'Ali 'Ulaywah, Colonel 'Abd-Rabbuh Mansur, and Colonel Ahmad 'Abdallah Husayn. Yemen was large enough for everyone. It still is large enough for everyone. But when one's outlook narrows, geography also narrows. They decided to disqualify me and my followers from all subsequent arrangements to build a unified state whose first job was to restore fractured national unity. They absorbed none of the thousands of civilian and military cadres in any of the state's institutions. When as a way out of our situation we asked to form our own political party as part of the political pluralism that allowed all to build their parties, we were not given that right. The two sides began to divide up our supporters and forces, as they previously had divided up the state and its institutions. Such was the situation on the eve of reunification. There was no normalization of conditions in the South to include everyone. There was a strict veto on our participation in the nascent unification experiment and on the formation of a party for us to express the vision of a part of the people and the community. Above all, we were not allowed to remain in Yemen. I left Sanaa pitying them, the unification experiment, and the future of Yemen. For all that, I felt no bitterness and withdrawal. I made every effort to bring the viewpoints together to protect unity and its future. I offered numerous proposals, views, and initiatives. Unfortunately, the response was weak, and good faith by the various parties was lacking.

[Nimr] Do you think that the events of 1986 are connected to the war and crisis that Yemen witnessed recently? What is the connection?

[Muhammad] Now that more than eight years have passed, let me first clarify what happened on 13 January 1986. It now appears to some as if it had been a personal struggle for power; others see it as having been a struggle for influence among tribes and governorates. These explanations and theories are at variance with the nature of the situation and conflict.

The real conflict was between two policies and visions within the Socialist Party. The conflict concerned the future development of the southern half of Yemen and the future relationship between the two halves. It directly involved relations with brothers and neighbors and with the other countries of the world.

In 1980, we started to implement a policy of opening up and encouraging the private sector and Yemeni expatriates. We began dealing with Western corporations and countries on the basis of economic benefit and commercial advantage. We began working to defuse the tension with Sanaa and to work seriously through joint companies to build up joint economic interests between the two halves, coordinate general policies, and complete the documents to unify Yemen. We worked to normalize relations with brothers in Oman and Saudi Arabia.

The reaction of some hard-line elements in the party was stormy. Balanced relations with all the world's countries were considered treason. Allowing Western corporations to build Aden Airport and the Aden Hotel was considered making oneself hostage to capitalism. The Aden Hotel was even called "a citadel of capitalism." Initiating trade relations with the West and the United States and buying Boeing aircraft instead of costly Soviet ones—they considered these things a deviation toward imperialism. Dealing flexibly and giving Yemeni expatriates favorable treatment were called "importation of the Gulf consumerist model and opening Yemen's doors to the bourgeoisie," despite the fact that expatriate remittances were the main source for covering our hard-currency needs. They called our peaceful program for unity between the two halves, instead of unity through coup and exporting the revolution, "a conspiracy against the national revolution." They considered normalization of relations with fellow Arabs and working for regional security and stability "plunging into the morass of reactionary countries."

Such was the disagreement and conflict between two visions and policies. Given the broad popular support for our vision, they could stop it only through the bloody events of 13 January. However, I acknowledge that the most important reason for the disaster of 13 January was the absence of democracy and the difficulty of appealing to dialogue within the party and the community. For this very reason we have acknowledged having made errors and have called for everyone to take responsibility for what happened. We should all be considered sharers of

responsibility. Therefore, after 13 January we did not try to take revenge or organize rebellions. We did not try to change the situation in Aden by force, despite the armed force we possessed and the broad popular support backing us. Rather, we presented a program for national reconciliation in February 1986 and held to this line until 1990, when the unification agreement was signed. For the sake of reconciliation and concord, we intervened with all forces, parties, and states. We called for the return to Aden of all exiles, though we agreed to the exemption of those whom Aden wished to exclude from return. All our proposals were rejected, and there was no response to our mediation. Finally we reached the situation that I have explained as having existed on the eve of unification. Afterward I repeatedly warned of the danger of a continued state of division in the party, the armed forces, and society. No one responded. Unity came with the community in the South divided, with national unity absent, and with the armed forces divided. The party did not learn from its past mistakes.

All these things inevitably influenced subsequent developments. The absence of national unity inevitably would express itself negatively at some time. I do not say it now to dig up history, but to learn from what happened and avoid repeating errors. The crucial fact was that matters were decided militarily in 1986, but not politically, and so the crisis continued. The same error must not be repeated now. Matters have been decided militarily, but they need a political settlement so that we can close the file of crisis and war and get over the destructive effects of the crisis. Everyone must reach a national reconciliation and comprehensive peace, so that we do not repeat the mistakes of 1986 or the events, clashes, and divisions in the community that preceded 1986. We are still paying the price for some of these things today. We maintain that reconciliation and concord are the best way to close the files of the past, give concrete form to national unity, and consolidate stability in our Yemeni society so that everyone can begin the process of building and development.

[Nimr] It seems that every few years the Socialist Party undergoes a crisis that sometimes extends to a state of military engagement whose price the Southern governorates pay. Does this mean that there is some error in the makeup of the party? Or is there a conflict-oriented mentality in the party? Why are there these crises?

[Muhammad] I think the main reason for them is the absence of democracy inside the Party. The Party in its earliest origins was based on the literature of the Arab nationalists' movement, which raised its young adherents on the principle of "implement, then discuss." In the period of armed struggle, the Party's makeup was based on commando organizational cells that operated secretly. This called for iron discipline and clusters of circles separate from each other and obedient to the leadership. The party subsequently developed into more democratic forms, but it was unable to rid itself finally of its old traditions. A number of attempts at reform were

confronted with rejection by hard-liners and were even interpreted as conspiracy against the Party. Thus democratic traditions had no opportunity to spread or deepen. More visible were the traditions practiced in the Party's everyday life. Furthermore, the Party in its most recent periods has been unable to embody the country's national unity. Many forces and governorates felt cheated because they were not represented with their true weight in the leadership of the Party and the state. All these things fermented and, when they found no way of expressing themselves, found expression in fights and bloody clashes.

[Nimr] What do you think is the solution, so that the Socialist Party can emerge from its present serious crisis? Could you clarify or explain to us the reasons for the Party's current dilemma?

[Muhammad] The Socialist Party is now going through the most serious crisis in its history. The reasons are everything I mentioned in my previous responses: the absence of democracy, its not giving concrete shape to national unity, its not learning from its past mistakes or even repeating the same mistakes, its inability to manage the political conflicts fermenting within it, in addition to the deadly mistakes that some of its leaders have made.

As for the way out of this crisis, I think that the leadership must ponder these things for a time, review its mistakes, change its method of dealing with events, and make broad changes in its program and internal organization, so that democracy in the Party becomes the Party's backbone. The leadership must set forth a realistic political program based on long-term political action among the masses and with the other parties and forces, not based on the politics of adventurism and managing conflicts by clashes, crises, and adventures.

[Nimr] Do you think the way out of the Socialist Party's crisis lies in the Party's trying to return to the ruling coalition that existed, or in its leading the national political opposition?

[Muhammad] Both possibilities are available to the Party. It can return to the coalition because it possesses a large parliamentary bloc as a result of the last elections—particularly if the Party leadership thinks that the current period of rebuilding and development requires a coalition of all forces. On the other hand, it could become an opposition and lead that opposition. This would provide a good opportunity to bring our country's democratic experiment to maturity. It might free the Party of its errors and flaws, particularly since it would be the first time the Party has given up power and regarded and seen the course of events from the outside. This would allow the Party to rid itself of some of the self-serving forces that linked themselves with it because it was the ruling party for 25 years. The important thing is to end the previous dualism of participating in the government at the same time as leading the opposition.

[Nimr] If the war has ended, do you think this war has settled the question of unity in Yemen, or do you think

that the causes the led to the war still exist? Do you think that Yemen's unity now is firmly established after this war? Do you think the war could start again?

[Muhammad] First, I think the subject of Yemen's unity was decided the day of the plebiscite on it. So it is wrong for us to think that war and unity go hand in hand. Unity is irrevocable. However, it will become firmly established by a number of factors. The most important of them is the building of a new state—a unified state that embodies citizens' hopes, ends corruption, and establishes a decentralized government that satisfies the citizens of all the governorates. Let us not forget that after any war in any country the greatest need is for embodying and strengthening national unity among the people of the country. What firmly establishes unity is reassuring all citizens and making them feel that their dignity is protected: that in a war between the sons of a single country there is no victor and no vanquished, no winner and no loser. This requires many measures to give embodiment to effective national unity.

If the psychological wounds remain, if discrimination between citizens continues, and if justice is absent, the causes of tension will remain and express themselves some day in a way that could be bloody. This is something that the Yemeni leadership must avoid. We therefore think that President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih by virtue of his position must lead a national dialogue that produces a general national reconciliation that includes all forces, parties, and key figures. He must sponsor a national reconciliation that embodies national unity and that gives everyone a feeling of security and stability.

[Nimr] In your view, what mistakes did the Socialist Party make so that it reached this result?

[Muhammad] I think its first and most important mistake was lack of concern for national unity, as I mentioned in my previous responses. Its mistakes began to accumulate until its leadership was unable to control them after the signing of the Amman agreement and the arbitrary way in which the dispute was managed after that date. Among the mistakes were the flight of the party's cadres from Sanaa to stop the operation of state institutions, the ill-considered escalation of the political crisis, the failure to respond to the proposal for the state's leadership bodies to merge, and finally the party's sudden announcement of the secession decision.

[Nimr] Some say that from the point of view of your supporters the recent war amounted to a rehabilitation of the victims of 13 January. Do you think it was?

[Muhammad] Much has been said about the war. Some say it was a rehabilitation of the victims of January 1986. Others think it was a rehabilitation of the president from the political and media campaign that his vice president, 'Ali Salim al-Bid, led against him. Still others have considered it a rehabilitation of unity. The fact is that I do not look at it so simply. The war was a destructive disaster. It could have been avoided. Now that it has

happened and left a huge amount of destruction and wounds, one should not stir up further conflicts in addition to what happened. What is required is that everyone work together to end the legacy of the war.

[Nimr] There is widespread talk about the plundering and looting that took place in Aden and about how some of your supporters participated in it.

[Muhammad] Facts and realities are always misrepresented in such situations. It is difficult to determine what went on. As everyone knows, someone who steals does not confess his crime unless he is irrefutably convicted. I therefore suggest and implore President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih to form a committee for this purpose chaired by the interior minister and with Professor 'Umar al-Jawi (as head of the committee to save Aden) and others who wish to participate as members to investigate the plundering and looting. The results of the investigation should be announced to the people, so that those responsible for what happened can be known, tried, convicted, and receive due punishment. Everyone condemns the plundering and looting that occurred. In this way charges will not be leveled indiscriminately while we have the means to investigate what happened.

[Nimr] Do you think that the Yemeni Reform Grouping will be able to exclude the Socialist Party from the current coalition or from political life in Yemen? Do you fear the increasing influence of the Grouping in the Sanaa Government? Do you think the Grouping wants to govern by itself and turn President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih into a president who implements the Grouping's policies, particularly since the People's Congress Party includes many leaders who support the Reform Grouping?

[Muhammad] It is not right for any party to try to exclude another party from political life. It is legitimate for all to engage in activity as long as they accept working within the framework of the constitution and the laws in effect. The Yemeni scene has room for everyone. Everyone must therefore live together. All currents have the right to express themselves in the community. The religious, pan-Arab, nationalist, and socialist currents should coexist on the scene and work to win the masses and persuade them of their political line and visions. None should obliterate the other. All should coexist and debate with each other within this framework. Excluding any party from the ruling coalition is a legitimate parliamentary device, and any party has the right to form a coalition with the party and forces that are in harmony with it. However, under the present conditions I do not advise doing this. As I explained earlier, I think that any war must be followed by national reconciliation, so that sectors of the community do not feel a sense of grievance, while others feel they are taking revenge on the defeated. Nevertheless, each party has the right to try to increase its presence in the government and the community. But monopolizing power is a danger that can lead to unhealthy consequences. Our Yemeni community has

already experienced this kind of monopolization. As for your question about the role of President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, I think he must play the role of the organizer of political life. He must oversee unity- and democracy-oriented operations in Yemen. He must embody and foster national consensus and national unity.

[Nimr] In your opinion, what reasons made the crisis and the war in particular end as they did with a loss for the Socialist Party? How was President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih able to win the war militarily? Do you agree with the point of view we have mentioned, that the president prepared and planned for war and unleashed it to settle the crisis, weaken the Socialist Party, and gain hegemony over the South?

[Muhammad] I alluded in my previous responses to the Socialist Party's mistakes that led to this tragic ending. As for the war, I also said that after the signing of the Amman agreement without discussion of how to implement what had been agreed to matters were hastening toward an impasse. The margin for discussion of peaceful solutions was also narrowing. The parties were honing their weapons, and the voice of reason no longer found attentive ears. Everyone was obsessed with looking for a solution other than the peaceful solutions. Both parties were looking for a justification for war. The first shot was the outcome of the crisis situation. Avoiding it was exceedingly difficult. It inevitably was going to come from one of the camps or from both together. It indeed came and led us to a destructive war.

[Nimr] Did the Yemeni president really repeat to you offers to return to Yemen to assume the vice presidency before the war and during the crisis? The offer is still said to stand despite reservations on the part of the Yemeni Reform Grouping regarding your return.

[Muhammad] Yes, that happened before the war and during the crisis. I have very good relations with Shaykh 'Abdallah Bin-Husayn al-Ahmar, head of the Reform Party. I have great respect and esteem for him. I have never sensed on his part what your question implies.

[Nimr] Why then did you not accept the president's offers?

[Muhammad] I thought that looking for political solutions satisfactory to all was more important than sharing power and entering into political alignments that would not solve the crisis and would not serve Yemen, but might only aggravate matters. I still think that political dialogue, reaching common denominators shared by everyone, and giving concrete embodiment to national unity so as to reach general national reconciliation must precede any arrangements on the state and government level.

[Nimr] Did 'Ali Salim al-Bid really offer you an alliance, return to South Yemen, and participation in the government? Did the Socialist Party really offer you a return to participation in the Party leadership so as to emerge from the crisis?

[Muhammad] Yes, that also happened. My reasons for declining to accept the invitation were the same as I have given above: the need to look for common denominators around which everyone could meet, and not entering into alignments that could harm Yemen and its future. As for returning to the Socialist Party, as I think that I can better serve Yemen at the present time from outside government than if I were a partner in it, I also think that I shall be of more benefit to the Socialist Party, the other parties, and Yemen's democratic experiment from outside the parties than if I participate in the Party's leadership. More importantly, I am giving priority now to reconciliation, dialogue, and concord.

[Nimr] Why do you not return to Yemen to take up your role in saving Yemen from the current crisis?

[Muhammad] If you mean returning to a position of power, I have explained why. As for participating in ongoing efforts, I am doing so now. My presence in

Damascus does not hinder this and may even help me carry out my role better. As for returning to Yemen—soon, God willing!

[Nimr] Could you throw some light for us on your role during the crisis and the war to remedy the situation—particularly your initiative to form a six-member committee headed by you to travel to Sanaa, Aden, and al-Mukalla? As everyone knows, the initiative did not succeed.

[Muhammad] We made many personal and group initiatives with many national and community figures. I contacted dozens of leaders and officials in person and by telephone. However, our efforts at the time did not bear fruit and did not receive a response from the various parties. The important thing now is the future. Everyone must share in building it and in beginning a new page in Yemen's history.

INDIA

Tension Between Congress, Opposition Viewed

[Editorial: "Outside the Internal Fight"]

[Text] The conflict within parliament has now burst out into the open. The parliamentarians of the opposition political parties did not enter the parliament yesterday. Many of them demonstrated and staged a sit-in strike in front of the main entrance of the parliament. During the last couple of days, a heated debate was going on inside the parliament between the government and the opposition parties. The excitement and noise sometimes reached such a level that the sessions in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha had to be adjourned almost everyday. The activities of the parliament have not run according to schedule for a single day since 26th July. The reason of this fiery debate between the government and the opposition rested on two reports about the stock market scandal. The first report prepared by the Joint Parliamentary Committee [JPC] had been submitted a long time ago. The response to that report and the measures taken by the government on the recommendations of that report was submitted by the government on 26th July in a Action Taken Report [ATR]. As the government could not agree with the report of JCP, the opposition also demanded the withdrawal of ATR. In fact, their demand is consists of simply this. In the demonstration of the parliamentarians in front of the parliament yesterday, they shouted slogans in favor of the implementation of the JCP report and for punishing the persons responsible for the stock market scandal. All the opposition political parties except All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam [AIDMK], the Indian Union Muslim League and Samajwadi Party [SP], agreed to that demand. But the government did not agree to withdraw the ATR. Though meetings were held between the government and the opposition parties several times till yesterday, no agreement was reached and both sides stuck to their stands. As a result, the opposition decided to boycott the current session of the parliament. So, the opposition parties did not attend the parliament. Therefore, no situation arose in either house of the parliament to allow adjourning the session. The parliament got a respite from the stalemate situation. As the seats of the opposition remained empty, the government and its supporters carried on the question-answer session without obstacle. This is one side of the picture. The other side of it is very complicated. Such a notion has spread among the people that due to the stock market scandal, banks, financial institutions, public sector companies etc... lost a total of six thousand crore Rupees [Rs 6 billion] of government money. The government did not take any step against those persons who were held responsible. The government had acquitted them in spite of charges brought against them with evidence submitted by the JPC. The gist of the government's view reflected in the ATR is that no one can be held responsible for the loss of six thousand crore of

rupees. Such a big scandal took place due to the administrative and procedural faults. The government acquitted the related ministers, bureaucrats and the bank officers by putting the whole responsibility on the system. The government brought numerous logic and arguments in favor of their stand, but failed to make it credible. The opposition has this advantage that they do not have to say anything in complicated or convoluted terms in support of their stand. They did not have to manipulate anything. The people may not fully understand the mystery behind the stock market scandal, but they at least realize that the government is not willing to punish those who are responsible for the loss of six thousand crores of rupees. If a scandal of this magnitude had taken place in any other country, the government would have had to resign. President Richard Nixon had to resign for spying on the office of his opponent and trying to suppress the evidence. In comparison, it is a much bigger crime for the government of a poor country like India to misappropriate six thousand crores of rupees. The JPC report clearly stated the names of those persons responsible and explained their faults, but the government did not take any action, rather, they supported them. The result will be bad for the government and the nation. From the time of the Bofors scandal, it was noticed that the government did not take action against those persons who were involved in stealing crores of rupees, rather they protected them. The government had taken the same kind of attitude and strategy regarding this matter. The people are seeing that the government is more interested in suppressing the truth than trying to uncover it. The opposition parties are taking advantage of the weakness of the government. There is no reason to accept the wrong done by the government. The government will have to pay a high price for its uncompromising attitude. It may lose the trust of the people, and lose the election [Unspecified as to which election].

Conspiracy Behind Bombay Bombings Viewed

[Article by Pabitra Kumar Ghosh: "An Oath to Destroy India"]

[Text] The duration of undeclared war is longer than that of a declared war and may be endless. As Pakistan is determined to destroy India, the undeclared war of Pakistan against India may not end. Pakistan cannot think of giving up her vow to destroy India. Pakistan is fighting against India on several fronts at a time. One front is Kashmir. In the other front inside India, there is a plan to destroy the major cities through sabotage. That would destroy the national economy, the lives and properties of the people and the whole of India would be terrified. This aspect of the war strategy of Pakistan is getting uncovered in the court trying the case of the Bombay explosions. The case is still in its preliminary stage. The prosecution has submitted charge sheets against the accused persons. The actual trial will begin in the current month. One can get an idea of the dangerous

plan of Pakistan from the documents already submitted in the Terrorist and Defense Related Activities Act [TADA] court. In the tightly secured courtroom of Justice J.N. Patel of the special TADA court located inside the central jail and N. Natarajan, the prosecutor on behalf of Central Bureau of Investigation [CBI], submitted the charge sheets. It was stated that 257 people were killed and 737 were seriously injured in the Bombay explosions of March 12 last year. Government and private properties worth of 23 crores of rupees were destroyed. The original bombing plan was not carried out completely. People were recruited from the underworld of Bombay and they were trained to carry out sabotage. These kind of people cannot successfully carry out a large, complicated and risky plan because they are not motivated or inspired revolutionaries, nor are they disciplined and professional soldiers. They are hired miscreants like mercenary soldiers. The main weakness of the plan of Pakistan and Daud Ibrahim to destroy the city of Bombay was their recruitment policy. They hired anti-social elements for doing the task. Usually, police informers work in those groups. Police know about them and they also know how to get information from them. They give information when they get drunk. The blueprint of the Bombay explosion did not go according to the plan for this type of recruits. That is not a matter of surprise. What is surprising is that in spite of basic defects of the plan the groups of Daud and Memon were able to strike in 13 places in a busy day on March 12, 1993. These type of mass sabotage attacks in so many places at a particular time were the first in the world. Such a well-planned and well-coordinated incident of sabotage did not take place in any large city anywhere in the world till now. The fundamentalist attacks occurred in big cities in Europe, America and Argentina, including New York and London. The prosecutor for CBI, Mr. Natarajan told the TADA court that besides Bombay, the aim was to destroy other areas of Maharashtra. Large cities like Calcutta, Delhi, Ahmedabad and Bangalore were also included on their target list. The special state prosecutors Mr. Ujjal Nikom told the court that all the powerful explosives used in the Bombay explosion were brought from Pakistan. The explosives were manufactured in the Woah Nobel private company situated in the Woah cantonment 36 kilometers from Islamabad. This company is one of the 14 ordnance factories of Pakistan. Besides, the recruits for the Bombay explosion were trained in the activities of sabotage in Pakistan. They went to Islamabad via Dubai in a Pakistan International Airlines [PIA] flight. They were received in the airport by the agents of the Pakistani government. So, they did not have to be checked through the immigration counter. Moreover, their journey to Islamabad from Dubai was not entered in their passports. The plan to bring the recruits secretly from Bombay to Pakistan was a nicely chalked out plan. The whole plan was made at the government level and was executed by Pakistani Intelligence [ISI]. Then the recruits were taken to a desolate place for training camp that was two and half hours drive from Islamabad. There they received training in using

AK-56 rifles, pistols, hand-grenades, rocket-launchers and explosives. In that camp, the recruits took the oath of secrecy. Central Bureau of Investigation [CBI] stated in court that eight days before the Bombay explosion, Tiger Memon had a meeting with the conspirators in the coffee shop of Taj Mahal Hotel of Bombay. In that meeting, he divided the responsibilities for the explosion among the conspirators and they, accordingly, agreed to do so. In that meeting, Tiger said that the whole of Hindustan had to be destroyed as revenge of the destruction of the [disputed] Babri Masjid and he further pointed out that it was the desire of the government of Islamabad. The fundamentalists with the support of Islamabad had planned to destroy a large country to take revenge of the destruction of the 500 year old mosque. They knew well that this particular mosque, built in the name of Babar, had not been used for religious purposes for a long period of time. The families of Daud Ibrahim and Memons are not foreigners; they are Indians. They have huge property in this country. If they can be a part of such a plan and possess that amount of hatred and sense of revenge, the fundamentalists of other countries will be more cruel to India. When those who have roots in this country do not care, other people will not hesitate to strike against India.

The chargesheet against 193 persons was submitted in TADA court. It was stated that as part of the large conspiracy, there was a smaller conspiracy too. The Daud and Memon led terrorists decided to kill the city councillors belonging to Shiv Sena and the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] on the same day, March 12. In the meeting in the Taj Mahal hotel, instruction was given to make an explosion in front of the Bombay corporation building for that purpose. They tried to carry out the instructions, but due to inexperience of the persons responsible for that it did not go according to the plan. CBI gave due importance to the plan of Daud Ibrahim. They said in court that the miscreants conspired to start a war against India. "The terrorists want to oust the government by violent means and thus Pakistan is fighting a proxy war against India"—this had been stated in the court by CBI prosecutor Mr. Natarajan. One issue can be raised here about which CBI has some information but did not submit in court. It will help to understand that the Bombay explosions were not stray incidents, nor was the whole thing a result of the revenge sought by Daud Ibrahim. It will also explain how deep the conspiracy was and how steps were taken in the perspective of future planning. A week before the Bombay explosion, Yakub Memon, one of the Memon brothers, met with Suresh Parulekar, the Industries minister of Goa. They had almost finalized an agreement on a land deal comprising thousands of acres of land. The land was situated by the side of Mandavi navy base. The Memons wanted to purchase the land because it would be easier for them to secretly and safely unload arms and weapons from the ships. To finalize the land deal, Yakub Memon secretly came to Panjim and met with Industries minister Suresh Parulekar. They had known each other

for a longtime and had met before. They discussed the matter on February 19 and March 5 in a five star hotel in Fort Aguara and signed the contract of the land deal. Suresh Parulekar's son was a business partner of Sohail Khandwani who is a longtime friend of Yakub Memon. Khandwani brought Yakub to Goa and he was present when negotiations were going on for the purchase of one hundred thousand acres of coastal land. The investigators came to know about the land deal involving the industries minister of Goa and they recovered the sale deed and related documents. Home Minister S.B. Chavan said that the connection between Parulkar and Memons was under investigation. The result of that investigation is not yet known. It is believable that Daud Ibrahim, the Memon brothers and behind them—the Islamabad government—took up the plan to destroy India just to take revenge for the destruction of the Babri mosque. The plan to buy one hundred thousand acres of land by the side of naval base in the coast of Goa was not a matter of whim. Such a huge land deal cannot be made without a long-standing plan. Dr. Wilfred D'Souza did not take any step knowing the whole thing. He did not ask any explanation from his industries minister, rather he gave him charge of the housing department. It is very difficult to understand who is obligated to whom. The behavior of filmstar Sanjay Dutt is equally perplexing. Many people felt very bad when he was arrested the TADA act and kept in prison. Whether he was involved in the plan for the destruction of India, and if he was, then how far—all these questions will be decided by the court. No comment can be made on a case under trial. CBI submitted very serious charges against him and in spite of pressures from different corners, the charges were not withdrawn. The CBI prosecutor tried to reduce the charges against Sanjay Dutt in court. In the same day, Indian Express published a report that Sanjay, when released on bail, went to Dubai and met with Daud Ibrahim. The news caused considerable harm for Sanjay. Outside the court, some charges are also being heard against Sharad Power, chief minister of Maharashtra. Khairner claimed that Mr. Power was involved with the Bombay explosion. Nobody knows what will come up in all of this.

IRAN

Western Cultural Invasion and Second Five-Year Plan

94LA0242A Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 9, 10 Aug 94

[Article in two parts by 'Ali Sa'idi, deputy director of the Islamic Propaganda Organization: "The Cultural Invasion and the Second Five-Year Plan"]

[9 Aug pp 14, 15]

[Text] Note: The Western cultural invasion of the ideological and moral foundations of Islamic societies, chief among them the Muslim and revolutionary nation of Iran, is a bitter reality to which the Islamic revolution's

exalted leader with the awakened heart has directed everyone's attention with repeated warnings. Muslim intellectuals and thinkers have also taken every opportunity to mention this threat and to recommend ways to deal with it. One of the most immediate and obvious necessities for dealing with it is to get the deputies in the legislative power involved in every way.

The article before you was written about the Western cultural invasion in the context of the Islamic Republic's Second Five-Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan which is being studied in the Majles.

Articles Service

Introduction

Because the Islamic Republic of Iran's Second Five-Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan was prepared some time ago by the government and its study has now begun in the Majles, and in view of the fact that the essence of our revolution is ideological and cultural and likewise that the exalted leader's special attention is focused on the issue of culture and the need to reinforce the public's religious and ideological foundation, his excellency emphasizes the need to fight the cultural assault.

To permit the respected Majles deputies to pay more attention to the respected government's cultural program for the next five years, it is appropriate to briefly review the need for more attention to the dimensions of the cultural invasion, to compare it with military invasion, to discuss the reasons for the lack of attention to the danger of the cultural invasion and its effects, and in conclusion to study existing solutions and recommendations for giving more attention to this important issue.

A: The Need For Attention to the Dimensions of the Cultural Invasion

The reality is that the Islamic revolution and its center, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is now being subjected to an all-out cultural invasion by world imperialism and infidelity. This invasion is the enemy's most extensive attack on Islam and the Islamic revolution, using the most efficient and effective weapons. In this invasion the goal is not to occupy part of our soil, defeat our national zeal or damage our economic ability. The invasion is aimed directly at the orthodox ideology of the Islam of Muhammad (peace be upon him), and in this invasion the enemy's goal is to destroy the Islamic nation's religious and ideological identity.

This invasion is taking place on all fronts, but not at some part of the country's border. Its fronts are the entire country, Islam and every place where the Islam of Muhammad exists. This battle involves military occupation, not occupation of some piece of land but rather occupation of the minds and thoughts of our generation. There is imprisonment in this war, but not the imprisonment of a number of individuals who even in the

midst of the enemy still retain their Islamic identity and who manifest the light of faith and Islam even among the enemy. The enemy seeks to imprison our thoughts, minds and beliefs.

There are casualties in this battle, but not those casualties whose victims make 100 lilies grow from every drop of their blood and make the atmosphere fragrant. The victim of that kind of casualty is revived upon his death, as where the Koran says: "Think not of those who are slain in God's way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord."

The victim is not that martyr whose family is proud of him and who is glorified and exalted by the people, who value martyrs. Its victim is not the one who loses his life and who protects society by sacrificing his life. The victim of the cultural invasion is indeed dead. This death brings hardship and suffering to the family. Not only is the victim himself destroyed, but others are corrupted and destroyed as well. When the territory of the mind is occupied by the cultural invasion and thinking and thought are taken captive, it is quite difficult and in many cases impossible to drive out the enemy.

The target of this invasion is not a special class. It engulfs all the classes of society, especially the vulnerable classes, as well as the young men, women and innocent children who are targeted and destroyed by this invasion's poisonous arrows.

B: Reasons for Lack of Coordinated Attention to the Danger of the Cultural Invasion

Just as has been said, the cultural invasion is a real and ubiquitous battle. It is much more extensive, comprehensive and dangerous than a military invasion. According to the exalted leader, the enemy's cultural invasion is a reality that severely threatens our young generation, but the basic question is whether our not our battle with the enemy in the cultural invasion is like that in a military invasion, and whether or not the same amount of investment should be made to fight the cultural invasion as is made to fight a military invasion.

Unfortunately, despite the importance and the danger of the cultural invasion, the amount of investment and planning to fight it differs greatly compared to that of a military battle.

In a military battle the entire nation is mobilized and an emergency situation prevails throughout the country. All the nation's political, economic, cultural and social abilities are used to fight the enemy invasion. Defense of the nation has first priority and is ahead of everything else.

Is it not true, however, that our Islamic country and our people are everywhere being attacked by the enemy? Is it not true that the enemy is attacking us with all his destructive cultural weapons and all his ability? Is it not true that in this fierce battle every day the enemy inflicts heavy casualties on us? Why do we lack that sensitivity and concern? Why has there been so little mobilization

and planning of resources for this front and this battle? The reason is to be found in the other differences between the military and the cultural battle.

J: Difference Between Cultural Invasion and Military Invasion

One of the important reasons for inattention to the danger of the cultural invasion can be seen as the fact that it and its effects and its manifestations are intangible.

All the dimensions and effects of the enemy's military invasion are tangible, unlike the cultural invasion, all or most of whose dimensions are intangible. In another comparison of the important differences, the following two may be mentioned:

1 - In the military invasion, the enemy is obvious.

In the military invasion the enemy declares war, and that happens after disputes and preliminaries. Although the planning and the time of the attack are hidden, they become clear with the first movement of the military columns and the first volley of bullets, and all the people become aware of the danger.

In the cultural battle, however, the enemy is concealed. His procedures and plots are hidden. The weapons and equipment are intangible, and the invasion takes place without fanfare or noise. Recognizing the hidden enemy, understanding his methods and procedures and fighting him are very difficult tasks. As the commander of the faithful (peace be upon him) said: "The greatest enemy is the enemy whose plans and plots are hidden."

In the cultural invasion the enemy does not attack publicly and openly. He assaults us and quarrels with us secretly, with his most complex and powerful resources.

2 - In the military invasion, the effects and consequences are tangible.

During the military invasion the battle is accompanied by the noise of cannons and tanks, the explosions of missiles and the roar of aircraft. Everyone can perceive it and sense it. The insecurity for the borders and even the cities is completely palpable, and when the smallest particle of nation's soil is occupied, national pride is injured, public opinion is aroused and the feelings of the people for fighting are incited.

Giving up captives in a military operation shocks society. The martyrdom of dear ones distresses the people and shakes the city, and other things happen.

In the cultural invasion, however, the effects and the results, though wider and more damaging, are not felt. Since the roar is not felt from the deadly waves of the enemy's satellites and other propaganda devices which constantly and relentlessly bombard the sacred thoughts, ideas and values of the people and that target all the classes in society, they are not followed by that reaction, that sensitivity and that public mobilization. Although

every moment the enemy inflicts the worst kind of deadly casualties on us, since this is not accompanied by a commotion, the appropriate reaction does not occur.

3 - In a military battle, the battlefield is limited in time and space.

Normally in military wars the battlefield is limited to specific places. The invasion begins at one point and stops somewhere else. In terms of time also there are many limits in a military invasion. In the cultural battle, however, neither the time nor the place are limited. The entire country is attacked, everywhere individuals are found. There is no time limit. This attack will continue through the years, and with the progress and development of technology, every day the battle becomes more complex and the weapons more effective.

Therefore, fighting a prolonged battle will need the planning and mobilization of all the nation's cultural resources because of its extended time and locations.

Unfortunately, the duration and vast extent of this invasion have caused it to appear as an ordinary matter and the natural course of events, despite its great importance. This has reduced sensitivity, and has taken the initiative out of the fight against the enemy.

H: The Enemy's Goals in the Cultural Invasion

Another important point is attention to the goals of the cultural invasion and comparing it with military invasion. In a military invasion, the goal is sometimes to change borders and sometimes the goal is to occupy a city. Sometimes the goal is to damage economic and military capabilities. War is rarely used to destroy a country or bring down a government.

With regard to the cultural invasion, however, one must ask, what is the goal? Is the goal of the cultural invasion to change geographic borders or to damage economic capabilities? Or is the goal to prevent the export of the revolution and contain the ideas of the revolution within our borders? Is the goal to put pressure on us to give up revolutionary slogans? Is the goal to damage the revolution? Or is the goal to damage the government?

Clearly, all these things are enemy goals. The enemy's most important goal in the cultural invasion, however, is to overthrow the ideological orthodoxy and foundations of the government and to change our Islamic identity and consequently to overthrow our revolution and Islamic nationality. Our values, our credibility and our independence depend on our ideological orthodoxy and principles, the same things that made of our people a strong and powerful nation that was able to stand up against the enemy's tricks, the same things that laid the foundations for our strong and powerful system that has been able to be a model for all those who are oppressed and in pain and help them achieve an ideal system.

Who does not know that today the lines are drawn between all of infidelity and all of Islam, and who does

not know that the infidel world has come to the battlefield today with all its resources and its most complex implements, using the most vulgar methods, to destroy the genuine Islamic culture and the ideological foundations that accompany our revolution?

Today they have targeted something, and if they are able to conquer this strategic fortress, they will easily conquer all the other fortresses. In any case, at first glance it must be said that the enemy's target is our orthodoxy, our ideology and our religion, which is today the foundation of the growth and evolution of the human being and human society.

The target in the next phase will be our nation and our people, as a nation that in the glow of this Islam and this sacred religion has been able to build an exemplary nation and government to stand up against world imperialism. From another point of view, those who are the enemy's prime targets are the young generation, society's future policy makers, managers and builders.

V: Effects of the Cultural Invasion

The effects and results of a military invasion are quite limited compared to those of a cultural invasion. The effects are often the reverse, because many nations cannot be brought to their knees by military invasion. Military invasion makes nations unite in solidarity to fight and resist the invader. However, the same country that will fight a military invasion may be unable to stand up against a cultural invasion. That is, nations are deeply vulnerable to cultural invasion. The reality can be seen clearly throughout history, how much nations resisted military invasion, and how vulnerable they were to cultural invasion.

When the Muslim nation first emerged, because of its belief in the orthodoxy of Islam and its firm adherence to it, despite the tens of wars and military pressures from the infidels and polytheists, its firmness and power increased day by day and it was able to triumph over the devils. In later times, however, because of the cultural invasions its enemies were able to dominate the body of Islam and do great damage to Islam.

It is clear that military invasion did not bring Andalusia to its knees. It was cultural invasion that overthrew the authority of Islam. In the modern age our country was in one of the most difficult military battles of history. The imperialists of East and West, helping one another, set out to bring our nation to its knees and to put down the revolution, but the nation and its leadership bravely fought the heavily armed enemy for 95 months and made him surrender.

Today, as the enemy has realized that this sacred Islamic nation and government cannot be destroyed by military invasion and that even the political tricks and the positioning of political pawns inside the government have had no effect and have not been possible, and that even the economic embargo has had no effect of any kind

on the government's stability, it has concentrated all its effort on the cultural front in order to shake society's intellectual and ideological foundation.

After that the enemy will go into action on other fronts, because a nation that has lost its ideological and intellectual identity and has been defeated by the cultural invasion will not be able to fight on other fronts. As long as a society has a sound young generation and a strong body with appropriate insight and understanding, firm belief in Islam and adherence and commitment to its luminous commands, the enemy will not be able to overthrow it with military, economic and political pressure.

In a short period the young basiji forces were bombarded with 1.5 million artillery shells on Majnun Island and did not yield. In a short period of time 70,000 liters of chemicals were dumped on them at the Faw Peninsula, and they continued to resist. The reason for this is they had a firm ideological foundation in Islam and the necessity to work for it because of belief in and love for the revolution and its leadership.

However, when the ideological and intellectual foundations of the individuals in society are shaken and weakened, they may be unable to resist the slightest pressure, and this is what is the most important item today on the agenda of the imperialists and the infidels of the world. They have brought the most powerful implements to bear to shake society's ideological and intellectual foundations, and this very cultural invasion with cultural implements and weapons is being used to achieve this goal.

Z: Dimensions of the Cultural Invasion

What is meant by the cultural invasion is not simply the manifestations of immodesty, immorality or in other words the spread of vulgar culture. The cultural invasion is a general and overall phenomenon that conflicts with our culture in every way and is being used to fight our culture. The peak of the cultural invasion is cultural vulgarity and the spread of manifestations of immodesty, and this has high importance in terms of cutting into and affecting the younger generation.

Another dimension of the cultural invasion is the information and news invasion. Its application is more extensive and comprehensive. Today American-led world imperialism has given up star wars and is seeking to establish news domination over the world. An American expert said: The world of the future will be like a village where the transfer of information from one corner to another will take place in a very short time. Today's world, with the techniques it has, is like a village where the transfer of information from one corner to another takes very little time. He said: The master of the world is someone who can control the means of news delivery and who can deliver it more quickly than others.

Today tens of important news agencies and tens of newspapers, magazines and other publications are

seeking to reach the people of the world. Today the dissemination of news and analysis and the control of public opinion is one of the most important items on the agenda of world imperialism. In any case, the danger and effects of news imperialism, and the imperialism of news and analysis are no less than those of the promotion of cultural vulgarity.

Likewise, the creation of models and heroes, the promotion of false images and the substitution of false and unrealistic transactions are manifestations of the cultural invasion and the most dangerous methods of world imperialism. These methods are sufficient for the promotion of and presentation of an idea that is against values. That idea is presented as a model for the public to see and think about.

Today the presentation of many things that are against values in the form of art and the discussion of many activities as the most attractive things, or the presentation of the most undistinguished people as heroes can have great effects on our young generation, our art and our behavior, just as conveying the cold and unemotional family relations of the people of Europe as those of civilized and advanced societies and the promotion of the culture of consumerism, ostentation and convenience are other manifestations of the cultural invasion that have had and are having a destructive effect on our new revolutionary society.

[10 Aug p 14]

[Text] Note: The first part of the article: "The Cultural Invasion and the Second Five-Year Plan" dealt with the goals, dimensions, and effects of the West's cultural invasion, comparing it to military invasion and discussing the reasons for the lack of comprehensive attention to it.

The second and final part of the article will be devoted to practical recommendations for fighting this quiet and dangerous invasion in the planning dimension.

Articles Service

J: What Is To Be Done?

The most important milestone in the discussion of the cultural invasion is the question of what is to be done in face of this great and dangerous invasion and what procedure exists for dealing with this issue. Today, especially when technology is in its service, when day by day satellite coverage of the world and residential areas becomes more comprehensive and when satellite dishes are becoming more technical and advanced every day and are reaching the point where they will cover all the space in our country, how can this phenomenon be resisted and how can its damage be prevented or reduced?

Should the method of resistance be aggressive and hostile? Is it possible to have an aggressive procedure to resist in kind, or should a defensive procedure be used?

Can this phenomenon be fought by closing borders, with an embargo, or by imposing tax laws and similar things? This part of the article will discuss the various phases of the resistance plan and all the existing solutions.

1 - First Phase—Believing in the invasion: The first step in the resistance is the principle of believing that this battle exists and believing that it is real. That is, we must believe that a nationwide and comprehensive battle is under way coming from the enemies of Islam against our religion, our orthodoxy, our ideological foundations, our revolution, our nation and our culture. It is a battle that has targeted our generation and the basis of our government and it is advancing. Every day rockets, chemicals and heavy and poisoned missiles hit our front, and every day they may inflict casualties and heavy damage upon us.

There are many views and opinions to the effect that the main problem is the fact that the officials and organizations involved do not essentially believe in the threat of this battle and its effects, and the fact that it is not tangible and visible to our people. That is, we do not believe that our being is threatened, and this bitter reality can be seen in the levels of planning, investment and concern for the battle. Is it possible that the entire government and its foundations are being attacked, the enemy is in the field with all his implements, while we remain undisturbed and allocate only a small part of our ability to this matter?

To fight Iraq's military invasion the entire country, including the government, the Majles and other organizations and the entire nation, were in a frenzy. Everything was used in service of the sacred defense. Staffs and bases were formed and investments were made in various dimensions! Shouldn't the same concern and investment be devoted to this battle, which is taking place on a much more extensive scale, and whose effects are more destructive? In any case, until we see the enemy and until we see the innocent victims of this battle before our eyes, there will be no possibility for us to act as we did during the sacred defense.

2 - Second Phase—Recognition: The next phase is recognizing the dimensions of the concept of culture and its fundamental role, recognizing weaknesses and defects, or in other words recognizing society's vulnerability to invasion. That is, the dimensions of the concept of culture and its applications must be completely understood.

Sometimes culture means the growth and elevation of public knowledge and information and advancing the level of public insight, and sometimes it means preserving and developing national literature and customs, preserving and developing cultural heritage, and in another dimension it means bodily and spiritual training. Sometimes culture means familiarizing the people with Islamic knowledge and deepening public belief in Islam and religious foundations, reinforcing piety and abstinence, or in other words building the

material and spiritual personality of the people in the framework of the culture of Islam.

It is also understanding the fundamental role of culture in its specific meaning for the building of Islamic society or revolution and its effect in preserving and stabilizing the revolution, or in other words understanding the effects the spread of religious knowledge and deepening religious belief have on preserving the body of Islam and the principles of the revolution.

Understanding and taking note of this issue may be one of the most sensitive milestones in this discussion, and ignoring it will do irreparable damage to the future of the revolution. We must realize that rebuilding the nation and the country and making the cities prosperous and grow quantitatively are important, but growth and reconstruction of human beings are much more important. We must realize that economic growth and prosperity and public welfare and ease in having housing and suitable nutrition are desirable, but clearly growth in religious education and reinforcing the ideological foundations of the people are more desirable than economic growth.

We must acknowledge that the growth and development of public knowledge is good, and that it is a good idea to develop the government university and the free university, but growth in the spiritual foundation and deterrent power of students will be much more important and fateful. We know that if the university develops and if along with that the culture and knowledge of Islam do not take root among the students, and if deterrent power (commitment and piety) is not reinforced in them, not only will the problems of the revolution not be solved, but that in itself will create a problem.

Along with the growth and development of athletic and physical training centers, we must also create religious coverage and Islamic education. Athletic activity will be useful for us if it has a good ideological foundation. That is, a sound body will be useful when it has a soul with faith and the peace of religion. We must realize that when electrical power goes into a village, in reality a change is made in the traditional life of that village, and along with that comes electrical power and its equipment. In other words, along with that come the resources for welfare, recreation and other things that have to do with electrical power. If along with public utilization of technological resources, the levers that reinforce public ideological foundations are not also created, then the development and growth of rural society will not be complete.

Another important matter is recognizing society's defects and the weaknesses that make it subject to influence from the cultural invasion. This includes the basic preparations for fighting the cultural invasion and dealing with the idea of "vulnerability to invasion." In other words, this is dealing with the question of what background, reasons and factors exist that create vulnerability to the enemy, and with the question of what

society's vulnerable points are. What is clear is that there are indications and signs in our society that show vulnerability to invasion and damage.

Today in our own society, despite the fact that it has been more than 15 years since the revolution, we still see manifestations of superstition, heresy, ostentation, welfare-seeking, an intense inclination towards consumption, superficiality, susceptibility to rumors and other things. It is very important to find the roots of these things and to remove these characteristics. This needs extensive investment and planning.

Another point is recognizing the people who are the targets of the cultural invasion, who our targets are, and what levels and classes of society they come from, what their inclinations and ages are, or in other words, anthropology. Awareness of the various cultures inside the country and understanding mentalities are a basic prerequisite for proper planning.

Another point that must be taken into account in the discussion about fighting the cultural invasion is our strengths, existing areas of background and the capabilities of our society and our society. Perhaps if it were not for the aggregate of resources and characteristics of our nation and system, our Islamic society would not be able to resist the heavy waves of vulgar culture from the West. Yet it is unfortunate that with all these potential and actual abilities and with all these very positive areas of background, we are passive towards the baseless and empty cultural invasion of others. Our resources and abilities are very great and extensive. Our revolution, our nation and our land have very valuable reserves. Our revolution is based on a culture of several thousand years and if we only make the history of Islam our basis, we have a rich, deep and extensive culture that is 15 centuries old that stands on the spirit and the unchanging source of creation.

An orthodoxy that was able to bring with it many values for humanity and to build a model nation and society, this rich culture with its characteristics, is our greatest treasure, not only for building society, the nation and our own generation, but also, with proper use, for building our society of today.

The system includes the nation and a people 98 percent of whom are Muslims following Islam and its luminous commands. The decisive majority believes in and follows the house of purity and chastity. Relying on this divine gift, a strong foundation will be created in our nation with the spread of the valuable culture of Islam and the deepening of Islamic knowledge. In our country we have an extensive propaganda and populist system, the like of which cannot be found elsewhere, and that is the traditional propaganda network, which is managed by clergy, scholars and seminary students and makes use of many resources within the people, and has a very close relationship to the people.

The public's love and interest in Islam and the Koran and the house of God, the existence of centers such as

mosques and religious centers, the existence of times such as the months of Moharram and Ramazan and the existence of the rich and powerful culture of Islam, all are reserves that have played and play the strongest role in preserving and spreading genuine Islamic culture among the people. If these resources are combined with technology and if we use technology in the service of this culture, and if we can establish a close relationship between Islamic culture and its art and the people who believe in Islam and technology, then no power will be able to defeat us!

Our essential problem is that we ourselves have not recognized our abilities and capabilities, we have not properly extracted our reserves and treasures, and we have not been able to create a logical and reasonable relationship between these God-given reserves and public possibilities and the resources of technology. Therefore, if the enemy operates in complicated ways on the weaknesses and defects in society, and if on the other hand the abilities and capabilities in society are so great that they can clearly fight the enemy and we are able to build our nation and our people, the basic requirement is proper understanding of these resources and capabilities and making full use of all existing capacities.

2 - Setting a Strategy: The next phase in the treatment of cultural pains and malfunctions and fighting the enemy's comprehensive invasion is the matter of setting a strategy. Our strategy with regard to culture must be clarified, in the dimension of reinforcing spiritual foundations, promoting values, spreading the culture and defending against the enemy, even if in the form of an attack on the enemy—for it is said that the best defense is a good offense. A strategy must be set in every case, which is to say that the levels of preparedness and investment must be set.

In some countries that claim to be Islamic, to promote what they call Islam, large sums of money, given in statistics, are allocated from the country's budget. Over a period of 15 years one of those countries spent \$5 billion on foreign propaganda to establish mosques, libraries, cultural centers, to print and publish books and publications, and on other propaganda matters. Naturally, with this policy, they automatically spent huge sums as well on domestic religious propaganda, which are not shown in the statistics.

Now our revolution is orthodox and the Islam of Muhammad (peace be upon him) is to be established in its center in the full sense, and its establishment means both the penetration of its luminous thoughts and ideas deep into the soul of each Muslim and that the Islam of Muhammad should be presented to the people of the world, so that those thirsty and deprived of the ideas, beliefs and luminous plans of this religion and pure practice may drink from this limpid spring.

Is our strategy specified for this high goal? Has our investment been set for this purpose? What percent of the budget has been allocated for culture in the general

sense, what percent for culture in the sense of reinforcing religious foundations and publishing Islamic knowledge domestically, and how much has been allocated for publishing the commands of Islam and for spreading Islamic culture throughout the world?

What is our plan of attack to show the world the sacred face of the Islam of Muhammad, and what is the level of our investment? Today when a very good climate has developed in the Muslim and oppressed non-Muslim nations for accepting the truth of Islam, what comprehensive plan do we have for presenting Islam? What comprehensive plan have we made domestically for deepening the public's religious and spiritual insight and knowledge, for building a pure and committed generation, for reinforcing the ideological and spiritual foundation and for the growth of political insight to make people less vulnerable to the cultural invasion?

A study of the cultural section in the First Five-Year Plan and in the Second Five-Year Plan shows that the level of our investment, especially investment in the cultural sector in its specific meaning, meaning for the growth of the culture of the Islam of Mohammad and for deepening spiritual belief and for the growth of the public's political and ideological foundation, shows that it falls far short of the amount that it should be.

It is true that our country is undergoing reconstruction and has economic problems, but assuredly the most fundamental reconstruction task is rebuilding the public's belief, faith and commitment. If the foundations for ideology, political insight and spirituality are made strong, the people will be able to stand firmly in the preservation and protection of the revolution against any problem. If this is not done, they may be vulnerable to the slightest problem.

Can the cultural invasion be fought with the amount of planning that is given in the cultural section of the Second Five-Year Plan? Can the exalted leader's intentions in the cultural dimension be carried out? The truth is that what is important about the cultural invasion and the dangers and consequences that exist in the fullest sense have been explained by the exalted leader.

His excellency, as the nation's leader and the protector of the body of Islam and the sacred government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has spoken and given the clearest message exposing the plots of the enemies of Islam to clarify thought in society and to delineate the direction of action for society's managers towards strengthening the public's cultural foundation and fighting this invasion, which he calls the "cultural night attack."

He left no room for ambiguity or doubt, and it is these executive officials, managers in society and respected Majles deputies who must take inspiration from the exalted leader's guidance to prepare a suitable and comprehensive plan that is more encompassing and comprehensive than what they have done, and after it is

approved and enacted they must implement it with strong support and serious persistence.

An important point is the need to do a review of the cultural programs in the Second Five-Year Plan. Unfortunately, a small percentage of the programs have been allocated to culture, and consequently a small percentage of the budget has been allocated to the cultural sector in the specific sense. Of course if we consider the total budget for the Ministry of Education and Training, the Ministry of Sciences [as published] and some other missions such as cultural heritage and the like to be cultural programs, the percentage of the cultural budget is significant, but as has been said, the cultural program in the general sense increases knowledge, science and specialization.

Other programs also create employment and fill free time and are to some extent a deterrent, but the thing needed even by culture in the general sense is the growth and development of Islamic knowledge and the deepening of religious belief and spirituality among the people and building a generation based on the sacred principles and commands of Islam. Increasing knowledge and employment without deepening commitment and piety will not enable us to resist a comprehensive invasion.

What is worthy of attention more than anything else now, after the completion of the previous phases, is the fact that those involved in planning on cultural matters, especially the respected Majles deputies, who now have the sensitive responsibility for the Second Five-Year Development Plan, need to think about what planning will now bring about growth and greater strength in the public's spiritual and ideological foundation in terms of religious fundamentals, and what methods will increase the public's beliefs and faith with respect to the principles and fundamentals of Islam and the revolution and will increase their adherence to the commands of Islam.

Another question is which organization or organizations have the talent, the competence, and the ability to plan for this important matter, when today one of the most basic issues is meeting the needs of the entire country at all levels and designing appropriate programs for all needs. Another issue is determining which organization or organizations are responsible for implementing which plans and responsibilities. We now have extensive executive organizations and networks in the country, and all of them need to present appropriate plans to meet the needs of the society they serve.

There is now an extensive clerical network that uses the vast traditional resources here and there in the country, and this network needs organization and planning. Our country has the vast Voice and Vision network with its extensive reach. With proper planning it can play a fateful role in reaching the aforementioned goals.

In our country there are tens of thousands of basijis who can be used in implementing propaganda programs.

Today in our country there are tens of thousands of Islamic councils and societies, and with proper and constructive planning they can fill some of the existing gaps. There are other bodies and forms of executive leverage that can achieve very good results if used properly and if given appropriate planning.

Today the Islamic Propaganda Organization, in view of its structure, its relationship with the exalted vice regent, the fact that it has the best committed and expert manpower in the affairs of religion and religious planning, its direct relationship with religious and denominational centers, and its close relationship with clergy and seminary students, has great capabilities to achieve the above goals. That is, it can be effective in the collection of statistics and information, in understanding malfunctions and threats. It can also play a role as a supreme cultural council to do comprehensive planning for all executive organizations, and it can also carry out sensitive missions in important areas.

It is important to take note of these capabilities and to allocate resources and an appropriate budget to achieve this. Unfortunately, in the First and Second Five-Year Plans, suitable attention has not been paid to this issue. Now, in view of the fact that the Second Five-Year Development Plan is being studied by the respected Majles deputies, it is appropriate that special consideration be given to the duties of the Islamic Propaganda Organization in the Second Five-Year Plan, and that programs and a suitable budget be provided for it.

PAKISTAN

Improved Relations With India Called Hopeless

94AS0445A Karachi JANG in Urdu 3 Aug 94 p 3

[Editorial: "It Does Not Appear That This Hope Will Be Realized"]

[Text] Foreign minister Sardar Asif Ahmad Afi expressed the hope that tensions between Pakistan and India would be reduced through diplomatic courtesy. He called his meeting with the Indian minister of state for foreign affairs constructive and said that it was agreed that a pleasant atmosphere would be created for conducting talks on all issues including Kashmir. Taking into account the degree of tension which exists between Pakistan and India, it does not appear that the foreign minister's hope that India will demonstrate its goodwill has any possibility of being realized. It is true that on several occasions in the past, India professed its readiness to negotiate on Kashmir under the terms of the Simla agreement but it is no secret that India's real objective was always to stop Pakistan from raising the Kashmir issue in any international forum. Once this danger passed, India refused to participate in any bilateral talks and immediately declared Kashmir to be an inseparable part of India. Obviously, in view of such irresponsible and provocative Indian behaviour, it would be self-delusion to hope that the establishment of

any committee would change the tension between the two countries into good feelings. One can hope that such a transformation will take place but there is very little chance this will actually happen.

Indian Consulate Said Active in Subversive Activities

94AS0445B Karachi JANG in Urdu 3 Aug 94 p 3

[Editorial: "The Indian Consulate's Dangerous Activities."]

[Text] According to a press report, after learning of the activities of the Indian consulate in Karachi, the government is studying the possibility of closing down the consulate. Public circles have for a long time been expressing concern over the fact that the Indian consulate in Karachi has violated diplomatic rules and accepted international regulations in becoming a center for terrorism and subversion. Unfortunately, the government has so far failed to take any steps even though the unpleasant conditions and hardship which India created for Pakistani diplomatic officials in Bombay provided sufficient justification for the Pakistan government to take action against the Indian consulate in Karachi. Our secret agencies have now confirmed that the Indian consulate directly patronizes subversive elements and the enemies of Pakistan. Young persons are recruited and trained in India and terrorists are given the task of attacking meetings and processions, exploding bombs and damaging government property. In view of such unequivocal reports, there is no further justification for the government to delay its decision regarding the Indian consulate.

If the delay is caused by the fear of further exacerbating the tension between Pakistan and India, then this lesson should be taken to heart, namely, that no matter how much goodwill Pakistan demonstrates, nothing good should be expected to come from India's direction. At any rate, no country can afford to demonstrate goodwill toward another country at the cost of its own internal security and order. The government should soon take measures in this matter.

Amnesty International Report Criticized

[Editorial: "Amnesty International's Charges"]

[Text] In its latest report, Amnesty International, the international organization for human rights, has accused Pakistan of deliberately misusing its law concerning insult to religion against Christians and adherents of other religions.

Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International profess lofty aims and objectives but unfortunately they use double standards and in general work in the interests of those countries which supply them with funds to continue their work.

When human rights are trampled under foot in occupied Kashmir; when the blood of Bosnian Muslims is shed; when American war planes kill innumerable women and children with their missiles in Iraq, Western human rights organizations turn a blind eye. But if anyone injures even a finger in a Muslim country, these organizations raise a hue and cry. Now Western countries and their protege organizations are, on the one hand, fanning the fears of an imaginary rise of fundamentalism in Muslim countries and giving vent to their traditional prejudice, and on the other hand, these countries are shedding tears over the violation of human rights in those [Muslim] countries.

Bhutto Criticism of Religious Leaders Attacked

94AS0445E Islamabad HURMAT in Urdu 28 Jul 94
p 5

[Editorial: "The Lady Should Not Shoot Herself in the Foot; the Prime Minister's Dislike of the Ulema"]

[Text] Prime minister Benazir Bhutto said regretfully that nowadays the ulema [religious scholars; literally men of learning] regarded Islam as their personal property and advised the ulema to abandon politics. She would limit the role of the ulema in society (as she understands it) and said that during the Friday prayers, the ulema should pray for good harvests, prosperity and Pakistan's honor and good name.

The prime minister's advice to the ulema to abandon politics has been heard before. The relationship to religious figures of the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the founder of her party, was strictly for show only and he maintained contact with the ulema only to the extent that he could "use" them. After his death, his party as a whole has not maintained even the remotest relationship with religion; in fact, the dislike of the party for Islam and the ulema is gradually being revealed. The situation now has reached the point where the prime minister does not hesitate to exhort the ulema from the podium to isolate themselves from the affairs of the country and limit their activity to prayers and amulets. Before the prime minister offered her valuable advice to the ulema, the same party's federal minister of law, Iqbal Haidar, made a contentious statement about the honor of the prophet which caused a price to be placed on his head. The government has had to take stringent measures to guard him.

In our view, the ulema's strong reaction throughout the country to the prime minister's statement was both natural and justified. However, we would like to suggest to the ulema that the reason why the prime minister separates religion and politics into separate compartments may be that she is ignorant of the nature of Islam and the role played by the ulema in an Islamic society. However, we think that the real reason for her speech was to please the ulema-hating world lobby which is scared of the so-called fundamentalist ulema in Pakistan and some other Islamic countries. Unfortunately, power

loving circles in Pakistan today are under the impression that governments are made in the United States and are also overthrown there; hence, these circles pay no attention to public opinion in Pakistan and are forever striving to gain America's approval. These elements believe as devoutly in the "omnipotence" of the U.S. as an ordinary Muslim believes and accepts from the depths of his heart that the fate of humans (and nations as well) is decided in the heavens and only Allah is the creator and owner of the universe.

The fact is that our ulema not only played an important part in the Pakistan movement but it is because of them that today the call to harken to virtue [part of the call to prayers] is heard in Pakistan (which was established in the name of Islam). We are certain that if the ulema and the sheikhs [religious leaders] had not remained an effective force in Pakistan, our authorities who were educated in irreligious universities such as Oxford and Cambridge and their enamoured-of-the-West wives would have driven Islam out of Pakistan and today the disco culture would be predominant in the country. Thanks be to Allah that although there is a world wide dislike of the ulema and, in Pakistan, those who regard the United States as their God have spread their roots, it has not been possible to mislead the people of Pakistan, whatever their faults and mistakes, and to turn them away from Islam. Even today, an ordinary Pakistani would gladly sacrifice his life for the sake of Allah and His prophet of the last age [Mohammad is believed to be the last of the line of prophets].

Therefore, we say to Benazir Bhutto to stop insulting the ulema for the sake of gaining American approval; if she, her party and her government continue their abominable efforts to offend the proud citizens of Pakistan, we feel that her already decreasing popularity and prestige among the people will suffer even further. No one knows better than the prime minister that when a leader loses popularity in his own country and the U.S. begins to regard him as a liability, it discards the leader as one throws a banana peel into the garbage can. We therefore advise the prime minister that it is in her own best interests not to shoot herself in the foot.

Clarification of Foreign Policy Goals Urged

94AS0445D Karachi JANG (Supplement) in Urdu
3 Aug 94 p 11

[Article by Mohammad Aslam Kalhori: "To Pursue a Successful Foreign Policy, Opportunism Will Have To Be Abandoned"]

[Text] A country's existence and safety depends not on its domestic political conditions but on its foreign policy. The less stable the domestic situation, the greater the need for stability and strength in foreign policy. Ever since its inception, Pakistan has had to face difficulties in its foreign affairs. Relations with India and the United States have always been touch and go; in 1965 and 1971, India demonstrated its aggressive aims and it was as a

result of these Indian objectives that East and West Pakistan were separated. In regard to Kashmir as well, India is openly demonstrating its usual aggressiveness. Pakistan's failure to obtain even a single vote on the Kashmir issue on March 9 has forced the country to ponder over its painful defeat in diplomacy.

The difficult conditions which Pakistan is facing makes it imperative that the government and the opposition agree over important national issues. Foreign countries have always taken advantage of the lack of unanimity over essential national issues; such unanimity is needed to preserve national dignity and interests. Our politicians are as opportunistic in basic national matters as they are in ordinary political issues and their behaviour causes the whole country to suffer.

It was expected that the new government would achieve success in foreign affairs but this hope has not been realized. In spite of every possible effort, the differences of view and ideology between Pakistan and the United States in the past years over Pakistan's nuclear program have not changed. Pakistan has always remained in the forefront of U.S. allies and its relations with the U.S. have always been friendly but past history proves that the U.S. has never come to the aid of Pakistan in difficult times. Just as over the past 4 years the Pressler amendment has created hardship for Pakistan. In 1965 also, following the war between Pakistan and India, the U.S. stopped aid to Pakistan thus punishing Pakistan alone because only Pakistan bought its weapons from the U.S., whereas India was obtaining its war supplies from the Soviet Union which it continued to receive. To fulfill its defense needs, Pakistan paid 658 million dollars in cash to the United States and it is America's responsibility to live up to its agreement and supply 38 F-16 planes to Pakistan on the stipulated date. But the Pressler amendment passed by the Congress prevents the administration from sending these F-16 planes. This is the reason why for the past 4 years it has not been possible to end the deadlock between the two countries. It is a matter of satisfaction that president Farouq Ahmad Leghari holds the view regarding Pakistan's defense that if Pakistan is unable to obtain F-16 planes, it should explore the possibility of obtaining planes equipped with modern technology which it is now doing. Not only should Pakistan seek alternative sources for weapons but, in view of U.S. behaviour over the last 30 years, reorganize Pakistan's foreign policy.

Pakistan's foreign minister, Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, recently toured Russia and during his visit, he received signals to the effect that Russia was reviewing its policies. We should make a serious effort to improve our relations with Russia because it may emerge as a strong power in the future and become a successor to the Soviet Union. Pakistan's efforts to establish better relations with Russia may help the former in its quest for modern weapons. It should be made clear to the U.S. that if the U.S. cares nothing for Pakistan's interests, then, in fulfilling its defense needs, Pakistan should not feel obliged to wait for U.S. approval.

It has been observed over the past few months that in regard to foreign affairs, Pakistan's delegations have generally failed to obtain the desired success. Foreign affairs are of vital importance and in selecting the members of delegations visiting foreign countries, the qualifications of the delegates rather than political affiliations should be used as the criterion. To select delegates who are not well versed in English and cannot speak convincingly, merely on the basis of political affiliations in fact harms the interests of the country. A serious review of foreign affairs is badly needed. It is necessary when dealing with foreign affairs to take into account qualification and expertise and, rising above political debt-paying, to employ experts. In order to succeed in foreign policy, national interests should be placed above opportunism. Success in the international arena requires a display of domestic unity in politics.

Azad Kashmir Council's Effectiveness Questioned

94AS0445F Karachi AKHBAR-E-JEHAN in Urdu
17 Jul 94 p 12

[Article by Khawja Abdul Rashid: "Has Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Lost Its Effectiveness?"]

[Text] The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council is the highest democratic and constitutional institution in the state. Six of its members are elected Kashmiris and six non-voting members are nominated from among the delegates of the Pakistan National Assembly. The constitution at the present time gives the chairmanship of the council to the prime minister of Pakistan and the vice-chairmanship to the 'president' of Azad Kashmir. The premier of Azad Kashmir and federal minister for Kashmir affairs are also the official members of the council. When the provisional constitution of Azad Kashmir was enacted in 1974, the council was created in order to establish a constitutional link on the highest level between the governments of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Another factor behind the creation of the council was the demand of Azad Kashmir's political leaders to abolish the ministry for Kashmir affairs. At the time it was decided that the council would replace the ministry. However, while the council was created, the ministry for Kashmir affairs could not be abolished so that one more powerful institution was added [to oversee] Azad Kashmir. At present, four institutions govern the people of Azad Kashmir; first, the government of Azad Kashmir; secondly, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir council; thirdly, the ministry for Kashmir affairs and fourthly, the government of Pakistan. While in the past, it was the ministry for Kashmir affairs whose abolition was being asked for, today it is the council whose abrogation is being demanded. The council receives 940 million rupees from Azad Kashmir and certain institutions in the form of income tax annually; eighty percent of the amount is returned to the Azad Kashmir government as grants in aid and the remaining 20 percent is spent outside Azad Kashmir. The council meets once or twice annually to officially approve the

annual budget. Since its inception, the council has met only twice in Azad Kashmir; all other meetings have been held in Islamabad. This year as well, the budget meeting of the council was held in Islamabad and was presided over by council chairperson Benazir Bhutto. The meeting was short. It drew strong criticism from certain members of the council and from 'Prime Minister' Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan.

Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan was greatly agitated and said that he had received intolerable treatment in the council meeting. Three members of the PML, Chaudhry Mohammad Hussain, Chaudhry Mohammad Yaqub and Chaudhry Tariq Farouq said in a press conference held after the meeting that the benefits and aims of the Azad Jammu Kashmir Council were no longer being achieved because it had fallen under the control of bureaucracy; that the council was trying to bypass the Kashmir leaders and that elected members had established a parallel government in Azad Kashmir. In view of the situation, they appealed to the president of Azad Kashmir, the prime minister, all the Kashmiri leaders and the legislative assembly to summon a joint meeting of the council and assembly under article 21 of the constitution to abolish the council and replace it under a new system. They said that in the budget meeting, the agenda and regulations were ignored and president Sardar Sikander Hayat Khan, 'Prime Minister' Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan and six elected members were not allowed to express their views on the budget and the resolution proposed on the Kashmir issue. One can easily imagine what the repercussions would have been if the president and prime minister of Azad Kashmir had walked out of the meeting. But these individuals acted with restraint and patience. At any rate, if an effort is made to make the minority dominant over the majority and if the PML's majority members are ignored and advisors are nominated from the minority members and an effort is made to create instability in Azad Kashmir, the council will not be able to function. Four members belong to the Pakistan Muslim League [PML] while one member belongs to the Pakistan People's Party [PPP] and one to the Liberation League. The PPP member in the council expressed the view that PML members should not make statements which would endanger the special status of Azad Kashmir; that before the council's budget meeting was held, the prime minister of Pakistan had set aside time to meet with the council members and during this meeting, topics concerning the appointment of advisors; making the council active; the budget and the situation in Kashmir were discussed; that this special meeting was held so as not to delay budget approval; thus there was no justification left for making long speeches in the council. The present Azad Kashmir authorities have never seriously taken up the Kashmir issue in the council meetings. The council bureaucracy is a separate issue; both the government and the opposition complain of bureaucracy. It is regrettable that bureaucracy is being made an excuse for contention and for demanding the abolition of the council.

In the council's budget meeting, 930 million 944 thousand rupees were approved as next year's budget out of which amount 70 million rupees were set aside as grants to the government of Azad Kashmir. One hundred and thirty million 640 thousand rupees were allocated to development expenses and one hundred million 290 thousand rupees for nondevelopment expenses. The existence of the Kashmir council has been a subject of argument among Azad Kashmir's political leaders and ruling party. In 1990, when Nawaz Sharif was in office, the council's meeting was held for the first time in Rawalakot in Azad Kashmir. In addition to budget approval, various important issues were discussed in this meeting and a committee was formed which was entrusted with the task of activating the council and improving its usefulness; the committee was also to study whether the council should continue and submit its recommendations. This committee lasted for quite a long time until the Nawaz Sharif administration ended; the government of the PML in Azad Kashmir also came to an end and its place was taken by the PPP administration which also fell from office after nine months and the PML again held the reins of power. During this period, the council met in Muzaffarabad under the chairmanship of provisional prime minister Moeen Qureishi and the council's existence was again discussed. All this time, president of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Sikander Hayat Khan, has remained the vice chairman of the council and has been trying to activate the council and save it from interference by the bureaucracy of the ministry of Kashmir affairs.

In his speeches and press interviews he [Sikandar Hayat] dealt in particular with the reform of the council. Meanwhile, the five elected members of the council submitted a draft law for approval in which it was proposed that the number of council members be increased from 6 to 19 and the council's name be changed to Jammu and Kashmir senate. However, the draft law could not be presented in the council meeting. Recently, it was decided that the vice chairman should be given certain powers and a permanent office should be established for him in Islamabad; in addition, the vice chairman was to be given a discretionary sum of 10 million rupees to be used for development projects. Nevertheless, the issue of the council's usefulness still remains. The question being asked in political circles is this: what service has the council rendered Azad Kashmir in the last 20 years and what has it accomplished to further the freedom movement in Kashmir; how far has the objective for which the council was created, namely, high level contact between the two governments and the solution of mutual problems, been achieved. However, the issue of the Mangla Dam royalties still remains unsolved. The decision to transfer the administration of Jammu and Kashmir state's immovable property to the Azad Kashmir government has not yet been carried out. These properties, worth billions of rupees, are under the jurisdiction of the officials of the ministry of Kashmir affairs. Strangely

enough, no one knows how much income these properties bring and where the money is spent; so far no audits have been carried out. Neither the Pakistan government's treasury nor that of Azad Kashmir receives this income and the income is not listed in the accounts of the ministry for Kashmir affairs. Nobody feels the need to ask any questions about this huge fiasco; even Azad Kashmir politicians talk about the subject only when the occasion arises.

Certain members of the council had demanded that if there was any hesitation over handing over the state properties to the Azad Kashmir government, the

council should be given control over them so that even if indirectly and the income could be used to benefit the people of Azad Kashmir. But this suggestion also came to nothing. Now that the issue of the council's existence is being raised once again, all the other matters are also expected to come to the forefront. Sardar Abdul Qayum has said that if the issues are not settled, a constitutional amendment would have to be made to reformulate the status of Azad Kashmir. The harshness of his tone suggests that all these matters will become confrontational issues in the days to come.

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